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Abstract 
Public Private Partnerships in infrastructure procurement: 
A Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model for minimising pre-contract time 
and cost overruns (GmAHM) 
The pre-contract phase of the Public Private Partnerships (PPP) procurement process 
in the UK has suffered the problem of bidding cost and time overruns since its 
introduction in the early 1990s. The main contribution of this piece of research is a 
greater understanding of the competency gaps within the public and private sector 
organisations that contribute to these procurement problems. 
A Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model is developed that identifies those 
characteristic attributes of the project environment that significantly influence the 
ability to negotiate PPP contracts in a timely and cost effective manner. The 
differences in perception between public and private sector parties on the relative 
importance of the attributes that contribute to successful negotiation are investigated. 
The study adopted the quantitative research methodology, using descriptive statistics 
to investigate the extent of bidding time and cost overruns. Inferential statistics are 
used to develop, test and validate the generic model and investigate the perceptual 
differences between the public and private sectors on the respective negotiation 
success attributes. The sample was drawn from the health, schools and civil 
engineering sectors within the UK. 
The research yielded three important outcomes. Firstly, the pre-contract time and 
bidding cost are generally high for PPP projects with the health and education sector 
projects experiencing exceptionally high overruns. Secondly, the study identified the 
public sector client's organisational and technical attributes as the most significant 
ones that influence the efficiency of the pre-contract procurement process, followed 
by those of the Consortium, the Project, and the External Environment. Thirdly, 
though there is general agreement within the public and private sectors on the 
hierarchical order of significance of the main attributes, differences in opinion 
occurred on such sub-attributes as the public sector client sensitizing public opinion 
on projects, the consortium's openness during negotiations and their early 
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Chapter I Introduction 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Rationale and Need for the Research 
The ever increasing demand on public infrastructure, the lack of requisite public funds 
to invest due in some instances to the apparent resolve of the electorate not to vote for 
governments that are explicit on introducing higher taxation, and the recognition that 
the private sector has the financial, managerial and technical potentials, coupled with 
the realisation that the state still needs to retain some substantial role in the provision 
of these services, set the stage for a new strategic rethink in public procurement - the 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). 
The basic principle behind this strategic rethink is that state departments are to *be 
transformed from being owners and operators of state assets into the purchasers of 
services from the private sector. The private sector becomes long-term providers of 
services which they deliver by taking the responsibility for the design, construction, 
financing and the operation of the assets. The Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have 
therefore become a rapidly growing means of procuring infrastructure assets and their 
associated services, signalling a fundamental shift in the relationships between the 
state and industry. The UK for instance established its version of this strategic rethink 
through the launching of the Private Finance in 1992. 
Despites the global appeal of the PPP strategy and the other variants such as the Build 
Operate and Transfer (BOT), delays and spiralling bidding costs during the pre- 
contract stages with some advisory cost overruns of up to 600% have frequently been 
cited as major impediments in the implementation of this philosophy. This has 
resulted in the expression of dissatisfaction by the private sector participants in 
particular and in some cases the general public (The Herald, 2002; Ward, 2002; NAO, 
1999; Owen and Merna, 1999). Akintoye et al, (2003), during their groundbreaking 
research into the management of risks within privately financed projects in the UK, 
indicated that the rather long and lingering negotiation periods was frequently cited by 
industry practitioners as one of the main impediments to the early and efficient 
realisation of projects and therefore a major contributor to the rather high cost of the 
PPP bidding process. 
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In spite of the enormous amount of debate within the media and in other forums about 
the rather expensive and time consuming nature of the PPP/PFI procurement process 
towards reaching agreement, there has not been an all-embracing research 
encompassing the entire spectrum of attributes that impact on the successful 
implementation of the process during the pre-contract stages. A fair amount of 
research has however been carried out on other areas of the PPP procurement. 
Akintoye et al., (2001), and Bing Li et al., (2002) for example examined risk 
assessment and management within projects procured through the strategy; the 
Construction Industry Council (2000), also commissioned research into the role of 
cost saving and innovation in projects procured through the strategy; and Pollock et 
al., (2002), reviewed the value for money issues in PFI/PPP projects within the health 
sector. 
The introduction of this new and innovative way of procuring infrastructure services 
means a change in the way the industry's services are rendered and/or purchased by 
the respective stakeholders. This requires either partial, and in some circumstances, 
the complete restructuring of the relationships between the stakeholders. Change 
introduces risk and uncertainties. It is therefore not surprising that delays, frustrations 
and the pre-contract cost overruns have been reported in the implementation of the 
PPP strategy (Tam, 1999). Mott Macdonald (2002) in their document - Review of 
Large Public Procurement in the UK - came up with the finding that due to the rather 
prolonged nature of the pre-contract stages of the PPP/PFI procurement process, 
overall project completion times are longer when compared to other modes of 
procurement strategies such as the traditional form. This, however, should not remain 
an endemic feature of the system. Hence the main objective of this study is investigate 
and develop a model that clearly identifies the key attributes that make the pre- 
contract processes work more efficiently and effectively. 
Over the past three decades, infrastructure procurement has primarily been based on 
the traditional form of procurement where the client clearly defines what is to be 
executed by the contractor. The result of this prescriptive mode of procurement is that 
bidders are literally bidding from a common platform and so the successful bidder is 
chosen principally on the basis of the lowest priced bid as pre-qualification would 
have determined the technical capabilities of the contractors in advance. This 
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traditional form of procuring the services of contractors could be likened to what is 
referred to in the marketing literature as routinized-exhange where the terms are 
established by administered programmes of pricing and distribution (Kotler, 1997). 
Hence it would be fair to conclude that the relevant skills for pre-contract negotiations 
have for some decades now been lacking both within the private sector and public 
sector. 
The concept of the PPP procurement strategy has of necessity introduced the element 
of negotiation as bidders are being called upon to submit innovative design proposals 
that meet the output specifications of the clients. Ahadzi and Bowles (2001a) 
identified the contract negotiation as the critical stage during which delays are most 
prominent during the procurement of PPP projects. There is therefore an urgent need 
to educate and inform practitioners and the public sector alike on those salient factors 
and/or attributes that make for the effective negotiation of the complex contracts 
envisaged under the PPP delivery mode. 
Contract negotiations become necessary when many factors bear not only on price, 
but also on quality and service. Additionally, when business risks cannot be 
predetermined accurately, and where a long period of time is required to produce the 
item or service, including production being interrupted frequently because of frequent 
change orders, negotiations become a necessity Kotler (1997). The aforementioned 
elements feature very prominently in any PPP project procurement due to the fact that 
the projects are generally not only complex in nature but can sometimes spread over 
different locations, particularly school projects. 
The current research therefore aims at developing a Generic Multi-Attribute 
Hierarchical Model, the essence of which is to add to the understanding of the 
importance of proactively managing the PPP contracts negotiation process in a more 
efficient manner in order to minimize and if possible eliminate the undue delays and 
the huge bidding cost overruns during the pre-contract stages. It should also help 
others in the business of contract negotiations to recognize the need for a broader 
perspective in their approach to the negotiation process so as to eliminate the reported 
80% of negotiating time being spent on arguing (Kennedy et al, 1987 pg 5 1). 
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The study is based on the UK, a country in the forefront of not only adopting the 
strategy but also vigorously refining and promoting it internationally (D&P Report, 
2001; Stone, 2001). The focus of this research is on the risks of pre-contract time and 
bidding cost overruns due mainly to the protracted negotiations. With the initial 
outlay in both human and capital investment during the bidding period already 
generally high for both the private sector consortium and the public sector client, any 
delays in the process will not only exacerbate the situation but will mean missing 
opportunities for the needed investment in the development and renewal of public 
infrastructure, and economic and social advancement. 
Time plays a crucial role in any contract negotiations; i. e. time as a function of 
economic consequence in terms of cost. Time is therefore a critical function of the 
bargaining process itself. The weighting to be given to time factor relative to the 
achievement of the outcome of a negotiation will reflect not only the cost involved 
and the discounting loss but also the need to secure the business quickly in relation to 
forward orders and work in hand in the case of the contractor. In respect of the client 
organisation this may represent the benefits lost as a result of the delays in bringing 
the project forward for the services to be delivered. These costs for the public sector 
client would not only represent an embarrassment but also a strain on existing 
facilities for example school projects. 
1.2 The Research Objectives and Propositions 
The research therefore has three objectives. 
To investigate the extent of pre-contract cost and time overruns when 
using the PPP philosophy in procuring infrastructure projects. Delays and 
spiralling bidding costs during the pre- contract stages have frequently 
been cited as a problem in the implementation of this philosophy, resulting 
in particular, the expression of dissatisfaction by the private sector 
participants. The pre-contract process in this context can be defined as the 
period between pre-qualification and placing of the contract with the 
successful bidder. 
To identify those characteristic attributes of the Private Sector Consortia, 
Public Sector Client Organisations, the Project, and the External 
Environment, that significantly contribute to the successful negotiation of 
PPP/PFI contracts in a timely and cost effective manner; and then develop 
a Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model capturing these respective 
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attributes, the main components of which are illustrated in Figure 1.2 
below. 
iii) To explore the differences in perception between public and private sectors 
on the relative importance of the attributes in contributing to the 
negotiation success. Highlighting such perceptual differences will lead to a 
greater understanding of the importance that each party places on various 
elements of the negotiation. This should them to identify and work on 
potentially tricky and contentious areas from the outset and to better 
understand each others concerns and values. 
Consortium Attributes 
Organizational Nature and Strength 
Q-Iitý ofl'-hni-d 11-1 ... ýUl 
Quahtý of Fin. -inl 




N. mre al NEGO' '! ATI(. )N 
OUTCOMF 
Uina-ial 
E. xterilal E. iiviromnent Attlibutes 
Figure 1.1 PPP & Contract Negotiations: Outline of the Generic Model 
NcWotiation outcoine in this research refers to time and cost efficiency during the pre- 
contract stages of the PPP procurement, where efficiency relates to the ability of the 
parties to nunirnise and/or eliminate unnecessary time and cost overruns and yet strive 
to conclude the deals in a satisfactory manner in terms of obtaining value for money. 
The propositions for this study are therefore: 
1) Tile twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns are real in the PPP 
lilt , rastructure procurement and therefore remain a serious issue to be addressed 
if the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among all stakeholders. 
2) A generic model can be developed to capture in a hierarchical order of 
significance the key attributes that positively influence the efficient and 
effective implementation of the negotiations phase of the PPP procurement 
process in terms of i-ninimising times and cost overruns to the parties. 
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3) Though there is a broad agreement between the key stakeholders (the public 
and private sectors), on the relative significance of the main attributes of the 
Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the Project, and the External 
Environment on the outcome of the PPP contract negotiations, differences do 
exist amongst these key stakeholders on the underlying dimensions to these 
main influence centres as to their effect on the outcome of the PPP contract 
negotiations. 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
According to Thurbin (1998), there are three sources that can be tapped into in order 
to create new knowledge. These are: 
a Repackaging the existing knowledge we already have and using it in novel 
ways; 
Seeking new knowledge from outside our experience to date; and 
Engaging in dialogue and conversation with experts and colleagues that 
challenge our perceptions and mental models that lead to new thinking. 
The research methodology outlined in Chapters 4 and 5 therefore seeks to apply these 
approaches in order to contribute to knowledge. 
The contribution to knowledge through this piece of research is therefore expected to 
be seen as: 
Highlighting the extent to which the twin problems of pre-contact time and cost 
overruns are real in the PPP/PFI procurement. 
Raising awareness among all the stakeholders within the PPP/PFI industry, of the 
importance of proactively identifying and managing the key attributes which 
impact on the PPP negotiation process as a means of achieving sound project 
outcomes. 
Contributing to conceptual thinking in the area of contract negotiations relevant to 
pre-contract stages of the PPP/PFl procurement process. 
1.4 Motivation for the Research 
The motivation for this research arose out of: 
The ever increasing concern about the unduly long time to progress PPP/PFI 
projects through the signing of the contract and the resultant costs to the parties; 
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The growing interest being shown in adopting the PPP approach to infrastructure 
procurement and the need to develop models that can be effectively be used to 
manage the process smoothly; 
Reported cases of failures and difficulties encountered in a number of developing 
countries in their attempt to procure infrastructure projects through the PPP 
procurement route. It is hoped that the knowledge generated from the UK 
experience could conveniently form the basis for other nations to frog leap their 
process rather than attempting to re-invent the wheels and end up making same 
initial mistakes. 
1.5 The Research Approach 
Figure 1.2 provides an outline of the methodology adopted for this research. 
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The methodology adopted in investigating the research problem and in meeting the 
objectives of the research has primarily been that of the Quantitative or the 
Hypothetico-Deductive approach. The first objective of the research was realised 
through a structured questionnaire survey of project stakeholders to collect data on 
planned versus actual pre-contract durations and bidding costs for a range of projects 
and across three major sectors throughout the UK. The analysed data thus included 
major health, education and major civil projects ranging in capital values from; Cl2m 
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to E1300m. The UK is currently in the forefront of not only embracing the strategy 
but also vigorously refining and promoting it internationally since it first launched the 
concept through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992 (D&P Report, 2001; 
Stone, 2001). The analysis of the data for this objective was done using descriptive 
statistics. 
The other two objectives were realised through the extensive review of literature 
relating to negotiation and bargaining theory to identify the influencing factors on 
successful contract negotiations, supplemented with preliminary interviews and 
information obtained during workshops and public forums on a major PPP/PFI 
schools project in the UK, and during a major international conference on the PPP/PFI 
as an emerging global procurement strategy held in London in June 2001. Multi- 
criteria analysis was used to evaluate the results of the structured questionnaire survey 
data and to develop the model for a range of attributes relating to the Consortium, the 
Public Sector Client, the Project, and the External Environment that significantly 
influence the success of the negotiation process. 
Multi-Criteria Decision Theory is based on the principle that among all achievable 
scores for any ith attribute, there is at least one extreme or ideal value that is preferred 
to all others. This, according to Zeleny (1982 pp 153-198), may be called the 'anchor 
value' and denoted as x*!. There is thus the axiom that: Alternatives that are closer to 
the ideal are preferred to those that are further away. To be as close aspossible to 
the perceived ideal is the rational to human choice. The approach is to have the 
decision maker range the attributes in order of their significance e. g. low significance 
=1, average significance =2, etc. This methodology has been used extensively in 
project management and construction related research (Mangitung and Emsley, 2002; 
Cheung et al., 2000; Wong et al., (2002); Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka 1998; 
Okpala and Aniekwu, 1988). 
The theoretical framework for the research has thus been drawn primarily from the 
existing knowledge in negotiation theory and the evolving contributions to the 
literature on contract procurement. The model was tested and validated using 
Speannan's Rank Correlation Coefficient and Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance. 
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Feedback obtained from the respondents on the model through postal validation and 
e-mails also added strength to its validity. 
The list of respondents for the questionnaire survey was drawn from a database 
compiled by Centaur (publishers of the PFI Report) in collaboration with HM 
Treasury (Centaur, 2002). This database contains a comprehensive listing of the 
names of top ranking construction and consultancy firms, financial institutions, public 
sector clients and individuals involved in project procurement using the PPP/Private 
Finance strategy including the list of PPP/PFI projects they were involved in. In all 
300 questionnaires were sent out to individuals selected primarily on the basis of their 
having been involved in concluded deals either as project managers, legal, technical 
or financial advisers, out of which 62 were returned representing a response rate of 
21%. Out of the 62 returned responses, 49 were found adequately completed for the 
analyses. As a check for non-response bias, the response rate for this study was 
compared with the level of responses obtained for other UK wide research in the area 
of the PPP/PFI. Bing Li et aL, (2002) reported 12% rate (61 out of 500) for their 
research on Risk Management in PPP and 9.9% (68 of 700) for the Institute for Public 
Policy Research's (IPPR) call of evidence for consultations on the PPP. Again 
because the questionnaire was designed to collect project specific data, further 
comparison was made with signed PPP/PFI projects nationwide. The representation 
was found to be 20% of the signed projects. 
1.6 Definition of Terms 
The following briefly describe the key terms that relate to the concepts covered under 
this study. 
1.6.1 Public - Private Partnerships 
Although the term Public Private Partnership may be interpreted in different contexts 
from country to country, it is essentially a form of collaboration between the public 
and private sectors. A classical definition is therefore provided by the Canadian 
Council for Public-Private Partnerships as: "A cooperative venture between the public 
and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and 
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rewards" (CCPP, 2001 pp v). The basic principle is that state departments are 
transformed from being owners and operators of assets into the purchasers of services 
from the private sector, with private sector becoming long-term providers of services 
which they deliver by taking the responsibility for the design, construction, financing 
and the operation of the assets. 
1.6.2 Stages of the PPP project procurement 
The entire PPP procurement process may be broken into four main stages; i. e. the 
Planning and Feasibility phase, the Bidding and Negotiation phase, the Construction 
phase, the Operation phase and possibly the Transfer and/or Renegotiation phase. For 
convenience of contract administration, the UK Treasury Taskforce on the PH 
redefined the stages in three broad categories (TTF, 1997): 
The procurement stage, during which the public sector client organisation 
established its contract management ground rule for the life of the contract. 
This covers all activities up to the award of the contract. 
The development stage, which covers the period from award of contract to 
the start of payments on commencement of the delivery of the services 
required by the output specifications. 
The delivery stage covering the provision and use of the contracted 
services during the remaining life of the concession contract. 
1.6.3 Contract Negotiations 
Walton and McKersie (1965) in their research on labour negotiations defined 
negotiation as a dynamic interaction of, and an awareness of inherent conflict of 
interest in a decision-making situation out of which the parties must wish to solve 
common problems or wish to integrate their interests in other ways. McCall and 
Warrinton (1989) also defined it as follows: 
Negotiation is any sequence of written andlor verbal communication process whereby 
parties to both common and conflicting commercial interests and of differing cultural 
backgrounds consider the form of any joint action they might take in pursuit of their 
individual objectives which will define or redefine the terms of their interdependence. 
The most prevalent concern in bargaining research has therefore centred around how 
to best identify the factors that determine the outcome of the negotiation in terms of 
(a) whether an agreement will be reached, (b) the amount of time required to reach an 
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agreement, (c) the nature of the agreement, and (d) the degree of satisfaction with the 
agreement and the commitment to carry it out. 
1.7 Summary of the Research Outcome 
The findings of the research are briefly outlined as follows: 
1.7.1 Pre-contract time and cost outturns 
The pre-contract time and cost data on a total of 45 projects were comprehensively 
reviewed. The projects comprised 12 health projects ranging in capital values from 
E30m - E200m; 16 school projects with capital values in the range of E12m - E91m; 
13 major civil engineering projects worth E25m - E1300m in capital values; and 4 
grouped as Others which consisted of fire stations, courts, and offices, with capital 
values in the range of 00m - E300m. The data indicated 98% of the projects had 
overrun their planned pre-contract times from between 11% - 166%. Thirty six 
percent (36%) of the projects overrun their planned pre-contract times by 11 - 15 
months. The highest of the overruns were noticed for the schools projects, where one 
of the projects recorded as high as 344% time-overrun -a total of 31 months of 
overrun. 
Bidding and advisory costs to both the private and the public sectors were found to be 
equally high ranging from fO. 1m - E6. Om depending on project type and/or size. 
There were equally substantial overruns on the advisory and bidding costs ranging 
from 25% to as high as 200% as a result of the continued retention of advisors by 
both sides during the protracted negotiations. 
These results therefore support other earlier findings and concerns that the bidding 
costs for PPP projects are generally very high compared to the other modes of 
infrastructure procurement (NAO, 1999; House of Commons, 1996), and that cost and 
time overruns are problems to the efficient implementation of the PPP strategy. It is 
for this reason that the second and third objectives of this research are aimed at 
unearthing the factors that could help in moving the process forward in an efficient 
manner without compromising on value for money, based on the principles of 
effective negotiations. 
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1.7.2 The signiflcant influencing attributes on the negotiation outcome 
The analysis was based on 49 responses, of which 25 came from the private sector 
and 24 from the public sector. The projects covered included those of schools, 
hospitals, civil engineering projects, fire stations and office buildings. 
1.7.22 Public Sector Client Attributes 
The attributes relating to technical capabilities ranked highest, with the key sub- 
attributes being the ability by the public sector to establish project parameters and 
prepare output specifications is most significant, strong in-house expertise, sound 
preparatory work, and clearly established evaluation criteria. The groups of attributes 
relating to organisational capabilities came next with the key sub-attributes being top 
level commitment, team collaborations, open/frank and flexible communication. 
1. Ul Consortium Attributes 
Of the Private Sector Consortium, the group of attributes relating to the 
organizational nature and strength came top. The sub-attributes that ranked high were 
appointing a dedicated bid manager, the ability to understand what the public sector 
wants, open and frank communication during the negotiations, involving at an early 
stage all relevant stakeholders, the ability of the consortium members to work 
harmoniously, the consortium's readiness to accept risk, and the ability to persevere 
during protracted negotiations. Those considered to have only minimal effect in 
pushing the process forward include the private sector consortium taking a proactive 
role in initiating the project, and experience of previously working with the public 
sector procurer. 
The quality of the technical proposals they produce for the bids ranks next, with the 
key underlying dimension being clarity in the submissions and responses to queries, 
followed by robustness of outline technical proposals. 
Quality of thefinancial proposals ranked third among the key attributes with the most 
significant underlying dimension being the level of tariff/tolls proposed for the 
project. The credibility of financiers ranked next followed by the issues of financial 
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risk exposure relating to both the clients ability to pay for the service being provided, 
and guarantee that the consortium can provide the services over the long term. 
1.7. Z3 Project A ttrib utes 
With regard to the project nature attributes, the most significant relates to the size and 
complexity of the facility. Ease of identifying, assessing and allocating risk is also 
accorded a high priority. Flexibility in the ability of the project to respond to future 
changes also ranked high. 
Considering the projects marketability, high priority sub-attributes naturally include 
its ability to attract funding and private participation. Other important attributes 
include the level to which the project meets the needs of the public and the level of 
tariffs and tolls set. 
1.7. Z4 External Environment Attributes 
Group of attributes relating to the socio-economic were regarded as most significant, 
followed by the political and legallregulatory regime environments. Within the socio- 
economic environment the top sub-attribute is the maturity of the financial markets, 
closely followed by strong relationships between the public and private sectors. Of 
least significance is the availability of traditional projects, 
Within the political and legallregulatory regime environment, clearly defined 
planning and regulatory frameworks ranked highest followed by well established 
institutional and policy frameworks, and the acceptability of the PPP philosophy to 
the general public. 
1.7.3 Perceptual differences between the Public and Private Sectors 
The research did reveal that there was a strong agreement between these two main 
stakeholders involved in the in the PPP procurement strategy about the relative 
significance of the main centres of influence on the pre-contract processes and the 
negotiation outcomes. However at the sub-dimensional levels some significant 
differences in perception were revealed by the study, especially within the dimensions 
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for the Public Sector Client Organisations and the Private Sector Consortium and. 
These differences are outlined as follows: 
1.7.3.1 Consortium Attributes 
Attributes relating to the Organisational Nature and Strength of the private sector 
consortium are the source of most differences in opinion. Eight (8) of the nineteen 
(19) sub-attributes in this category were ranked quite differently by public and private 
sector respondents. The key sub-attributes on which there were differences are: 
" Open andfrank communications during negotiations 
" Early involvement ofstakeholders 
" Readiness to accept risk 
" Consortium's previous experience in PPPprocurement 
" Willingness to commit to earlier negotiated terms 
" Ability to tie equity into the projectfor a long period of time. 
" Experience of consortium previously working together as a team. 
" Ability to obtain planning permission timeously 
In contrast, there was full agreement on the relative importance of those attributes 
related to the quality of bidders technical and design proposals. The quality of the 
financial proposals category highlighted some differences in opinion on relative 
importance of individual attributes, but no substantial differences in their relative 
significance index. 
1.7.3.2 The Public Sector Client Attributes 
Regarding public sector client attributes, there was broad agreement about ranking of 
importance for the various main-attributes. Significant differences were noted on 5 
out of 12 sub-attributes under their organisational. capabilities. These were: 
" Ability to accept and absorb risk. 
" Ability to effectively sensitise public opinion on project. 
" Existence of established PPP unit. 
" Tapping knowledge and expertise gained elsewhere. 
" Ideal attitude to cost. 
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Of the technical sub-attributes, differences in perception existed on: 
The use qf standard bidding documents 
Previous experience in PPP project procurement 
Differences on perception were also noted on two of the financial capability sub- 
attributes. These were: 
* Ability to raise bonds 
9 Ability toprovideflexible tax regimes 
1.8 Areas for Further Research and Limitations of the Research 
One main area identified for further research is the need to thoroughly examine the 
cultural variability dimensions of the hierarchical model if it is to be interpreted with a 
global perspective. This is due to the fact that negotiations are carried out between 
individuals or a group of individuals and that an individual's perceptions and attitudes 
are greatly influenced by the culture within which they grow and develop. People are 
social beings and our values and behaviour are greatly influenced by our social and 
cultural environment. The fact is that negotiation represents a microcosm of our 
broader social milieu; negotiating behaviour is therefore regulated by societal norms 
making Cultures to differ a great deal across countries. The model therefore needs to 
be tested with data obtained from other countries. 
1.9 The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis structure is outlined in Figure 1.3 below. 
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The structure therefore provides a clear outline of the how the entire research has been 
conducted and documented. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review has been presented in two main parts. The first part looks at the PPP 
procurement by briefly tracing its evolution; its strategic relevance; the process as it is 
practiced in the UK, highlighting some of the difficulties associated with the process 
especially the overwhelmingly excessive pre-contract time and cost overruns. The second 
part provides a thorough review of the literature on bargaining and negotiation, the 
theoretical foundation around which the preliminary model has been developed in 
Chapter 3 for the main research theme. Insight is provided into what is meant by contract 
negotiations, the two main types of negotiating strategy, and the interplay of the 
characteristic features and factors that influence the negotiation process and outcome. 
The theoretical issues relating to contract negotiations have been reviewed including the 
influencing characteristics of how deadlocks and delays could be avoided during 
negotiations. 
PART A: Infrastructure Procurement and the PPP Concept 
2.2 An Overview of Infrastructure Procurement 
Infrastructure refers to the whole stock of capital and facilities for the production of 
public goods. The term infrastructure is therefore used in the broad sense to include 
facilities that provide for the transportation of people, goods and information; the 
provision of public services and utilities such as water, power and the removal and 
minimization of waste, including general environmental restoration. On the other hand, 
construction procurement has been defined by the CIB W92 Working Commission on 
Procurement Systems as 'the framework within which construction is brought about, 
acquired or obtained'. It therefore covers the entire process from project definition 
through to construction, operation and recently of increasing importance, the disposal of 
the constructed facility (Miller, 1999; Kumarasawamy & Dissanayaka, 1998; Kim, 1997). 
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As indicated in Figure 2.1 the procurement systems within the construction industry were 
thought to have evolved around the traditional form which started around the end of the 
18'h century when the architect was recognized as the independent designer and manager 
of the building process. In recent years however, new and innovative systems have 
evolved in the forms of design and build, management contracting, construction 
management, etc. reflecting the increasing integration of design and construction 
including even the financing and maintenance of the constructed facility (Miller, 1999; 
Rowlinson, 1999). 
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Figure 2.1 Forms of procurement systems and the vicious circle of construction procurement 
Source Adapted from Rowlinson (1999 p 35) 
These innovative changes have been spurred on by what Rowlinson (1999) described as 
the vicious circle in construction procurement when from the 1860s in the UK for 
example, the state began to play a significant role as the client of the construction 
industry, from which time competitive tendering became the norm. Then came the 
growth of the independent professions within the industry seeking to protect the interest 
of the client; thus in effect establishing a reward and penalty structure for the actors in the 
industry (Winch, 2000). From then on, most if not all, publicly procured projects were 
contracted out competitively on the basis of bills of quantities prepared from full working 
drawings and elaborate specifications. The lowest tender price then significantly became 
the basis of assessing value and the choice of contractors. This approach has of late been 
observed as not only acting as a constraint on contractor's ability to innovate but also 
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adversarial and thus contributing to inefficiency and lack of growth in the industry 
(Latham, 1994; Egan, 1998). The result was that as clients tried to push down their 
production costs, they saw their transaction costs rather rising in the form of fees to 
additional professional hands to protect their interest (Curtis et al, 1989; Cooney, 1993). 
The industry analysts have observed that due to the very diverse and complex nature of 
the production process within the industry, with transaction between many actors and the 
existence of a series of value chains, the development of a close relationship and the 
establishment of good atmosphere in the transactions would reduce costs (Bremer and 
Kok, 2000). Various forms of arrangements have therefore emerged within the industry 
for the procurement of infrastructure projects and services, each of which introduces 
interrelationships that are governed by both contractual and tortious linkages that are 
strengthened by various forms and conditions of contract such as the ICI and FIDIC for 
civil engineering contracts and the JCT for building contracts. 
Figure 2.2 provides a pictorial view of the various types of procurement strategies and the 
range of organizational variations to the management of projects within the construction 
industry. 
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Figure 2.2 Procurement systems and variants of Organizational management of projects 
Source: Turner (1997 p 44) 
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2.3 The state and infrastructure procurement 
The evolving participation of the state in economic enterprise has been covered 
extensively in literature (Kerr, 1998; Griffin 1999). Prior to 1945, state enterprises were 
exceptions; the private sector was dominant even in such areas as canals and rail 
development in the 17th and 18th centuries (Walker & Smith, 1995). Prominent among 
some of the early private sector infrastructure concession projects included the water 
supply and distribution concession contract granted to the Perier Brothers in France in 
1782, the concession contract for the Suez Canal granted to Campagnie Unversalle de 
Suez in 1854 (Owen, 2002). 
However state involvement in infrastructure development started becoming more 
prominent after 1945, as the state in a bid to improve social welfare after the great 
depression of the 1930s, increasingly took on the responsibility of massive investments in 
state enterprises and the nationalization of private ones. In the UK for instance, 
government's share of the estimated E55b annual output of the construction industry 
alone is 40% (Graves et al, 2000). No doubt the demands upon governments to achieve 
rapid growth, to improve social conditions in urban areas, to improve health and 
education, and so on, is beginning to exceed the resources of the state and its managerial 
capacity. Whereas public sector net investments have been declining in some instances, 
rapid population growth particularly within the urban settings is exerting enormous 
pressure on existing infrastructure (White, 2001; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2001a; Office for 
National Statistics (UK), 2000; HM Treasury, 1998). 
With capital costs for infrastructure projects becoming increasingly more expensive, 
coupled with the intense competition for the alternative use of available fund and the 
global easy access to knowledge and free movement of money across borders, the 
thinking had started changing from the 1960s however towards a search for 'best 
practice' in construction procurement. This has led to the introduction of such innovative 
procurement strategies as selective rather than open competitive bidding, management 
contracting, package deals, design-build and novation. Other strategies include more 
collaborative and win-win approach to construction procurement in the forms of 
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partnering, forming teams that can focus on adding value and improving profitability of 
individual companies through efficient working, promoted in the main by the private 
sector clients (Turner, 1997; Cox and Townsend, 1998). Increasingly, the awareness also 
began to dawn on the public sector which has the largest construction spend to improve 
efficiency in the procurement of projects and obtain value for money. 
Interestingly however, amidst the growing difficulty of governments to invest in public 
infrastructure due to lack of the necessary investment capital, the recent years have 
witnessed a phenomenal growth both in numbers and in the amounts of money held by 
private individuals. It has for instance been estimated that assets owned by individuals 
with more than a million dollars each in the banks will double between 1997 and 2005 to 
a total of $40 trillion world-wide (FT, 2001 a). Private equity firms in Europe for instance 
raised a record amount of C48bn in 2000, up 89 percent from a year earlier (FT, 2001b) 
The combined effects of these developments, i. e. the ever increasing demand on public 
infrastructure, the lack of requisite public funds to invest, and the recognition that the 
private sector has the financial, managerial and technical potentials, coupled with the 
realization that the state still needs to retain some substantial role in the provision of these 
services, set the stage in the early 1990s for a new strategic rethink in public procurement 
- the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). The basic principle behind this strategic rethink 
is that state departments are to be transformed from being owners and operators of state 
assets into the purchasers of services from the private sector. The private sector becomes 
long-term providers of services which they deliver by taking the responsibility for the 
design, construction, financing and the operation of the assets. 
In the UK for example, in order to encourage value in government procured construction 
projects, the New Public Management system was adopted in the early 1990s as a way of 
reorganizing public sector organizations to bring their management reporting and 
accounting procedures closer to business methods, leading to some form of deregulation 
designed to promote sensitivity to market pressures (Hall and Holt, 2002). These 
developments and policies led to the launching of the Private Finance Initiative in 1992. 
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Infrastructure services can be grouped into two broad categories - the recurrent cost of 
providing services such as water, sanitation, garbage collection and other services whose 
direct beneficiaries are readily identifiable and can therefore be readily financed through 
user-charges, and other services such as drainage, schools, roads, for which charges 
cannot be directly passed on to the beneficiaries should be financed from general taxes 
and other revenue sources (Kim, 1997). In 1998 alone, an estimated total of $3 trillion 
was spent on construction worldwide (Crosthwaite, 2000). Public sector expenditure 
incidentally constitute the largest proportion of these massive construction spends. 
Estimates by the World Bank indicate that within Asia alone, demand for infrastructure 
investment for the period 1995-2004 will amount to US$1,262 billion (Ong and Lenard, 
2001). However, national budgets derived from revenues and taxes alone cannot meet the 
rather huge investments required to either built their national infrastructure or renew the 
decaying ones without critically sacrificing those other vital areas as welfare, health and 
education. In order to promote economic growth, governments all over the world are 
therefore constantly seeking alternative procurement strategies to finance the 
development and renewal of their national infrastructure in order to more efficiently 
redirect these huge chunks of their national revenue that goes into the provision of 
infrastructure into other areas as the environment, welfare and health in order to promote 
economic growth and stability. 
The huge demands for infrastructure development are attributable to the fast population 
growth particularly within the urban settings of the world. The populations of the world's 
megacities are expected to increase at phenomenal rates between now and the year 2015, 
with some cities, especially those in the developing countries, such as Jakarta moving 
from a mere 2.8 million people in 1950, and 9.5 million in 2000 to an estimated level of 
21.2 million in 2015. Cities of the developed world are no exemptions as the population 
of Los Angeles for instance is expected to grow from 4.0 million in 1950 to 14.2 million 
in 2015 (Baker D. and Newton, D., 2001). These high levels of population explosion as 
shown in Figure 2.3, have brought not only chaos on a number of highways in these 
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major cities, but increasing pressure on all other public utilities and services including 










Figure 2.3 Population growth patterns of mega cities (in millions) 
Data source: Financial Times of London, 3d March 2001. 
Fo 
lain White (2001), writing on the situation in Delhi (India), painted a vivid picture of the 
typical chaotic conditions on the roads in most of these fast growing cities - 'a two-lane 
highway reconfiguring itseU* into five-lanes of chaos with every one giving way to the 
might of lorries and buses and nobody taking notice ofpedestrians'. Similar pressures are 
being felt by other public sector facilities such as education and health. 
There is also the growing recognition within the developed world that their countries' 
infrastructure needs urgent renewal and modernization. It has for instance been estimated 
that traffic levels on UK roads will continue to rise from a level of 455 billion vehicle- 
kilometres in 1998 to 478 billion in 2001 and 524 billion in 2006 (Office for National 
Statistics, 2000). This phenomenon will thus put increasing pressure on the existing road 
infrastructure and increase traffic congestion which has been estimated to be costing a 
colossal sum of over L20 billion annually within the UK (Kinnock, 1998). The question 
then is where does the needed investment come from to rehabilitate and build the 
infrastructure which has been recognized as decaying rapidly. Public sector net 
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investments have rather been declining over the years due in part to the difficulty of 
raising income through taxes. Figure 2.4 portrays a vivid picture of this for the UK. 
,,.. I 
:, "-I ., --,! .i", 
Figure 2.4 LJK public sector net investment 
Som cc: HMII easmv ( 1998) 
Within the developing world also these high demands for infrastructure development 
coupled with the pressures on national budgets is making governments to move towards 
encouraging private sector to invest in infrastructure projects in the forms of Build 
Operate and Transfer (BOT), Build Operate Own and Transfer (BOOT), Build and 
Transfer (BT), Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO). Tam (1999) indicated that 
while some of the projects emanating from these arrangements have proved quite 
successful Such as the Cross-Harbour Tunnel, the Western and Eastern Harbour 
Crossings all in Hong Kong, others such as the Bankok Elevated Transport System, the 
Second Expressway System and the Don Muang Tollway all in Thailand were saddled 
with problems due to the nature and amount of risks the projects were exposed to. Others 
included the cancellation of power project agreements in Pakistan, renegotiations of 
power and water agreements in India and Argentina respectively, (Wells, 1999; Tam, 
1999). These problems have begun to raise concern among the large investment 
organizations such as the World Bank to start organizing international conferences to 
discuss how best to confront the problems (Salinger, 1999). 
The Public Private Partnership mode of procurement strategy cannot therefore be said to 
be immune froin the risks generally associated with infrastructure procurement. In fact 
24 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
the risks are rather exacerbated due to the high capital outlays involved and the long-term 
nature of this procurement strategy. Wang et al (2000), Ozdoganm & Birgonul (2000), 
Tam (1999), Treasury Taskforce (1997), Songer et al (1997), Private Finance Panel 
(1996a), UNIDO (1995), Drake (1994), Yates and Mukherjee (1993), have variously 
identified the key risk areas associated with privately financed infrastructure projects. 
These risk areas can be broadly categorized as Bidding, Construction and Operating 
Risks. 
2.4 The PPP Concept 
Although the term Public Private Partnerships may be interpreted in different contexts 
from country to country, it is essentially a form of collaboration between the public and 
private sectors. A classical definition is therefore provided by the Canadian Council for 
Public-Private Partnerships as: "A cooperative venture benveen the public and private 
sectors, built on the expertise oj'each partner, that best meets clearly defined public 
needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards " (CCPPP, 2001 
pp v). The basic principle is that state departments are transformed from being owners 
and operators of assets into the purchasers of services from the private sector, with 
private sector becoming long-term providers of services which they deliver by taking the 
responsibility for the design, construction, financing and the operation of the assets. 
The entire PPP procurement process may be broken into four main stages; i. e. the 
Planning and Feasibility phase, the Bidding and Negotiation phase, the Construction 
phase, the Operation phase and possibly the Transfer and/or Renegotiation phase as 
shown in Figure 2.5 below. 
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Figure 2.5 Stages of the PPP project procurement 
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Figure 2.6 also provides a decision flow chart of the PPP procurement process. 
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Vigure 2.6 PPP procurement decision chart 
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2.4.1 Traditional vs. PPP project procurement 
A PPP project structure is expected to have a scope to allocate risks to the private sector 
for efficiency benefits to be generated across the life of the project and also allow the 
private sector to innovate and design away risks that bring new ideas to the way the 
service is provided. The project should thus have substantial operating content, a clear 
boundary and measurable output performance. Paramount to all these is the principle that 
the risks transferred to the service provider are commercial in nature and controllable 
(Treasury Taskforce, 1997) 
In PPP procurement, while the public sector no longer takes responsibility for the design, 
it rather specifies its services by way of output specifications which are only frozen 
before the submission of the best and final offer (BAFO). These output specifications 
cover the objectives, purpose, scope and performance requirements for the contract, with 
emphasis being on the 'what' and not the 'how' in relation to the service provision 
(Private Finance Panel, 1996b). Statements such as: "the purpose of this project is to 
provide a safe and reliable road transport link between cities X and Y The consortium is 
responsible for designing, constructing and maintaining the road and providing other 
services for the duration of the contract", are typical features of an output specification. 
In the same respect performance requirement are detailed in terms of operating output 
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and not how the performance will be achieved such as the ýpavement surface shall befree 
ofpockets ofwater during and after any rains. ' 
Figure 2.7 provides an illustrative distinction between Capital Asset procurement and 
PPP procurement. 
A capital asset procurement A PPP procurement 
Public 
Funding from sector 
Gov't Dept --- 11s. procurer/ 
Service payments Public sector 
(capital and the 
from Gov't DeDt 
orocurer 
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Operating or service 
Construction/supply 3' party revenue or comtract 
contract paid for ever &am vroceeds aid for ever contract life 
the construction/supply ODefatOr 







Advisers SUM He banks,, 
sharcholderms 
Fig 2.7Capital Asset Procurement v PPP Procurement 
Source: Private Finance Panel (I 996c) Risk and Reward in PFI Contracts p3 
A distinctive feature of the PPP procurement is the linkage of payments directly to 
performance and quality. As noted by Williams (1995), the service level of any PPP/PFI 
project agreement can be said to be the 'teeth' of a PPP deal, and therefore the trigger for 
remedies and the primary tool for withholding payment to the service provider in the 
event of default. This link is as shown in Figure 2.8 
Incentives 
Payment for usage, volume or demand 
Payment for support services according to minimum performance standards_ 
Availability/capacity payment for core services 
Devt period 3 Operating/Delivery period 40 Time (yr. ) 
Figure 2.8 Payment mechanisms In PPP/PFI procurement 
(Source: adaptedfrom PFP (1996a) Risk and Reward in PFI contracts p 9) 
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Table 2.1 provides a characteristic overview of the PPP procurement process as opposed 
to the traditional form. 
Table 2.1 Key differences between tradition public sector procurement and PPP 
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The contractual relationships within the PPP/Privately Financed schemes can generally 
be complex. This is due to the very large number of stakeholder involvement. Figure 2.9 
provides a picture of the contractual relationships within a typical Privately Financed 
Scheme. 
.......... ............. - ................ ................................................. ... ................... ................. 
Fqmtý 
Project compa"y 
I i-d P'i- ...... ký. ý 
. ... ...... Figure 2.9 Typical Contractual arrangements for a Privately Financed Project 
Source: Adapted from Walker and Sinith (1999 p 10) 
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At the core of the whole process is the project company which may be made of a 
conglomeration of companies coming together to form the Consortium, which in some 
instances are referred to as the Sponsors. The project company enters into the main 
agreement with the public sector client organization for the provision of the services 
required. Further arrangements are made with other specialist agencies for the 
construction and supply of specialist equipment, and for the operating of the facility, 
including entering into agreements with lenders, equity investors and insurance 
companies. 
2.4.2 The Bidding and Negotiation phase of PPP procurement 
Figure 2.10 provides an outline of the Bidding and Negotiation phase of the PPP 
procurement process within the UK - the stage which forms the main focus of this 
research. At this stage of the process all the key players will begin to exert significant 
influences. 
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Figure 2.10 The PPP procurement process up to financial close 
Source: Ahadzi & Bowles (2001a) 
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The very complex nature of the process no doubt has generated risks of pre-contract time 
overruns and high bidding costs. The research would identify the key attributes that help 
in making the process smoother and therefore add to the needed knowledge in managing 
the process successfully. 
2.4.3 Interactions between the parties within the PPP contract relationships 
The interaction between the public sector client and the private sector service provider 
under the principles of the PPP project procurement could be likened to that of a buyer 
and seller in the realm of commerce for which a number of models have been developed. 
One of such models is termed the problem-solving model which provides the opportunity 
for the seller to analyze the buyer's problem to come up with solutions after evaluating 
possible alternatives (McCall and Warrington, 1989). The model presupposes prior study 
of the buyer's business, the sector he/she operates in, and the existing economic and 
competitive conditions affecting the buyer's problem. 
The problem solving model focuses on the needs, attitudes and values of the buyer. These 
three elements form the hallmark of any sound PPP procurement. The approach is 
considered appropriate where there is a diversity of needs to be met, where the product or 
services are complex and the unit transaction is high. The model thus relies on the expert 
knowledge of the seller and as well as the ability of the buyer to express his/her needs 
very clearly and practically. Such a mutual role-taking is not only a necessary 
prerequisite for effective communication and successful interaction but also their ability 
to tap into the appropriate power bases for their particular situations. Their respective 
organizations' derived resources, such as reputation, reinforce this power, including the 
authority invested in them to vary the price and the delivery terms. The negotiation 
process under such circumstances tend to take account of the differences that can arise 
out of a situation of mutual dependence, and hinges on the exchange of resources related 
to such items as specification, service levels, technical advice and price. Additionally, 
where there is a concentration of strength through centralization of the buying function, 
such as those found in the Highway Agency and the NHS, the organizations eventually 
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develop increased power from the greater knowledge of supplier's product, processes and 
capabilities. 
The interactions between the parties to PPP project procurement could also be influenced 
to a large extent by what Robinson and Faris (1967) identified as the buy-phase model in 
commercial transactions. This relates to three types of buying situations. 
a) the new buy where the need for the product/service has not previously arisen, so 
there is no experience in the buying organization and a great deal of information 
is required; 
b) the modified re-buy, where a regular requirement for the type of service/product 
exists and the buying requirements are known, but sufficient change has occurred 
to require some alteration to the normal supply procedure; 
c) the straight re-buy, where a routine procedure exists and there is an approved list 
of suppliers. 
According McCall and Warrington (1989), there is evidence to show that the buying 
process will be longer and more complicated if the products or services being purchased 
are new and custom-built rather than routine. 
Again, the PPP pre-contract procurement process as earlier outlined in Figure 2.10 could 
be likened to the buying process classification developed by Hill and Hillier (1977). Hill 
and Hillier viewed the buying process as key decision points which consist of four main 
stages: 
i) the precipitation decision stage; 
ii) the product/service specification stage; 
iii) the supplier selection stage; 
iv) the commitment decision stage. 
Each of these stages comprises individuals most of whom are unlikely to be included at 
all the stages and as the stages move from one to the other, there is increasing restriction 
on the freedom of decision-making activities. These individuals may in fact take policy 
decisions which can limit and affect the later decisions. 
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The mix of people involved, the nature of the procurement process, the nature of the 
services/product and its use, the reason for its purchase, and the behavioural 
characteristics of the participants, all combine with other external/environmental factors 
to determine the buying and hence the negotiation behaviour and to underline its 
complexities. The PPP project procurement requires extensive relationships where the 
need for change is typically perceived within the relationship. A critical aspect of the 
management of these relationships is the extent to which the parties can balance their 
relationships with each other, a process which may have a profound influence right at the 
negotiation stages. This is principally due to the fact that each party will attempt to define 
and capture their respective roles and obligations within the relationship including the 
expected benefits to be derived from taking on certain risks. 
2.4.4 The global perspective of the PPP philosophy 
As a result of the introduction of the PPP procurement strategy, a number of funding 
options are now available to national governments all over the world for the provision 
and maintenance of public and social infrastructure as shown in Figure 2.11. 
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Figure 2.11 Funding options for public infrastructure 
The PPP concept, including other variants such as BOOT, BOT, etc, of procuring social 
infrastructure in partnership with the private sector is therefore increasingly being 
embraced by a number of countries and supported by a number of international 
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institutions. Prominent among them are the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, Japan, Finland, the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the UN (The 
PFI Report, 2001; Hamilton, 2001; Brook; 2001; Kouvarakis, 2001; Leiringer, 2000). 
Table 2.2 provides a brief overview of the above the rate at which countries all over the 
world are adopting the strategy. 
Table 2.2 The PPP/Private Finance landscape 
Country/Institution Types of projects/activities 
United Kingdom Formally launched through the Private Finance Initiative in 1992, the following represent the types and 
number of projects implemented through the strategy by 2000; 
Educational facilities schools - 59 projects; colleges - 29 projects 
Healthcare 164 projects Prisons - 12 projects 
Police 21 projects Fire Services -5 projects 
Armed Forces 20 projects Hosing & Offices - 17 projects 
Water and Sewerage 10 projects Waste Management - 17 projects 
Roads 15 projects Bridges -3 projects 
Railways, Underground and Trams - 10 projects 
Canada The strategy is being promoted in the main through the Canadian Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships. Below is a list of variety of projects procured through the PPP by 200 1; 
Airports and Civil Navigation -4 projects 
Education -7 projects Environmental - 24 project 
Healthcare -4 projects Human Resources -2 
Inventory Management -I project Property Management -7 projects 
Justice/ Correction 2 Research -3 projects 
Ports and Seaways 3 Information Technology - 15 projects 
Land Development and Revitalisation -4 project 
Transportation (roads, bridges parking, etc) - 15 projects 
Australia - PPP policies and frameworks put in place by the states 
- Some 24-36 defence projects earmarked by the Federal Government to be procured through the PPP 
route 
South Africa By March 1998,18 Municipal Services Partnerships projects in total value of R5.19 billion 
completed in partnership with the private sector and The Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
Unit (MIIU). The MIIU was launched in 1998 in response to the national govemment's realisation 
that the backlog of municipal infrastructure could be cleared by the combination of government 
intervention and private sector involvement 
Other projects include the N4 Pretoria - Maputu, N4 West - JHB - Botswana road projects 
Western Europe Italy - Framework in place. ( the Merloni Bills of 1994 and 1998) 
Spain -a number of road projects operational eg the M45. 
-8 toll motorways due for completion by 2007 
-3 new rail lines on the drawing board 
- the A6 Madrid-Galica Motorway project 
Portugal - Widely seen as at the forefront of PPP with large road projects 
Greece -a couple of projects such as the Spata Airport and Athen Ring Road 
- PPP programme formally launched in November 2000 
Germany a BOT law passed with a number of road projects underway 
Finland PPPtaskforce and pilot scheme put forward 
lemal changes n2ade to enable PPP take place 
Japan Projects underway and/or at the planning stages include: 
- experimental facility for testing telecommunication systems at a research 
park in Yokosuka 
-II housing complexes to house government employees 
The United Nations The UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) has set up the following units aimed at 
promoting the concept: 
- BOT Expert Group which includes representatives from many of the 
world's leading PPP enterprises 
- UNECE Private Partnerships Alliance of governments and enterprises to 
develop pilot PPP projects, improve procedures and regulations and laws 
for the PPPs. 
The World Bank So e of the units setup to promote private sector participation include: 
- Private Sector Advisory Services 
- The Rapid Response Unit 
- The International Finance Corporation. 
Sources: Bank of Scotland, (2002); The PFI Report, (2001); Shur, (2001); Hamilton, (2001); CCPPP, 
(2001); Brook, (2001). 
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The main drivers behind this fundamental shift in the way public and social infrastructure 
is being procured have been identified as budget deficits, ageing or poor infrastructure, 
and growing demand or expectations on public sector services. Others include the search 
for greater efficiency and creativity in the delivery of public services, the desire to 
introduce competition and the shortage of domestic experience (D&P Report, 200 1; 
Rabin, 1992; Modic, 1989). The concept is therefore a rapidly growing means of 
procuring infrastructure assets and their associated services, signaling a fundamental shift 
in the relationships between the state and industry. 
2.4.5 The PPP as an growth oriented strategy 
Factors such as economies of scale and institutional reforms placing greater emphasis on 
private participation have been identified as determinants of development growth (Chen 
& Feng 2000). The service industry has also been recognized as making increasingly 
greater impact on growth in the developed economies (Griffin, 1999). The following 
therefore represent some of the anticipated and/or reported gains through the introduction 
of the PPP concepts. 
Z4.5.1 Efficiency in resource utilization 
The efficient allocation of resources has been recognized in the economics literature as a 
primary factor within the concept of economic development (Romer, 1990). It is argued 
that the concept of the public private partnership is first and foremost a method of 
procurement which seeks to achieve best value for money by focusing on the genuine 
transfer of risks to'the private sector, the aim of which is to incentivize the private sector 
to manage and minimize those risks which are within their control (Private Finance 
Panel, 1996c). By putting emphasis on placing a contract for providing services rather 
than any particular asset, procurement through the PPP/PFI route is therefore thought to 
have in-built efficiency gains that outweigh the higher financing cost associated with 
private sector borrowing. As an example, the PFI solutions to the Wycombe and the 
Amersham hospitals were found to be actually more radical than the ones that were 
originally proposed by the public sector. There was a more radical solution to the layout 
of the site and the quality of the buildings with the result that the total scheme was both 
34 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
lower in cost and preferred by the clinicians because they regarded it as of a better value 
(House of Commons 1996). 
Payments under the projects procured through the PPP approach are done through a 
unitary payment system. With funding costs built into the unitary payment as a project 
cost, healthy competition amongst funders to reduce funding cost would thus be an 
advantage to the public sector procurer. Additionally, lenders to the private sector tend to 
be very much directly concerned with the quality of the projects they are funding. Before 
deciding to lend towards the cost of project, financial institutions apply very rigorous 
analysis and assessment of the risks of making the investment and thereafter, maintain 
close scrutiny over the project by imposing strict controls on the performance of other 
members of the consortium. This may not usually be the case when they lend to 
governments as they are sort of guaranteed the repayment, except such big time donors as 
the World Bank. In the same vein, improvement of service is associated with investment 
of risk capital. The providers of risk capital risks losing their money if things go wrong 
but equally should be able to generate increasing returns as the improvement in the 
services are achieved. As noted by the Scottish Office (1996), the presence of equity in 
the financial structure of PPP/PFI projects should be one of the key factors that should 
drive efficiency. 
It has for instance, been noted that designers for projects procured directly by the public 
have had the long standing complaint of not being allowed to design to the required 
standards because of budgetary constraints, with the result that a few years down the line 
the structures begin to deteriorate at a rather fast rate (House of Commons, 1996). 
However, by transferring to the private sector the responsibility of designing, 
constructing, financing and operating the scheme, the private sector would consider the 
obligations as a whole over the specified life of the contract, taking full account of the 
risks inherent at each stage, including the long term maintenance costs. There is also the 
contractual requirement, of course, that the facility will be of economic use for much 
longer period than the concession period and would be handed over where applicable 
with a specified life expectancy. 
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A direct relationship therefore exists between the way a scheme is designed and 
constructed and its whole life operational cost. With the private sector choosing how to 
provide the service to the level specified by the public sector client and appropriate risks 
allocated to the party best able to manage them, this should lead to an efficient service 
and a lower whole-life cost. In a case study on eight DBFO road contracts, cost savings 
compared with the public sector comparator averaged 15%. For road projects, because 
the operators would be paid each year primarily according to the level of usage of the 
road, their income will vary as traffic varies. Making them take a share of the traffic risks 
in this way, it is hoped, would help establish a private sector road operating industry 
which will be sensitive to road usage and open up the avenue for more efficient 
construction and maintenance practices (Highway Agency, 1997). 
Competition has been identified as a key factor in the efficient allocation of resources. 
Not only are tenders for PPP/PFI projects procured competitively but it has for instance 
been reported that on the first four DBFO projects procured by the Highways Agency 
another dimension to the value for money exercise was introduced by asking the other 
short-listed bidders to keep their bids on the table as reserved bidders while negotiations 
continued with the preferred bidders, thus effectively sustaining the competitive pressure. 
In two of the projects, Al(M) and the A419/A417, the successful consortium, Road 
Management Group, was made to absorb most of the increases in their revised bid as a 
result of this competitive pressure which would otherwise have increased the present 
value of their bids (NAO, 1997a). 
One objective of the PPP is to minimize claims by transferring responsibility to the 
private sector in order to achieve value for money. In the traditional form of procurement 
for example, claims could be made for unforeseen design errors, etc. A study conducted 
by the National Audit Office on a sample of 42 traditionally procured road projects each 
worth over US million, revealed an average increase of 28% between tender and out- 
turn price (NAO, 1997b). An important dispute prevention technique within the 
construction industry is the equitable distribution of risks. Another dispute prevention 
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technique is the use of positive contractual incentives to reach certain performance results 
which have an effective means of aligning the contractor's goal with the client. These can 
encourage superior performance and discourage claims oriented conduct. In a study into 
the top causes of contractual disputes in the USA, failure to deal promptly with changes 
and changed conditions and owner changes which disrupt the flow of the contractor's 
work, were identified as the highest ranking causes of disputes (Diekmann & Girard, 
1995). The principles underlying the PPP procurement process attempt to effectively 
eliminate these problems as design responsibility rests with the private sector and the 
partnership approach is founded on win-win scenario. 
24.5.2 Investnwnt and structural transformation 
One of the key benefits advanced for the PPP strategy is that of fostering economic 
growth through innovative investments. Brinkman (1995), identified investment as the 
engine of growth, while others like Solow (1957), Schumpeter (1954) Kuznets (1965), 
and Romer (1990), identified technological change as lying at the heart of economic 
growth. Griffin (1999) also drew conclusions from his empirical studies that economic 
growth and expansion are impossible without investment. The UK government's 
objective has been focused towards reducing public spending to below 40 per cent of 
GDP. The injection of private capital investment and expertise through the PPP/ PFI is 
therefore a key factor in reconciling the need for sound public finances with acceptable 
levels of taxation and huge investment in infrastructure. As at March 2000, over 430 
PPP/PFI projects with estimated capital value in the region of L32 billion have either 
been procured or at various stages of the procurement process nationwide covering all 
sectors of the economy from education, health through to defence. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 
give a vivid picture of the PPP/PFI project landscape within the UK as at March 2000. 
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Figure 2.12 Total number of PFUPPP projects as at March 2000 
INta source: DETR (2000) 





Figure 2.13 Estimated Capital Value of PFI/PPP projects as at March 2000 
Data source: DETR (2(XX)) 
The transportation sector has seen the largest infusion of private capital in project size 
and value since the introduction of the PPP/PFI. As at March 2000 some f 7.5b worth of 
private investment through PPP/PFI were concluded ranging in various sizes such as the 
Channel Tunnel Link worth f4b (DETR, 2000). Other projects include such major 
bridges as the 812 metre cable stay Dartford River Crossing over the Thames, the 5.2km 
long Second Severn Crossing, the Skye Bridge consisting of a 500m main bridge with 
70m long approach viaduct and 200m secondary bridge. Other rail projects include the 
f200 million 4.2km underground Docklands Light Rail Link to Lewisham, of which the 
private sector company, City Greenwich Lewisham Rail Link ple, is contributing fI 65m 
(Treasury Taskforce 1997). A number of road project have also been undertaken and/or 
being undertaken via the PFI/PPP route such as the A74(M)/M74 in Scotland, the first 
eight DBFO road projects in England which, including six others announced, had a total 
capital value of fl. 3bn (Highway Agency, 1997). 
These huge private sector injections of capital are thus expected to reduce the Public 
Borrowing Requirement (PBR). For example, over the planning period of 1995/96 to 
1998/99, public sector capital expenditure was expected to fall by 12.5bn. This public 
capital expenditure shortfall was expected to be offset by investments under PPP/PFI of 
about f, 2.8 billion during the financial year 1998/99 (House of Commons, 1996). The fact 
that some of these projects are expected to pay for themselves through revenue streams 
generated by the facilities, and that those paid for by the state are paid through unitary 
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pricing systems over the concession periods only when the facilities are delivering the 
services, govermnent budgets should therefore be relieved greatly from excessive up- 
front capital expenditures. 
Within the financial sector, new products are emerging as confidence in the PFI/PPP 
continues to grow. Nubben & Mcintosh (1997) for instance, noted that in March 1997 
NatWest Markets had converted almost flbn of British housing association loans into 
bonds in a PFI securitisation exercise. A number of other PPP/PFI investment funds such 
as the Innisfree and BZW, are being set up with the likelihood of being floated on the 
stock market. This represents a healthy sign as the input of financiers could be courted 
earlier and thus minimizing the chronic delays in reaching early financial close. With 
concession periods set beyond the range of conventional debt, financial innovation should 
be encouraged through the use of alternative sources of funding. There is also the 
possibility of re-financing after the completion of construction, all of which can provide 
financial benefits to the project sponsor; a method used in the eight benchmarking PFI 
projects by the Highways Agency 
Owen and Merna (1999) noted that with margins on projects procured through the 
conventional means running at 0-3%, PPP/PFI offered a good opportunity for contracting 
firms within the UK to diversify their work and realize greater margins. Currently, return 
on investments for some PPP/PFI projects average 15 to 20 percent annually (NAO, 
1999a p 37). They however observed that a major failing with UK contractors was their 
inability to contribute equity into the finance package. However, with the influx of 
foreign investment in the form of large stock acquisitions of major UK construction 
companies (e. g. Malaysia's Intria Berhad into Costain and Kvaerner into Trafalgar House 
and Bouygues into Tarmac), the equity capital base of these firms should improve 
substantially. 
The professional consulting industry is equally experiencing some structural changes. 
With bidding consortium being led by large construction firms, the fear as was associated 
with design and build, was that the larger construction firms would use their economic 
39 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
might to muscle them out as they already have in-house design capabilities. This fear 
however has largely proved unfounded since the consortia are invariably depending 
extensively on the services of consultants and advisers, with some participating as equity 
partners. They are also actively participating in the process as advisers to the public 
sector procurers in the financial, legal and technical disciplines. 
In 1996, the then Chancellor, Lamont, in a speech to the Private Finance Annual 
Conference, observed that interest in the PFI was growing nation-wide and that this 
interest was not confined to the UK alone as overseas delegates kept coming over to also 
learn about it. He further noted that like privatization before it, PFI was fast becoming 
another successful British export (HM Treasury, 1996). It was reported in the 4h June, 
1999 edition of the Building magazine that Japan was planning to pass its PFI bill in the 
summer of 1999 which was earmarked to bring in YI OOObn (f5bn) worth of investment - 
a possible opportunities for British firms specializing in the PPP/PFI procurement process 
(Cavill, 1999). ). A number of investigations, such as those of Balassa (1985), Fosu 
(1992), as cited in Aiello (1999), also demonstrated that positive correlation exist 
between the growth of exports and economic growth. 
Z 4.5.3 Kit o Wedge form ulation an d diffusion 
The development, dissemination and advancement of useful knowledge, in particular 
scientific knowledge, has been identified by Kuznets (1966), as a crucial contributing 
factor to economic growth. As cited in Ruttan, (1998), this view was also shared by 
Romer (1986) who argued that long-run growth is driven primarily by the accumulation 
of knowledge by forward-looking profit maximizing agents and that the creation of new 
knowledge generates positive external effect on the production of technology. Hence the 
contribution of ideas is the primary source of economic growth. Finding better ways of 
doing things has always been the main source of long-term economic growth since 
economies are increasingly being based on knowledge. 
As indicated in Figure 2.14 the interaction of mankind with the environment 
encompassing culture and the physical world originates new knowledge and knowledge 
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1ý 
appears in its application as technology and in its store as culture. Brinkman, (1995) 
describes this as the dichotomy of useful knowledge. 
Figure 2.14 The Dichotomy of Useful Knowledge 
Source: Adapted from Brinkman (1995) 
For very complex PPP/PFI projects, transaction teams consisting of members of the 
public sector agency, legal, technical and financial advisers from consulting groups are 
constituted after receiving intensive training in team building and negotiating skills in 
helping to evaluate the bids and subsequently negotiate with the bidders. This process 
should substantially help to achieve better value for money by awarding the projects to 
only bidders with financially and technically robust offers and not necessarily the 
cheapest. The same team building effort takes place within the consortiums, in very 
intense fashion. This should therefore help the development and diffusion of both tacit 
and explicit knowledge. 
The most important resources have been recognized as knowledge based and that for new 
joint capability to be developed from existing capabilities which are most likely to be 
underpinned by tacit knowledge, then these tacit knowledge bases could be best shared 
through the process of frequent physical proximity, shared experience and the 
development of trust - i. e. partnership relationships (Hall, 2000). One noteworthy benefit 
of the PFI competition organized by the Prison Service for the Bridgend and Fazakerley 
prisons was the opportunity of accessing overseas expertise in prison construction and 
operation. Three of the five bidders had overseas partners in the consortium i. e. American 
and French. The winning consortium, Securicor/Costain added Skanska, a Swedish 
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construction partner, also carried out research into American prison design and operations 
which contributed to the innovative aspects of their proposals (NAO, 1997b). 
Under the DBFO road projects undertaken by the Highway Agency, the agency noted 
that some bidders also applied value-engineering techniques throughout the procurement 
process to reduce construction cost by optimizing the Agency's design. The National 
Audit Office is noted as observing that a notable feature of the A74(M)/M74 DBFO 
project in Scotland was the liaison of the Scottish Office project staff with their English 
counterparts, the Highway Agency, for the cross-fertilization of ideas and the taping of 
the rich knowledge gained from the latter's experience on their first four pathfinder 
DBFO road projects. Similar expertise gained by the NHS on their Dartford and 
Gravesharn PFI hospital project is being difftised onto their other numerous PPP/PFI 
projects (NAO, 1999b). 
As stated in the UK Government's Convergence document (HM Treasury, 1998), the 
primary responsibility of fiscal policy in its long-term macroeconomic framework is to 
contribute to economic stability through sound public finances by drawing a clear 
distinction between current and capital spending, and to ensure that current spending is 
paid for as it occurs and not a burden on future generations. The public private 
partnership form of procurement by which unitary pricing systems of payments are 
effected over the life of the project therefore seeks to answer this aspect of the economic 
policy. 
Net investment was forecast to increase from its present level of 0.5% of GDP to 1.1 % by 
2001-02, as part of the measures designed to address the maintenance backlog within the 
public sector and improve on the existing infrastructure partnerships (HM Treasury, 
1998). Much of this investment was expected to come from the private sector by way of 
public private. The setting up of Partnership UK following the Bate's second review of 
the Private Finance initiative in which a total El billion in equity and debt was to be 
raised to promote projects through the PPP/PFI approach (Building, 1999). As cited in 
Chen and Feng (2000), the works of Kormendi and Merguire (1985), and Levine and 
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Renelt (1992), have demonstrated that investment as a share of GDP has a significant and 
positive effect on economic growth. 
Knowledge generated as a result of the introduction of the initiative is increasingly 
having a spillover effect. The Financial Times of London for instance reported that Mr 
Montague, former head of the projects arm of the PFI taskforce had been hired to play a 
key role in the privatization of the London Underground. He is also reported to be 
advising the Dutch Ministry of Finance on the development of that country's PPP (FT, 
2001a). In effect knowledge and expertise in this form of procurement strategy is not 
only being disseminated locally but is also becoming an export commodity, a 
requirement essential for economic growth. The initiative is therefore becoming an 
investment which is creating and revealing further opportunities, a necessary criterion for 
growth. 
Hopefully, the envisaged development of an equity market within the infrastructure 
industry should pave the way for the inflow of direct foreign investment into the UK 
economy; a condition recognized by development economists as essential for growth. It 
has for instance been noted that Japan for example has many rich people with huge 
amounts of money but very few safe places to invest in (FT 2001b). In theory, such 
surplus savings could flow into the UK infrastructure industry once an investment market 
is clearly established. 
Based on the principle that the PPP/PFI is expected to deliver value for money, that the 
level of service to be delivered to the customers will be better than if delivered by the 
public sector, and that in the long term this should influence the public sector to become 
more competitive in the management of public assets, the general effect on the 
macroeconomic climate of the nation should therefore be a positive one. Experience 
especially in the USA, has also shown that public-private partnerships have proved to be 
productive especially in the health sector and that efficiency gains have been realized in 
many public sector organizations (Rabin, 1992; Modic, 1989). In the same vein, there 
have been some disappointing results elsewhere especially in the developing countries for 
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example the cancellation of power project agreements in Pakistan, renegotiations of 
power and water agreements in India and Argentina respectively, and dispute over toll 
roads in Bangkok (Wells, 1999; Tam, 1999). 
One must however not lose sight of the fact that projects procured under PPP are long 
term in nature and therefore have the tendency to experience what is termed the 
'obsolescing bargain model' where the initial project drivers change with time (Wells, 
1999). In order to keep the innovative motif alive, the packaging of these 
projects/contracts should be such that slices within them can be revisited periodically for 
review to keep pace with the ever changing technological advancement necessary for 
economic growth. As a means of testing whether the objectives are actually being 
achieved on the ground, a number of projects that have successfully taken off need to be 
studied in detail against the initial base line situations. 
There is also the concern however that by turning capital into current expenditure, the 
cost of investments is passed to the future. This could have implications on the 
government's revenue expenditure in the light of PFI/PPP commitments being entered 
into by diverse organizations -a situation that might render control and monitoring 
difficult. A further observation was that in some instances such as the health projects, the 
PPP/PFI approach had delayed investment rather than encouraged it due to the rather 
long delays encountered during the procurement processes. An additional concern is that 
since the private sector is motivated essentially by profits, priorities might get distorted 
with profit making projects taking priority position over projects that might deliver social 
benefits generally. 
2.4.6 Difficulties associated with the PPP process 
Despites its global appeal and the anticipated benefits of the PPP concept, delays and 
spiraling bidding costs during the pre-contract stages have frequently been cited as major 
impediments in the implementation of this philosophy. This resulted in the expression of 
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dissatisfaction by the private sector participants in particular and in some cases the 
general public (The Herald, 2002; NAO, 1999a; Owen and Merna, 1999). 
The very diverse nature of the infrastructure procurement industry naturally makes the 
management of any new and innovative mode of procurement strategy, such as the PPP, 
much more difficult. The introduction of this new and innovative way of procuring 
infrastructure services means a change in the way the industry's services are rendered 
and/or purchased by the respective stakeholders. In some situations, it would require 
either partial and/or complete restructuring of the relationships between stakeholders. 
Change introduces risk and uncertainties; it is therefore not surprising that such delays, 
frustrations and the pre-contract cost overruns have been reported in the implementation 
of the PPP strategy for the procurement of infrastructure services. However this should 
not remain an endemic feature of the system. Hence the main objective of this study is 
investigate and develop a model that clearly identifies the key attributes that make the 
process work more efficiently and effectively. 
Although a number of successes have been reported on projects procured through the 
Public-Private Partnerships/Private Finance arrangements, there have been substantial 
teething problems associated with the process. This is particularly true of the initial stages 
of the process (The Herald, 2002; Yeo & Tiong, 2000; Tam, 1999; Owen & Merna, 
1999). Some of these relate to excessive delays during the bidding and negotiation stages 
and the associated high bidding and advisory costs, some of which run as high as 600% 
above their original estimates (Ahadzi & Bowles 200 1 b). 
The focus of this research however is on the risks encountered during the bidding or the 
pre-contact phase of the procurement process - the risks of pre-contract time and bidding 
cost overruns due mainly to the protracted negotiations. With the initial outlay in both 
human and capital investment during the bidding period already generally high for both 
the private sector consortium and the public sector client, any delays in the process will 
not only exacerbate the situation but will mean missed opportunities for the needed 
investment in the development and renewal of public infrastructure including missed 
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opportunities for economic and social advancement. Mott Macdonald (2002) in their 
published document - Review ofLarge Public Procurement in the UK - came up with the 
finding that due to the rather prolonged nature of the pre-contract stages of the PPP/PFI 
procurement process, their overall project completion times are longer as compared to 
other modes of procurement strategy such as the traditional form. Earlier research, 
(Ahadzi and Bowles, 2001b), identified the contract negotiation as the critical stage 
during which delays are most prominent. 
Wang, et al (2000), Ozdogamn & Birgonul (2000), Tam (1999), Treasury Taskforce 
(1997), Songer, et al (1997), UNIDO (1995), Drake (1994), Yates and Mukherjee (1993), 
have variously identified the key risk areas associated with privately financed 
infrastructure projects. These risk areas can be broadly categorised as Bidding, 
Construction and Operating Risks. Risks in privately financed infrastructure projects are 
heightened by the rather large capital outlays, the long lead-time and the fact that 
financiers will have to exclusively rely on the project cash flows for their returns. The 
genuine and prudent transfer and/or allocation of risks is therefore a critical factor in 
determining whether the private sector will respond positively to participate in a PPP/PFI 
bidding process including the realisation of main objective of value for money. When 
tenders for the first two PFI custodial services, i. e. Bridgend and Fazakerley prisons were 
received, none of the parties invited to tender felt able to comply with the Prison 
Services' terms and conditions relating to the nature of risks they were being asked to 
bear. The invitation to tender resulted in non-complaint bids, which was quite an 
expensive procedure (NAO, 1997b). 
A commonly stated problem with PPP procurement is the rather long time it takes to 
conclude a deal due to protracted negotiations, and the high cost associated with the 
process. Owen & Merna, (1999) have identified these problems as being the reason 
behind several high profile withdrawals during the early PPP/PFI tenders, resulting in 
some preferred bidders being selected by defaults as other competitors withdrew. Bidding 
for a PPP/PFI project is usually much more complex than for a traditional public sector 
project involving the appointment of top advisers and designers at a great fee in the 
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preparation of detailed design, comprehensive planning, extensive bid documentation, 
and lengthy clarifications. Jarvis, for example, had experienced dissatisfaction with some 
of its biggest schools PFI projects due to delays in the bidding process and increasing 
bidding costs, a situation which is reducing their profits by as much il 2m in their current 
financial year. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Finance Director of Carillion, 
one of the key players in the PPP projects, that bidding costs for PPP projects cost them 
f6m in the first half of 2003 and were expected to rise to fI 2m by the end of the year 
(Contract Journal, 2003). These developments have prompted suggestions from bidders 
that the public sector procurer compensates the bidders for some of the excessive bidding 
costs especially the second lowest bidder who is made to keep his bid on hold as a means 
of maintaining competitive pressure on the lowest bidder. 
There is also the added perception that public sector managers have been 'cocooned' in a 
culture of 'rules not deals' (Gallimore el al, 1996). Hence, it could be said that the public 
and private sector decision makers are dissimilarly conditioned in their attitude to risks 
and thus limiting sufficiency in the convergence of opinions on the level and degree of 
risk as to enable agreement on price to take place. 
Figure 2.15 gives an indication of the average cost of bidding for four DBFO (PFI) road 
projects at the various stages of the procurement process. Figure 2.16 also gives a 
comparative picture of the proportion of bidding costs to total project costs using the 
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The costs to the public sector departments in terms of consultancy and advisory fees have 
equally been quite high as exemplified in Table 2.3. Due to the uncertain scope of the 
works involved in letting the early PFI contracts, both the public sector agencies and the 
advisers found it difficult to set accurate budgets for advisers' costs. On some projects the 
principal advisers' costs were over 600% their initial estimates (NAO, 1999a p 49) 
Table 2.3 Advisory costs on some early PH projects 
Project Capital Value 
(EM) 
Advisory costs 
(Ern excluding VAIF) 
Dartford & 40ravcsham hospitals 94 2.36 
Carlisle NHS Trust Hospital 65 1.43 
South Buckinghamshire Hospital 45 2.6 
Norfolk and Norwich hospitals 144 4.43 
North Durharn hospital 61 1.83 
Bridgend 8c Fazakerley Prisons 162 
Source: NAO, 1999a p50 
The risk of procurement time and cost overruns has been a feature of most of the PPP/PFI 
projects. In the case of the A74(M)/M74 DBFO road project in Scotland for instance, as a 
result of the extensive consultations with the bidders, the procurement time scale had to 
be revised from 17 months to 27 months. The result of this revised time-scale and other 
unforeseen events was that the procurement costs to the public sector procurer increased 
from f 1.3m to E2.85m (NAO, 1999b). 
2.4.7 Level of research interest in the PPP Concept 
The concept of the PPP/PFI since its introduction in the UK in 1992 has generated some 
fair amount of research interest. Akintoye et aL, (2002); Bing Li et al., (2002) for 
example examined risk assessment and management within projects procured through the 
strategy. The Construction Industry Council (2000), also commissioned research into the 
role of cost saving and innovation in projects procured through the strategy. Pollock el 
al., (2002), also reviewed the value for money issues in PFI/PPP projects within the 
health sector. 
However despite the enormous amount of debate within both the media and in other 
forums about the rather expensive and time consuming nature of the process towards 
reaching agreement, there has not been an all embracing research encompassing, the 
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entire spectrum of attributes that impact on the successful implementation of the process 
during the pre-contract stages. This study therefore aims at developing a Generic Multi- 
Attribute Hierarchical Model, the essence of which is to add to the understanding of the 
importance of proactively identifying and managing these attributes during the complex 
contract negotiations in order to achieve win-win scenarios and value for money within 
these long term relational procurement strategy. The model should therefore act a 
practical framework for negotiators involved in the PPP/PFI procurement process so as to 
prepare themselves better for the complex negotiations. It should also help others in the 
business of contract negotiations to recognize the need for a broader perspective in their 
approach to the negotiation process. The study is based on the UK, a country in the 
forefront of not only adopting the strategy but also vigorously refining and promoting it 
internationally (D&P Report, 2001; Stone, 2001). 
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PART B: The Theory on Contract Negotiations and 
Bargaining 
2.5 Definition and Context 
According to McCall and Warrington (1989), negotiation is increasingly being viewed as 
a relatively universal phenomenon. They define it as follows: 
Negotiation is any sequence of written andlor verbal communication process whereby 
parties to both common and conflicting commercial interests and of differing cultural 
backgrounds consider the form of any joint action they might take in pursuit of their 
individual objectives which will define or redefine the terms of their interdependence. 
The process is thus a result of the need for resolution of conflict. It is a dynamic process 
of adjusting by which two parties, each with their own objectives, confer together to 
reach a mutually satisfying agreement on a matter of common interest. This should lead 
both parties to emphasize the cooperative nature of their relationship and to convert as far 
as possible the issues dividing them into problems to be solved in order to increase their 
total benefits or joint utility (Marsh, 2001; Kennedy el aL, 1987). 
In the realm of contract negotiations, the procurer's and the contractor's terms and 
conditions, the financial, technical and commercial differences, which in turn are linked 
to their respective organization's objectives, will be the focus of issues on which they 
seek agreement. Each party would have differing views represented at the negotiation 
table on these issues for which each side would be striving to gain an advantage, with the 
result that where the negotiating atmosphere is distributive rather than integrative where 
reciprocity is key to resolving issues, the process could be prolonged unnecessarily. 
McCall and Warrington (1989) citing the works of Galbraith (1975), indicated that as a 
result of the increasing development and technical complexity of products and the 
processes by which they are manufactured, the web of contracts to secure the price and 
supply of the products and services, continue to expand. As a result, millions of contracts 
are in existence at any time with tens of thousands negotiated each week. Contract 
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negotiation in the planning system is therefore a major preoccupation. A businessman at 
anytime is thus negotiating a contract, assembling information that allows him to do so, 
contemplating the renewal of a contract or considering the cancellation of a contract. 
Within the world of commerce, contracts that are a subject of negotiation in respect of 
specification, price and payment conditions, delivery, performance and other terms of 
concern to the parties. The negotiations are frequently opened by the prospective client 
often after discussions with the prospective supplier/contractor, by first asking the 
supplier/contractor to quote against the former's requirements. This is often the case with 
engineering products of the capital goods variety or with products of high elements of 
technology where the client/buyer relies on the judgment of the supplier/contractor to 
meet his/her requirements. The resultant quotation is normally an offer subject to the 
seller's conditions of sale, and is open for acceptance unless it is qualified to show that 
the proposal is a negotiating step only. The PPP/PFI procurement is basically structured 
in a similar fashion where the public sector organization, seeking to procure services 
from the private sector, solicits an offer through invitation to negotiate and provides his 
requirements by way of output specifications. The resulting response from the private 
sector becomes an offer subject to negotiations. 
The process of bargaining can again be defined as an interaction that occurs when two or 
more persons attempt to agree on a mutually acceptable outcome in a situation where 
their orders of preference for possible outcomes are negatively correlated. In situations of 
this nature, a number of proposed settlements of the mixed-motive conflict can be offered 
so that both sides can have the opportunity of improving their outcomes provided 
agreement can be reached. The process towards reaching agreement therefore involves 
interpersonal bargaining which is a common method of resolving conflicts. Hence the 
most prevalent concern in bargaining research has been to identify the factors that 
determine whether an agreement can be reached, and the amount of time required to 
reach an agreement. Others include the nature of the agreement and the degree of 
satisfaction with the agreement, and the commitment to carry it out (Hammer & Yukl, 
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1977) 
2.5.1 Bargaining types during negotiations 
Writers on negotiation and bargaining have identified two types of bargaining during any 
form of negotiations (Raifa H, 1982; Ury W, 1992; McCall and Warrington, 1989). These 
are the distributive and integrative types of bargaining. Contract negotiations for major 
infrastructure projects tend to be the distributive type as both sides generally try to settle 
mainly over price. This is particularly true with the traditional form of procurement. In 
construction contract negotiations in particular, every conflict on issues has implications 
for costs and outcomes. The more issues there are, the greater the opportunity there will 
be to explore how resources and in particular risks will be exchanged or shared. 
Z5.1.1 Distributive bargaining 
Within this type of bargaining, the parties are concerned with establishing the negotiating 
range by taking up their extreme positions in relation to the issues about which they are in 
conflict. These extreme positions reflect the most hopeful objectives of the parties, as 
distinct from those they would like to settle at, and represent the starting point for the 
assessment of the feasibility of demands. Some of these objectives will not be known 
prior to the negotiation and will have to be established during the negotiation process. 
Most negotiators will seek to convince their opponent that their opening position is their 
limit. The reality is that a negotiator's behaviour is rarely accommodating to the extent 
that he will move all the way towards his opponent's position. It is more likely that the 
implications of the positions taken up will be assessed. 
According to McCall and Warrington (1989), research into the effects of early 
cooperative or competitive attitudes on the course of negotiation led to the conclusion 
that the early initiation of cooperative behaviour tends to promote the development of 
trust and a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship, and that early competitive 
behaviour tends to induce mutual suspicion and competition. 
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Distributive bargaining tends to be generally exhibited at the early stages of the 
negotiation process. Negotiators often consider it appropriate for this stage of negotiation 
to be used to test limits and a variety of behaviours with their opponents before 
committing themselves to a particular stance. It has been established that a hostile act in 
the early stages of a relationship is far less likely to induce a retaliatory response than one 
performed at the later stages. However it is vital that trust is quickly established at this 
stage. Once established, mutual trust allows negotiators to adopt a cooperative pattern of 
behaviour that may prevail throughout the negotiations. Maxwell et al (2003) for 
example have established that extreme position taking at any negotiation has a spiraling 
effect where each side tries to adopt a tit-for-tat attitude. 
Bargaining is generally done within the perspective of conflict resolving behaviour. This 
has for example been developed into two dimensions of behaviour, i. e. 
assertive/unassertive and uncooperative/cooperative. The assertive/unassertive behaviour 
tend to measure the extent to which a party seeks to satisfy his own objectives and the 
uncooperative/cooperative measure the extent to which s/he attempts to satisfy other's 
objective. This sort of dimensions of behaviour in conflict resolution is demonstrated in 
Figure 2.17 
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Figure 2.17 Conflict-handling behaviour open to negotiators 
Source: McCall and Warrineton (1989) 
According to McCall and Warrington (1989) avoiding and accommodating behaviours 
are not normally expected in negotiations. To them, if they do occur, behaviour of the 
avoiding type will result in breakdown and behaviour of the accommodating type would 
result in agreements being made immediately by acceptance of the accommodating 
behaviour. Competing is a behavioural state whose outcome is based on power (Kennedy 
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et al, 1987). A competing approach has to be matched by a complete accommodation by 
the other side, otherwise agreement is unlikely. Collaborating behaviour is based on the 
premise that a joint problem solving operative provides for the most mutual advantageous 
outcome. Such an approach is seen to have the ability to create alternatives which 
increase the total benefits from which both parties share more than they would from a 
compromise outcome. Compromising is a strategy which is directed at resolving conflict 
by give and take on both sides. 
Z5.1.2 Integrative Bargaining 
This mode of bargaining is characterized by movements toward reaching an agreement 
based on problem solving through synergy. To be able to adopt this mode of bargaining it 
is important to overcome what is termed the concession dilemma where either as a result 
of the fear of losing face and the danger of antagonizing an opponent through appearing 
to be more and more committed to an earlier position, the parties tend to stay poles apart. 
One approach to avoid such a situation according to Morley and Stephenson (1977), is to 
adopt the principle of conveying without commitment by way of indicating behaviour. 
This is done by each negotiator asking questions where s/he gives his opponent the 
chance to develop aspects of his/her objectives. 
Any negotiator who chooses to be uncooperative induces uncooperative behaviour in the 
opponent as well. Where a negotiator is cooperative, the need for the opponent to 
maintain face is reduced and cooperation is generally reciprocated. Under such 
circumstances there is a synergistic joint effort aimed at not only distributing the pie in a 
mutually advantageous manner but rather increasing the size of the pie that needs to be 
shared. This is achieved by keeping issues linked as reflected in package deals or tie-ins. 
The package deal involves proposals to settle generally related issues simultaneously 
while tie-ins involve the introduction of issues that may be extraneous to a given set, with 
the stipulation that the settlement of the set is dependent on the satisfactory agreement on 
the extraneous issues as well. The trade-off resulting from such concessions are more 
efficient because they lead to significantly high joint outcome distribution. The greater 
the number of issues, the greater the pressure to differentiate between them, and to 
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separate them into different packages according to their importance or into some form of 
grouping. 
In a nutshell, distributive bargaining tends to deal with issues as the subject matter while 
integrative bargaining focuses on problem solving. According to Walton & McKersie 
(1965), issues involve a fixed total objective value, which in its pure form would require 
that whatever gain is available to one party necessarily entails a corresponding and equal 
sacrifice by the other party. On the other hand, problems are agenda items which contain 
possibilities for greater or lesser amounts of value which can be made available to the 
parties, the outcomes of which the two parties would be equally concerned. Pruit & 
Lewis (1977) identified integrative bargaining as a creative process in which new options 
are discovered during the negotiations process, representing a set of all possible solutions 
to the bargaining problem at hand. The distributive bargaining model is therefore equated 
to the win-lose mindset during the negotiations while the integrative type equates to win- 
win approach. 
2.5.2 The bargaining framework/continuum 
The initial positions parties adopt during negotiations do take into consideration 
expectations of a pattern of responsive concessions occurring over the bargaining period. 
The bargaining outcome therefore rests between the initial offer of the contractor and 
what the client specifies as the top limit of what s/he will pay. For every offer where there 
is an element of possible negotiations, the bidder will build into the offer concessions or 
contingency features in excess of his/her target objective which may be his/her minimum 
below which s/he will not be prepared to go. The area between what the contractor has 
offered and what the client is prepared to pay for is what is termed in negotiations as the 
bargaining arena (Kennedy el al, 1987). This is illustrated in Figure 2.18 overleaf, In 
situations where what the bidder wants is in excess of what the client is prepared to pay, 
no agreement will follow until both parties have altered the expectations of the other. 
Where the overlap between the bidder's and the client's limit is small as in (1), neither 
will see possible outcomes as a fair deal to him/herself unless each of them can alter the 
other's expectations, or by cooperation, enlarge the bargaining overlap. Where there is 
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sufficient bargaining room for each to go away satisfied that s/he has made an 
advantageous agreement, an agreement will be reached much more easily and quickly as 
depicted in (2). In situations where there is no overlap as in (3), it is unlikely for the 
parties to reach an agreement and the likelihood is a breakdown in the negotiations unless 
the parties' expectations can be considerably altered. 








Figure 2.18 The bargaining zone during negotiations 
Source: Adapted ftom McCall and Warrington (1989) and Kennedy et al (1987). 
Strategically, where a party to the negotiation can be able to obtain information which 
s/he can use advantageously to alter the expectations of the other party by emphasizing 
the parties need for the benefits to be derived from the outcome of the negotiations, s/he 
will be attempting to alter the bargaining and the settlement areas and thus improving his 
satisfaction of the outcome of the negotiations. The bargaining and settlement areas can 
thus be altered through information elicited durmg the interactions which is a strategic 
function of the face-to-face situation (McCall & WwTingotn, 1989). 
2.5.3 The Cycle of negotiation 
The process of negotiation takes place in a series of ascending time scales. First there is 
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the short period during when the negotiators must prepare for and execute the initial 
approach; then follows the period when the parties must reach agreement for the common 
interest to be realized. The third period is when the contract is at an implementation 
stage. During this period the agreement itself operates and may give rise to the need of 
further negotiations. Finally there is the very extended period within which the parties 
contemplate a continuing commercial relationship and which in certain circumstances can 
be regarded as infinite. Such final stages in, for example, the supply of equipment may 
involve the regular/periodic maintenance of such equipment by the supplier (Marsh, 
200 1). Progression from one time scale to the other does not just happen by itself. It often 
needs very considerable skills of sensitivity, communication and judgment on the part of 
the parties to effect movement through the stages. Table 2.4 shows the stages and the 
skills required in any negotiation process especially contract negotiations. 
Tahla IA Tho IrwMa ntNoantiatinn 
Stages Skills required within each stage anal what it takes to effect rnývcmcnt 
V-rn one stage to the other. 
Pro-NoU. ti. ti. n Stage Sicilia needed In the negotiation prneess 
- determine objectives in relation to environmental and known or likely 
factors. 
establish best level of first offer where appropriate 
iclcntifý, e where passible. nature of the issues to be resolved. if necessary by 
the interactive process-. 
identif),, passible intangible issues 
plan the negotiations clig by idcntifýyinlg and building in trade-affs; 
prepare alternative courses of action to meet different contingencies. 
establish authority limits 
Skills needed to move to the next Stolle 
- make where necessary. written and/or aral presentation& such as quotations. 
bids. or propositions fbr mutually dependent activities. of such a quality an to 
elicit a positive response to open nestatiatians 
t3istributive 13arlimining Skills needed In the negotiation process 
stage - test limits and further isolate Issues. 
- Identify factors In the situation that effect relative power 
- idcntifýo whether cooperative or competitive strategic* should be adopted-, 
- establish preference and needs afthe opposing party 
Skills noodecl to move to the next stage 
- convey without commitment. by use of Indicating behaviour. implying 
willingness to move from and entrenched position provided same movement 
in made in return by the appaser 
- achieve a positive response by appropriate verbal and nan-varbal/crass 
cultural skills 
Integrative Hargaininit; Skills needed In the negotiation process 
Stolle . be aware of own and opponents style of behaviour; 
- adapt appropriate conflict handling models-, 
- exercise the range of interpersonal attributes, especially those concerned 
with communication and influencing: 
- maintain flexibility of movement be keeping issues linked In face of 
proposals and counter proposals 
- elicit infbrmation regarding tangible and intangible Issues end reformulate 
an necessary. objectives and strategy 
Skills needed to move to the next stage 
- persuade the opponent by moves and cauntermaves to bargain away what is 
unacceptable to him/her 
1.3celsi-Making and Skills needed In the negotiation process 
. *. Cti. n Stella - access interaction of factors bearing an outcome and to make a judgement 
by means of a package or packages. and of what is acceptable in terms of 
exchange or divisions afresaurces 
- test far understanding and agreement 
- select appropriate closing technique. cill summarizing or making a 
concession 
Skill. needed to move ta the next stage 
confirm In writing what has been agreed in a way -hich reflect. the 
i established u derstanding afthe parties 
Post-Neu"tiattlan Stage Skills needed In the negotiation process 
- draw up or accept contractual or other agreement which reflect the 
established understanding and the realities of legal interpretation 
I 
- pravida far review or revision In the liaht affactor chanixes. 
Source: adapted from McCall and Warrington (1989) 
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Viewed in the context of the above stages of negotiation, the PPP procurement concept 
fully encompasses all the above time scales, a process that involves, short-listing, 
invitation to negotiate, submission of tenders, and tender negotiations and the operating 
phase where there would continually be opportunities to reopen certain aspects of the 
contract due to technological changes over time. 
2.6 The role of Time in Contract Negotiations 
Time plays two principal functions in any contract negotiations; i. e. time as a function of 
economic consequence in terms of cost, and time as strategic and psychological element 
of the negotiation process. According to Kennedy et al (1987), any party going to a 
negotiating table sets his/her optimal outcome based on: 
a) the time which would be expended to secure each outcome over the range of those 
foreseen as possible and the related time cost and discount factor among other 
considerations. 
b) the opponent's resistance to a range of possible demands. 
2.6.1 Time as a function of Economic Consequences 
Time represents a critical function of the bargaining process itself Time limits at some 
stage in the negotiations, are the rule rather than the exception in every commercial and 
contractual practice. The weighting to be given to time factor relative to the achievement 
of the outcome of a negotiation will reflect not only the cost involved and the discounting 
loss but also the need to secure the business quickly in relation to forward orders and 
work in hand in the case of the contractor. In respect of the client organization, this may 
represent the benefits lost as a result of the delays in bringing the project forward for the 
services to be delivered. These costs for the public sector client could be an 
embarrassment and a strain on existing facilities for example school projects. 
A contractor or bidder's influence on the time scale for a contract award arises first from 
the levels of the initial offer. In general the higher the initial offer, provided that is not so 
high as to kick him/her out of the competition or the bid being recognized as pure 
'padding', the longer the negotiations will take. The second way in which the contractor 
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influences the negotiating time is through his/her decision regarding the rate at which 
s/he will concede and the minimum bargain s/he is willing to accept. The more 
favourable the bargain required by the contractor, the longer will be the negotiating 
period and hence the higher the time cost may be. 
The decision rule for any contractor submitting a bid is to submit the bid at a level which 
will maximize his/her subjective utility value. The first influence on the contractor in 
determining the conditional utility value to him/her of a bid at any particular price level 
will be the profit contribution given by that price level. Other factors may include the 
longer term marketing benefits which the contractor might derive from an award of the 
project, which may include securing the recognition as a competent contractor in the 
particular market through the prestige value of the contract and the having the 
opportunity to obtain a follow-on business (Marsh, 200 1). 
During any contract negotiation, the more favaourable the term demanded by the client 
side the longer the likely of the negotiations prolonging unnecessarily and the higher will 
be the time cost. Theses cost could essentially be in the form of. 
The loss of revenue or additional expenditure in which the client will be involved 
due to delay in starting the works and therefore completing it and the associated 
loss of revenue if it a commercial venture; and at the same time involving the 
client in paying interest charges on capital already expended. 
If the tender is not on fixed price basis, the escalating costs for the works being 
completed later especially in times of inflation could erode the expected gains 
from further negotiations. 
The actual cost of the negotiation itself in terms of the allocation of staff involved 
and those of the supporting staff to the negotiations 
iv) Prolonged negotiations can also render the validity periods of the tender to lapse. 
In situations where the contractors finds that s/he will be in better position if the 
tender is annulled, the entire pre-contract activities could be an exercise in 
futility, and at an immense cost to the client. 
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V) Dislocation costs whereby works may have to be carried out at overtime hours in 
order to meet deadlines, all at an extra cost. 
In the same vein the contractor suffers time costs in terms of manpower, the loss of 
possible revenue by not picking up some other competing projects which would probably 
have taken off much more quickly than the one under negotiations. Interest charges on 
funds invested in the preparation of the tender could also be mounting. In giving 
concessions therefore, the contractor will weigh the level of the time cost against the 
concession s/he expects from the client. Where the time cost is considered to be rising 
higher than the concession, the tendency would be to give in rather than risk a no bargain. 
2.6.2 Time as a strategic and psychological tool 
At the very outset of the negotiation, a negotiating time frame or limit could be 
established, or in situations where a specific time limit does not exist, one is subsequently 
created unilaterally by one side issuing a demand for the negotiation to be completed by a 
defined date, often accompanied by a statement as to the terms upon which s/he requires 
agreement to be reached. An approaching deadline thus brings pressure to bear which 
actually changes the least favourable terms upon which each party is willing to settle. 
Strategically, the stronger party within the negotiation could impose a time limit to the 
bargaining process and follow it with a threat with full commitment to carry out such 
threat. These threats could be in the form of stating that if a particular concession is not 
reciprocated by a particular time and date then s/he will pull out of the deal knowing very 
well that a no bargain will hurt the weaker party more (Kennedy et al, 1987). 
The deterrent effect of any threat will depend on the extent of commitment by the person 
making the threat to carry it out, and the degree to which the other party believes the 
threat can be carried out which is further influenced by latter's perception of the level of 
injury he/she would suffer as a result. This loss/injury could be counted in both economic 
and personal injury terms i. e. injury to his her own personal reputation in terms of his/her 
personal goals. Within such dilemma, a negotiator will only put his/her reputation at 
stake after carefully weighing the costs of the threat being implemented. The authority 
and reputation of the person issuing the threat thus becomes a big factor. This authority 
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and strength may be obtained in a variety of ways - through personal experience and 
expertise, through the power base of the organization the negotiator represents; and the 
level of dependence of the one party on the other (McCall and Warrington, 1989). 
Within the context of PPP contract negotiations, a dedicated bid manager with the right 
level of authority and reputation could thus effect a speedy negotiation with use of subtle 
threats. Same could be said of the public sector team represented by powerful champions 
with the appropriate amount of authority. The skills and personals traits of the negotiation 
team leader will therefore have a profound effect on the negotiation process in terms of 
how long it takes to conclude the deal. Some of these will include his ability to lead a 
negotiating team as opposed to any purely technical skills he may possess; of generating 
enthusiasm in his team; maintaining their morale under all conditions; and obtaining from 
each member of the team their maximum contribution which s/he is capable of providing; 
and flexible communication during the negotiations and with members of the 
organization s/he is representing in respect of the direction to take. 
Time pressure can also be created in the opposite direction where, for example, one party 
during the negotiation deliberately extends the negotiation so that the other party is left 
uncertain of the former's real intentions. This tactics is most effectively used where the 
client is negotiating with two or more suppliers. This situation could be likened to where 
the second lowest bidder is put on hold in the case of some earlier PPP procurements. 
This creates a nervous strain on the private sector negotiator. The result could be an 
irresistible temptation to accept terms and/or give concessions that under normal 
situations would not have been given. 
2.7 Interacting factors that influence negotiation outcomes 
McCall & Warrington (1989) developed an outline of interplay of factors that influence 
the conduct and outcome of negotiations. They identified four main categories of 
influence centers on individual negotiators. These main centers of influence are the 
behavioural predisposition of the negotiator, their influence strategies and skills, the 
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situational influences and the environmental influences. Behavioural disposition accounts 
for such elements as the self image of the negotiator, his/her motives, perceptions and 
attitudes; interpersonal orientation and sensitivity to interpersonal relationships; 
cooperative/competitive disposition; experience; and willingness to take risks. The 
influence strategies and skills of parties would encompass such factors as the level of the 
presentation of the case; the level of the proposals; their power base; communication 
skills; and conflict handling modes. On the other hand, the situational factors may include 
such elements as conflicts of interest and/or rights; the degree of mutual dependence of 
the parties and the distribution of power between them; the objective of the parties; and 
the level of the first offer. The environmental influences may include macro environment 
such as the legal, political, economic and technological factors; and the micro 
environment relating to the organizational strategies and structures. The outline of these 
influence factors is as shown in Figure 2.19 below. 
--. 
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Figure 2.19 Negotiating factor interactions 
Source: Adapted form McCall & Warrington (1989) 
Viewed in the light of the above outline, past precedents which a contractor has 
established with the client and the contractor's experience in dealing with the individual 
negotiators for the client, the personality of the individual negotiators for each side, and 
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their knowledge of and respect for each other's skill, will come into play during the 
negotiations. Additionally, the way the client views his/her long term relationship with 
the contractor and his/her expectation of the contractor's willingness to respect the 
client's viewpoint taking into account the prospect of future business may influence the 
conduct of the negotiations and its outcome. A situational influence with respect to the 
objectives of the parties in negotiating the contract may include the effect which the 
granting of the concessions will have on the client's business with other firms, and the 
ratio which the contractor's business with the client bears to client's business as a whole 
in the particular field. The client is more likely to grant concessions if these can be 
isolated from the remainder of his/her business and if the proportion of the total business 
affected by such concession is small. 
On the environmental influences, mandatory requirements imposed on the client either 
from the existence of rules internal to the organization, national laws and in some cases 
international laws may have a strong influence on the way the negotiations are conducted. 
These factors apply strongly to contracts placed by government or government controlled 
agencies where accountability by public servants is very strong. The public sector client 
faced with such a situation would consider the level of adverse criticisms that his/her 
organization might face from either political opponents, local interest groups and the 
media. This possibility may lead the client to adopt low concessions factors and behave 
accordingly, while in reality be prepared to concede more if the concessions can be 
structured in such a way that any external criticisms can be minimized. 
Organizational culture also comes into play during negotiations. The individual in any 
organization is forged into a community where all the members tend to form a common 
mental set or perceptions. Thus while the private sector organization may as a result of its 
organizational culture pursue profit as its main motivational goal and thus groomed in 
that cultural mindset, the public sector procurer may, as a result of the rigid rules and 
regulations relating to accountability, become cocooned in these rules and regulations as 
part of its culture. Every organization thus manifests a strong evidence of providing a 
sub-culture which reflects a distinctive set of meanings shared by a group of people 
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whose form of behaviour differs to some extent from those of other organizations 
(Turner, 1971). Anyone entering into negotiation with a public sector client should then 
know that s/he is going to bargain with an opponent who operates against a background 
of decision rules which differ in many ways from those of the private sector - differences 
that have important implications for the outcome of the negotiations. The organization 
member then turns to become what s/he speaks and writes, particularly in an 
organizational context. In this respect both the public sector and the private sector at a 
negotiating table may approach same issues in differing perspectives and thus making it 
quite difficult to reach early agreement on issues. 
One of the ways of overcoming these cultural barriers would be the opportunities 
provided when both parties work together over a period of time or having worked 
together before the outset of the new project. Having worked together before may also 
increase the level of socialization necessary for cooperative and mutually beneficial form 
of bargaining identified under integrative bargaining. The complete communication 
framework of words, actions posture, gestures, tones of voice, facial expressions, the way 
time and work are handled , the way one defends him/herself; are all a complete 
communication systems with meaning that can only be read correctly only when the 
parties are familiar with each other. Once that awareness is achieved, a negotiator will be 
in a position to exercise the cultural sensitivity necessary for successful social interaction 
between negotiators of deferring organizational and cultural backgrounds (Hall, 2000). 
The cultural variability is not only an issue between the private sector and the public 
sector client alone. The formation of a Special Purpose Vehicle by the private sector for 
any PPP project involves the coming together of a number of organizations who may 
have varying degrees of objectives and cultural mindsets. There is therefore bound to be 
tendencies of differentiation among the individual private sector companies forming the 
consortium. These differences may also have a significant influence on the negotiation 
process and outcome. Leadership then becomes a critical element in the process towards 
achieving a successful negotiation outcome. The leader is an integral part of the group 
organization. The most significant factor in the exercise of leadership in the negotiation 
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process is the personal ties between the leader and members of the team and acting as a 
strong champion with a conviction that the process will work to their mutual benefit. 
One important factor which arises from the mutual dependence inherent in any voluntary 
relationships as envisaged through negotiations for such long term contracts as the 
PPP/PFI, is the relative power that exists between the two organizations/parties. If here is 
an over dependence of one party on another, that party is in a position of relative 
weakness in relation to the other party. This will thus have a bearing on the negotiation 
objectives and eventual outcome, especially where the stronger party decides to exercise 
that power. These kinds of power may come from a variety of sources. They could be 
environmental, consisting of such issues as the level of competition within the industry. 
Where, for example, there is a prolonged absence of traditional projects within the 
industry, competition for projects of the PPP/PFI type may be fierce, unless the project is 
so unique that only a limited number of firms can bid for it. In situations of such nature, 
the client is in a relatively stronger position of power and may be able to determine the 
terms. On the other hand, a bidder eager to secure the project so as to maintain his/her 
fixed overheads may be more flexible during the negotiations. This sort of power may be 
termed an external environment factor as neither party has in effect any significant 
control over it. If, however, there is a flood of traditional projects in the economy, bidders 
will be in a position of stronger relative power. In fact the relative power between the 
parties can change over the course of the negotiations especially when the negotiating 
period becomes so prolonged as was witnessed in the early days of the PPP/PFI 
procurement, where some prospective contractors had to withdraw from the competitions 
and in some instances there were no responses to the invitations to negotiate resulting in 
abortive bids. 
2.8 Summary 
In any major business transaction such as those envisaged under the PPP/PFI 
procurement, the goals and objectives desired by one party may create actual or potential 
costs or risks for the other party. Under such circumstance therefore, responsibilities, 
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costs, risks and the rewards need to be discussed, understood, and allocated in an honest 
and open manner through an effort designed to avoid misunderstanding and deception. 
This can only be achieved through a sound negotiation framework where both parties 
work together in a cooperative negotiating environment for their mutual and optimum 
benefit. Despite the eagerness of national and local governments to adopt the PPP 
procurement route as a means of clearing the backlog in infrastructure development and 
maintenance, the literature revealed a growing concern for the rather long delays and the 
excessive bidding costs associated with the process towards the formalization of the 
contracts due to the rather protracted negotiations. 
The literature on negotiation/bargaining theory revealed certain important elements 
which could be beneficially applied to the negotiating processes when procuring the 
PPP/PFI projects. Chapter 3 develops on this negotiation theory and concepts in line with 
the principles and procedures of PPP/PFl pre-contract negotiation process by clearly 
identifying the key factors necessary in pushing forward the negotiation process in an 
efficient and timely manner. This will be achieved through identifying and analyzing 
attributes relating to the consortium, the public sector procurer, the project and the 
external environment that have profound influence on the outcome of the pre-contract 
negotiation processes. 
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Chapter 3 Formulation ofthe preliminary model and research hypotheses 
Chapter 3: Formulation of the preliminary model and research 
hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to ascertain the strategic choice in selecting topical 
domains for the development of the multi-attribute hierarchical model based on the 
review of the literature on contract negotiations and bargaining theory. The process 
therefore involves scanning the existing literature in search of the constructs that have 
some established evidence of empirical reliability and validity in negotiation theory in 
particular and in the management literature in general. The comprehensive topical content 
of the preliminary model will be displayed at the end of the chapter. This preliminary 
model will then act as a guide in the development of the survey questionnaire based on 
the underlying dimensions of the topical content. 
The most prevalent concern in bargaining research has been to identify the factors that 
determine the outcome of the negotiation in terms of a) whether an agreement will be 
reached, b) the amount of time required to reach an agreement, c) the nature of the 
agreement, and d) the degree of satisfaction with the agreement and the commitment to 
carry it out (Naquin, 2003; Maxwell et al, 2003; Brett et al, 1998; Phatak & Habib 1996; 
McCall & Warrington, 1989). 
3.2 Outline of the Preliminary Model 
The review of the literature in Chapter 2 and the various interviews conducted during the 
early stages of this study and information gathered at workshops on the PPP/PFI, 
identified the key elements that may influence the outcome of any negotiations and in 
particular PPP/PFI contract negotiations. Each component of the model will be 
considered in detail in order to unearth their underlying dimensions which will then be 
subjected to statistical analysis after a questionnaire survey in order to develop a generic 
multi-attribute hierarchical model. The outline of the model is provided in Figure 3.1 
overleaf. 
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This model is based fundamentally on the Negotiaition Factor Interaction model 
developed by McCall and Warrington, (1989) as shown in Figure 3.2, and the contextual 
model proposed by Phatak and Habib (1996). McCall and Warrington, (1989) in their 
research on commercial negotiations, identified such main factors as behavioural 
disposition of the parties to the negotiation, and their influence strategies as affecting the 
outcome of commercial negotiations. They included other factors as the situational 
influences and the external environmental influences. 
Tile Phatab and Habib (1996) model, considered the negotiation process and outcome in 
the context of two major influencing factors - the ininiediate context and the external 
environinent context. They linked the external environmental context to forces that are 
beyond the control of either party involved in the negotiations - the dimensions of which 
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included legal and political pluralism, currency fluctuations and exchange controls, 
government controls and bureaucracy, the influence of external stakeholders, cultural 
differences and ideology. The immediate context included such aspects as the relative 
power of the negotiators and the nature of their interdependence over which the 
negotiators have influence and some measure of control. The other underlying 
dimensions of immediate context included levels of conflict underlying potential 
negotiations, relationships between negotiators before and during the negotiations, the 
desired outcome of the negotiations, and impact of immediate stakeholders. 
A number of other researchers also identified a host of influencing factors, such as the 
manner in which the case is presented, the pattern of moves, communication and the 
development of thrust; the negotiators' motives, personal values, competitive/cooperative 
disposition, previous interactions, experience and willingness to take risks. Others factors 
include the objectives of the parties in relation to the perceived issues, the level of the 
first offer, the degree of mutual dependence of the parties and the distribution of power 
between them, the extent of conflict of interest and perceptual distortions, and the degree 
of overlap between the objectives of the two parties (Naquin, 2003; Maxwell et al, 2003; 
Brett et al, 1998; Kennedy et al, 1987; Marsh, 2001; Webster, 1984; Raifa H, 1982; Ury 
W, 1992; Hill & Hillier, 1977; Seaton AN. 1976; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Stephenson, 
1971; Turner, 1971; Walton & McKersie, 1965). The sections that follow therefore 
review the literature under the main components of the model in order to identify their 
underlying dimensions towards the development of the hierarchical model. 
3.3 The Consortium 
Walton and McKersie (1965) in their ground breaking research on labour negotiations 
emphasized four basic ingredients of any meaningful negotiations, i. e. (i) a configuration 
and a dynamic interaction of the negotiating parties; (ii) an awareness of inherent conflict 
of interest in a decision-making situation out of which the parties must wish to solve 
common problems or wish to integrate their interests in other ways; (iii) the desire to 
change or maintain the basic attitude of trust and friendliness between them; and (iv) the 
69 
Chapter 3 Formulation of the preliminary model and research hypotheses 
parties being responsible for achieving consensus or acceptance within their respective 
groups. 
The PPP concept of procuring public projects is an embodiment of a long-term 
relationship just as it is in labour-management relationships. The very nature of the way it 
is organized and the number of parties involved makes the above ingredients very 
relevant in the context of the PPP contract negotiations. Not only are the parties striving 
to resolve their differences in term of the project requirements but they must equally 
strive to satisfy the varying objectives of the respective interest groups within both the 
public sector organization and the private sector consortium. 
A number of researchers have examined the role contractors play in the general 
procurement of infrastructure projects. Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1998) for 
example identified available capacity of the contracting industry and the performance of 
the contractors as some of the influencing factors in the choice of even a procurement 
strategy, since the choice of the strategy may have a profound effect on the eventual 
outcome of the project. 
3.3.1 Experience 
According Brehmer and Hammond (1977), successful negotiation is hard to achieve, not 
only because the judgment tasks are complex but also because judgments are produced 
by a poorly understood process. They argued that human judgment is best characterized 
as a quasi-rational process where there is interplay of a mixture of analysis, intuition and 
experience. Experience in the context of this research has been grouped into three 
categories: - 
a) experience of the firms constituting the Consortium of having worked together in 
the past, 
b) experience of the Consortium having worked with the public sector organization, 
and 
c) Consortium's previous experience in project procurement through the PPP route. 
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Within the negotiation and bargaining literature it has been documented that a bargainer 
will fail to make concessions because s/he distrusts the opponents (Walton & McKersie, 
1965). The opportunity of having worked with a particular client in the past would 
provide an avenue to develop trust and thus enhance the possibility of reaching an early 
and mutually negotiated settlement. 
Negotiation is an art for which skills must be developed. Over the past three decades, 
infrastructure procurement has primarily been based on the traditional form of 
procurement where the client clearly defines what is to be produced. The result is that 
bidders are literally bidding from a common platform where the successful bidder is 
chosen principally on the basis of the lowest priced bid as pre-qualification would have 
determined the technical capabilities of the contractors in advance. This traditional form 
of procuring the services of contractors could be likened to what is referred to in the 
marketing literature as routinized-exhange where the terms are established by 
administered programmes of pricing and distribution (Kotler, 1997). Hence it would be 
fair to conclude that the relevant skills for pre-contract negotiations have some decades 
now been lacking both within the private sector and public sector. 
Citing the works of Dobler (1990), Kotler indicated that contract negotiations become 
necessary: 
" when many factors bear not only on price, but also on quality and service; 
" when business risks cannot be predetermined accurately; 
" when a long period of time is required to produce the item or service; 
" when production is interrupted frequently because of frequent change order. 
The concept of the PPP procurement strategy has of necessity introduced the element of 
negotiation as bidders are now being called upon not only to submit proposals and 
innovative designs that meet the output specifications of the client, but also the long term 
commitment of maintaining and operating the constructed facilities for periods of up to 
30 years or more. Infrastructure procurement is thus moving away from the domain of a 
one-off transaction-oriented to that of relationship-oriented form of contracting, the later 
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of which negotiation becomes an inevitable element in establishing the necessary 
relationships, which is referred to in marketing literature as customer-delivered value 
which incorporates the difference between total customer value and total customer cost. 
Total customer value covers such elements as product value, services value, personnel 
value and image value; while total customer cost include monetary cost, time cost, energy 
cost and psychic cost (Kotler, 1997). 
Trust is also vital for the success of such relationship-transactions and this can only be 
established through initial dialogue and discussions. Hammer & YukI (1977) citing the 
works of Siegel and Farouker affirmed that as negotiations progress the successive bids 
seem to give experience to the bargainer enabling him/her to establish a realistic level of 
aspiration; a situation that enables him/her to find means by which concessions can be 
made to the opponent. The repeated participation in the process will therefore not only 
sharpen the skills of the negotiator but where it involves two opposing parties having 
interacted in an earlier project, it should enhance the process further. 
There is evidence in the management literature that as teams work together they begin to 
form and norm together. If the Consortium members have had the opportunity of having 
worked to together, this would help the process of bonding together through the 
development of thrusting relationships, an ingredient for quick and sound decision 
making and consensus building. Obviously, the levels of concessions to be offered at the 
negotiating table with the client would need to be discussed and agreed between the 
Consortium members, and where thrust already exists agreements on the levels would be 
made much easier. According to Pruit & Lewis (1977), for aspirations to rise, people 
must be aware of their own interests and have some faith in the possibility of furthering 
them. Such awareness and faith often develop in cohesive groups of people with common 
interests who discuss their situations with one another. Such group effects can contribute 
to joint outcome provided that as aspirations rise, a problem solving orientation is 
maintained within the group. The development of these aspirations and trust can come 
about in the main through the coming together and working towards a common cause 
over time. 
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The PPP procurement requires the Consortium to take on board those risks that 
traditionally fall in the domain of the public sector client. As a result, and in order to 
safeguard against the uncertainties that may result from some of these risks, the 
Consortium is most likely to pitch their aspirations very high. In the same vein, the 
pressure on the public sector to obtain value for money and to be seen to display 
accountability in a domain which may be considered as unfamiliar territory, their 
aspirations levels would equally be high. Where the Consortium and the public sector 
organization have had the opportunity of working together in the past, the development of 
thrust would enable both sides to adopt integrative bargaining strategy where both sides 
would make a joint effort of increasing their total utility by broadening the pie. 
Pruit & Lewis (1977), postulated that where limits or aspirations are high, integrative 
bargaining reduces the likelihood that negotiations will fail, by making it possible to 
locate options that satisfy everybody's ultimate limits, and that it leads to speedier 
settlements. It also reduces the danger that one or both parties will repudiate any 
agreements secured; as they are generally more satisfactory to both parties. Improved 
relationships also develop as a result, including improved organizational effectiveness. 
Reciprocity, which refers to the desire to repay the other party for a past favour, can 
contribute to the development of integrative bargaining, the bedrock of which is thrust. 
Research also suggests that friends are more responsive to the needs of one another than 
are strangers, and where there is an element of trust, the level of information exchange 
increases thereby inducing integrative negotiating behaviour (Pruit and Lewis, 1977). To 
them, this problem solving approach to bargaining is encouraged by positive feelings, 
interdependence, kinship, a perception of value congruence or common fate and an 
apprehension about the development of a conflict spiral. Hence physical intimacy may 
discourage distributive behaviour and encourage problem solving and the development of 
integrative bargaining. They cited the works of Milgram (1974) who found that it is 
easier to impose costs on another person when he is at a distance than when he is close at 
hand. Hopmann and Walcott (1976) call this the friendliness-hostility dimension in 
negotiations in their research on the outcome of the international negotiations on the 
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Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in which they found that the high level of hostility 
between the then Soviet Union and the US, resulted in both sides adopting harder 
bargaining strategy at the outset of the negotiations. This hard line strategy however 
significantly moved toward soft strategy over the period between December 1962 and 
June 1963 as each party began to know each other better leading to the conclusion of 
agreements. 
3.3.2 Reputation 
One of the characteristic attributes that effective negotiators make use of in order to 
obtain agreement is power, which comes in all forms such as coercive power, legitimate 
power, resource base and control of such resources, and expert power. Bargaining has an 
element of persuasive communication and one of the established social-psychology 
principles is that an expert is superior to a non-expert in gaining conformity to persuasive 
communications especially when this expert knowledge is being applied within the 
environment where that knowledge is relevant. Tedeschi and Bonoma, (1977) found that 
expertise enhances the effectiveness of warnings and recommendations since a source's 
reputation for expertise apparently leads others to assume that that person's credibility is 
high. A Consortium with previous experience in PPP procurement should thus have 
acquired expert knowledge in this field of procurement and would make good use of it 
during negotiations in order to push forward an agreement on relevant issues. This level 
of knowledge will naturally induce believability in the proposal put forward by such a 
Consortium. 
In addition to the above expert power base, where the Consortium enjoys a good 
reputation of meeting targets in their previous PPP projects, it gives them the added status 
power necessary to get through the negotiations. High status contributes to the 
believability of a source's communication and hence to the effectiveness of his 
persuasions during the bargaining. Taken at individual levels therefore, such 
organizations may have in their team experts that may be designated as dedicated bid 
managers and champions whose persuasive abilities will help push the negotiation 
process forward. 
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3.3.3 The role of Champions 
One other complementary strategy than can be used to a great advantage is that of 
aggregating issues such as in logrolling, or systematically trading off bundles of issues 
that are desirable to the other party but not important to self for bundles of issues not 
important to the other party but important to self. One thing that expertise does is that a 
person with such an expert knowledge is able to see through issues quickly and break 
them down into smaller components or be able to bundle them in a manner that can 
facilitate the negotiation process. It is expected therefore that the presence of a dedicated 
Bid Manager and a champion within the Consortium will help enhance this vital element 
in successful and speedier negotiations. 
Additionally, as demonstrated in the literature on social psychology, one determinant of a 
negotiator's initial orientation to a negotiating situation is his personality. His/her 
predisposition and expectations about the other party's behaviour at the negotiation can 
be affected by his/her personality traits (Rubin & Brown, 1975). However, according to 
Hermann and Cogan (1977), the strength of this relationship between personality and 
initial definition of the situation depends on the constraints imposed on the negotiator by 
the party that s/he represents. The less constrained the negotiator, the more likely his 
personality is to influence the initial definition of the situation. To them, when a 
negotiator enters into bargaining with a representative of the other party, a stage of 
exploration begins as each learns about the positions and intentions of the other and the 
constraints on him/her. If the negotiators are not too greatly constrained by the parties 
they represent, and if they have characteristics that make them interpersonally sensitive to 
each other, both sides begin to quickly see the opportunities for give and take. This will 
thus avoid either a deadlock or decidedly low progress towards reaching agreement due 
to the give and take necessary to reach early agreement that takes place. They argue that 
personality can influence initial behaviour because individuals may have little to rely on 
except their predisposition and past experience in defining the situation. However, once 
the interaction is underway, the personality and behaviour of the opponent becomes 
important as each opponent reacts in turn to the other. The role of Champions and 
dedicated Bid Managers within both the private sector Consortium and the public sector 
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client organization may therefore fit squarely into this social psychology evidence in 
literature. 
On the other hand, quite frequently during negotiations, there comes a time when either 
party is threatened by face and may have to undertake certain face-saving or face 
restoration measures. In situations of this nature, referents such as third parties not 
directly involved at the negotiating table may provide the impetus to regulate this face- 
saving or face-restoration behaviour. In such circumstances, it is not uncommon to find 
negotiators wanting to defer certain decisions until they confer with their superiors. 
Champions within both organizations to the PPP procurement could thus play a 
meaningful role in this respect to avoid deadlocks, by appealing to a negotiator's image 
or intervene in ways that have implications of saving and/or restoring face and thus 
progressing the process toward reaching early agreement. 
The negotiation literature reveals what may be termed interpersonal comparisons in a 
conflict relationship. Stem et al. (1977), indicate that an exchange of persons between 
two organizations might require the social actors participating in the exchange be chosen 
from comparable levels within each organization so as not to produce disparities in status. 
To them, to do otherwise would create a situation of imbalance, marked by loss of self- 
esteem, or induce other emotional reactions that could interfere with the establishment of 
cooperative relations during the negotiations. The appointment of a dedicated Bid 
Manager with high level of expertise on the side of the Consortium and an equally 
qualified person from the public sector organization should help eliminate this danger and 
induce an element of cooperative negotiations. Equally important is the element of 
external comparison within the negotiation process whereby the parties may look up to a 
third person who may have a strong influence on the outcome of the negotiations in 
respect of the pressures such third parties tend to exert on the negotiators. In this regards, 
the existence of champions within the Consortium who could drive the process and the 
presence of a strong support from the top level of the management structure of the public 
sector organizations may help speed up the process. 
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3.3.4 Strategic Business Interest 
McClintock, (1977), during his empirical study on social motives and negotiation settings 
concluded that the behaviour of a party in a setting of outcome interdependence is a 
function of that party's motivational orientation, his/her strategy and his/her expectations 
regarding the behaviour of the other party. To him, given a choice among a set of 
available alternatives, the individual would select the alternative for which the perceived 
value of the accompanying outcome is as high as or higher than the values attached to 
any other alternative available at the time of the choice. Hence as shown in Figure 3.3, 
the private sector Consortium naturally enters the PPP project competition with certain 
strategic motives which begin to reflect during the negotiations. 
Privalesector Consortium P"blic sector orgunisation 
Coals Alternatives Coals Alternatives 




Figure 3.3 Variables affecting decision making in settings of outcome interdependence 
Source: adapted frorn Me Clintock ( 1977) 
One would therefore expect that where the PPP procurement philosophy is part of the 
Consortium's strategic business interest there would be signs of commitment during the 
negotiations as the Consortium will be motivated towards reaching an early but effective 
outcome to enable it carve a niche in the market. This strategic business interest will also 
be greatly influenced by the job holdings (i. e. projects currently ongoing or due to start) 
of each individual members of the Consortium or the Consortium as an entity. 
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Business organizations faced with choice would select the alternative that affords the 
outcome with the highest expected value. Since every company has limited resources 
both physically and financially and also have a number of potentially desirable activities 
over which those resources could be employed, the scale of resources required at any one 
time to satisfy all those activities will be greater than those which the company possesses. 
A business's ability to make profits is thus dependent largely on how those resources at 
its disposal are effectively utilized on those activities which will provide the maximum 
return for the effort expended, over the time scale for which the business is being 
planned. It is therefore not unlikely that a contractor who has a number of traditional 
projects on hand would be hard on his client during the negotiations for any new project 
because s/he already has alternatives on which to rely for the moment. His/her attitude 
during the negotiations will be more of adamancy to move towards reaching the speedy 
resolution of the issues that divide him/her and the public sector organization. Current 
level of projects on hand is therefore an indication of the level of power the Consortium 
possesses and level of its dependence on the public sector procurer for the particular 
project being negotiated. Power and dependence are generally key elements that greatly 
influence the type of strategy a party adopts during any form of negotiations (McCall and 
Warrington, 1989; Walton & McKersie, 1965). 
The formation of a bidding Consortium for a PPP project could be likened to the 
formation of coalitions of individual organizations or firms coming together for a 
common purpose. A coalition only succeeds to the extent that it is able to fulfill the 
purpose it sets for itself. According to Midgaard and Unerdale (1977), a rational actor 
would only seek to join such a coalition if s/he expects to achieve something more than 
that s/he could achieve him/herself by going it alone. The implication is that the coalition 
must pursue some purpose that the actor finds attractive and have no side effect that is 
detrimental to that purpose and must succeed in promoting its purpose. In addition, by 
joining such a coalition s/he would be hoping to improve the coalition purpose and/or 
contribute to its success. Individual and collective organizational goals therefore become 
the underlying motives of any Consortium. 
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It is not uncommon to find the private sector Consortium taking a proactive interest in 
bringing up a project forward where it is in its strategic interest to do so. A number of 
such instances abound in the developing countries where multi-national companies in a 
bid to expand and establish their foothold in particular countries put in the maximum 
effort to ensure that negotiations are concluded as quickly as possible especially where 
they have taken the initiative in the realization of the projects. On a particular design, 
finance and build road project in which the author was informed, the negotiating team 
members of the multi-national company were ever ready to work round the clock to 
conclude the contracts. 
3.3.5 Financial Strength 
As evidenced in the literature on negotiation theory, one of the sources of power 
employed during negotiations is that of the power of control over resources. The ability 
of the Consortium to provide equity and also be able to tie this equity in the project for 
long periods is an indication of their financial strength and power. This should act as an 
attribute that should convince the public sector procurer that the Consortium members are 
serious and committed to the project. Evidence produced in a research on BOT projects 
indicated that equity, if not demanded, is often expected of the Consortium by both the 
public sector clients and by the lending institutions supporting the project. This is because 
equity decreases the burden placed on projects to service debt and also signify the 
Consortium's faith in the viability of the project. Of the 38 BOT projects that Tiong 
(1995) reviewed, 26 requested for the provision of equity by the Consortium. 
The ability to provide equity is therefore a show of strength and financial clout which in 
turn makes the Consortium's proposals attractive to the big time financial organizations 
to support them in the financing of the projects. Hence any financial guarantees that they 
provide to support their bids would be coming from institutions that have credibility. As 
believability in the instruments provided will induce trust, the negotiation process should 
thus be enhanced by these instruments or guarantees by contributing to a successful 
negotiation outcome. 
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3.3.6 Negotiating style adopted 
Contract negotiations, like any social action, occur in the context of outcome 
interdependence between the participating parties. Hence not only achieving valued 
outcomes dependent upon the actions of others, but the very behaviour of one party may 
vary as a function of the behaviour of the other party. As observed by McClintock 
(1977), five motivational vectors are frequently seen in negotiating settings where there 
are two or three interdependent parties. These include the demonstration of altruism to 
the other party by attempting to maximize the opponent's outcome; maximizing joint 
outcomes through cooperative behaviour; attempting to maximize own outcomes through 
individualistic behaviour. These motivational factors are illustrated in Figure 3.4 below. 
Figure 3.4 Motivational Vectors during Negotiations 
Source: Adapted from McClintock 
The other motivational factors include maximizing relative advantage of own over 
other's outcomes or minimizing relative advantage by acting competitively, and finally 
minimizing other's outcome through aggressive behaviour. The deployment of any of 
these modes of negotiating behaviour will evoke similar response from the other party as 
vividly demonstrated by research on the Prisoner's Dilemma (Pruit & Lewis 1977). 
Any demonstration by the private sector Consortium of a predisposition towards 
cooperative/altruistic behaviour during the negotiations would signal a similar response 
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from the public sector negotiating team and thus lead to meaningful outcomes during the 
negotiations by eliminating antagonistic behaviour. The implication here is that the joint 
gains resulting from this kind of negotiations are increased outcomes for each party over 
and above their initial estimations. This forrn of negotiation behaviour is necessary if the 
gains of the rather long-term nature of the relationships expected under the PPP strategy 
are to be realized. Open and frank communications during the negotiations should 
therefore enhance this process. After all, problem solving should succeed where there are 
signs of openness and frankness. There should also be signs of not only committing 
oneself to the outcomes of each stage of the negotiations but the willingness to do so 
should be clearly demonstrated right from the onset of the negotiations. The ability to 
persevere even if the negotiations become protracted is also an indication of ones 
commitment to the process. 
Equally, any demonstration of proportionate competition which implies that the private 
sector is willing to adopt an absolute level of competitive advantage, will also receive a 
similar response from the public sector. The relationships between the parties to a PPP 
contract are long term in nature (10 - 30 years). The development of an early rapport 
between the parties will very much enhance this partnership relationship for the effective 
delivery of the services. Both sides should therefore take a long term view of the 
relationship right at the negotiations stage of the contract as an early termination due to 
contractor default would indicate a major failure of the systems put in place to ensure 
satisfactory service delivery. A situation of this nature would also put the public sector 
organization in a situation where it may find it difficult to provide the services to the end 
users during the period when the search for a new service provider is underway. 
Research has found that where both parties act in a spirit as if they were members of the 
same organization, there is a high level of information exchange during the negotiations. 
The result is that their joint gain at the end of the negotiations is higher because they tend 
to adopt an integrative form of negotiation which is more of problem-solving rather than 
the distributive type. This information exchange may include requesting the other party's 
reaction on the latest offer/concession which provides a feedback that enables the 
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offering party to devise a new offer which will be more to the liking of the other party 
(Walton & McKersie, 1965; Pruit & Lewis, 1977). 
3.3.7 The multidisciplinary nature of the Consortium 
The Consortia bidding for PPP projects are typically constituted by a number of firms all 
coming from varying types of disciplines. The team therefore tends to be very 
heterogeneous and multidisciplinary in nature. It is obvious that before the submission of 
the offers and during the process of negotiating with the client organizations, there would 
be intense level of negotiations even amongst the individual members of the Consortium 
in order to arrive at acceptable levels of the offer and the level of concessions to offer 
during the negotiations with the public sector organizations. Added to this, as observed 
by Winham (1977) in his research on the outcome of the Kennedy Round of negotiations 
on the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), is the fact that over time, 
negotiations to resolve complex issues accumulate settlement from the bottom up -a 
process generally referred to as building a package. The result is that negotiators monitor 
certain feedback variables, such as in the case of the consortium, the support from the 
various member firms for the outcome of the negotiations and thus their willingness to 
cooperate in the negotiated settlements. 
Midgaard and Underdal (1977), in their study on multilateral negotiations suggested that 
one of the most fundamental consequences of increasing the number of actors is that the 
negotiation situation tends to become less lucid, more complex and therefore in some 
respects, more demanding. This is so because as number of participants increase, there 
would be more values, more interests and perceptions to be integrated or accommodated. 
What this means therefore is that each member of the team would have to consider more 
interests when deciding on his/her moves, as well as the fact that there are more moves 
and systems of interaction to be coordinated. They also argued that since there are more 
interests to consider, there would be more uncertainties as to the interests and motives of 
some of the other members of the team as to their perceptions of one's own utilities. This 
therefore led them to conclude that as membership of the negotiating team increases it 
becomes difficult for each member to decide on own moves and to find satisfactory 
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solution to the problems involved. This is because the heterogeneity in terms of interests 
and perceptions and more uncertainty within each party as to the preferences of the other, 
tends to inhibit the search for fair and integrative solutions, and cooperative and open 
negotiations become more difficult to attain. Uncertainty as to the exact preferences of 
others implies uncertainly as to which criteria should be met if a solution is to be 
satisfactory; and even if the criteria are clear, since interests are varied, the harder it is to 
generate solutions that satisfies them all. The result is that stalemates become likely 
features of the negotiations. 
To resolve some of the problems associated with negotiation within heterogeneous teams, 
Midgaard and Underdal (1977) suggested a number of measures to adopt, one of which is 
through differentiation by which a leader or a mediator is appointed, since to them, 
powerlessness begins to develop as the team size is enlarged. It is in this respect that the 
role of a champion within the Consortium becomes vital. Another may be by way ofjoint 
measures through the formalization of rules and the introduction of special mechanism 
for resolving stalemates such as ensuring that once agreement is reached on an issue it 
not reopened by another party, implying there is commitment to the earlier negotiated 
terms. Other measures may include the formation of subgroups specifically assigned to 
examine particular issues and find solutions to them. 
It must however be emphasized that, from a process perspective, the multidisciplinary 
nature of the Consortium means there will be more parties and thus more resources 
working on finding solutions. However, according to Midgaard and Underdal (1977), the 
extent to which this happens depends on the unity among members. Research by 
Underdal (1973) on negotiating behaviour of the EEC coalition, found that the pluralistic 
structure affected community decision-making capacity as well as the substance of the 
decisions arrived at. Thus a Consortium consisting of members whose positions are' 
identical in advance may reduce complexity in their efforts in reaching agreement on 
issues. The danger therefore is that where there is no unity of purpose, coalitions or 
subgroups tend to develop within the Consortium which in turn engenders slow decision 
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making and disagreements. The result is that Consortium members become slow and 
inflexible in their actions and tends to develop passive approach to the negotiations. 
3.3.8 Level of the first offer 
Negotiations are as a result of conflict of interest. Conflict of interest between any two 
parties is referred to as the discrepancy between their preferences for the distribution of a 
scarce resource. The conflict is thus caused by different expected payoffs for the same 
outcome. Hence parties to a negotiation tend to become deadlocked when both are 
strongly motivated to achieve their most desired outcome under conditions that permit 
only one to be realized. During their experimental study on the effect of the level of 
conflict of interest on negotiation outcome, Druckman et al., (1977) found that where 
each party has vested interests, the time it takes to negotiate and resolve the conflict is 
usually longer. They also found that at the end of the day there were more unresolved 
issues among the parties with higher vested interests. Negotiators in the high-conflict-of- 
interest conditions view the conflict as more of win-lose competitions and are therefore 
less willing to compromise and feel dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiations. 
They also found the negotiating atmosphere as more hostile and more ftitile. 
On the other hand those under low-conflict-of-interest conditions view the outcome of 
the negotiations as more positive, the process as more rational, cooperative, friendly and 
productive. These finding were also corroborated by Hammer & Yukl, (1977) after 
extensively reviewing various researches on negotiating strategies and came to the 
conclusion that the probability of a settlement was greater when the opponent adopts a 
soft- or intermediate-offer strategy rather than a hard-offer strategy where the opponent 
sets a high initial offer level and make very little concessions. Walton and McKersie 
(1965), also argue that just as an opponent may resent the extreme early-firm- 
commitment strategy which is essentially a final-offer-first approach, s/he may also react 
adversely to an initial position which is extremely ambitious and bears no relationship to 
a reasonable settlement. 
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The level of the first offer proposed by the Consortium coupled with the expectation of 
the public sector organization in term of the Public Sector Comparator, will determine the 
extent of the bargaining arena. The public sector comparator is calculated by computing 
what it would have cost the public sector if the project were procured using the traditional 
route including the operation of the infrastructure over the concession period. Where 
there is a yawning gap between the initial offer and the public sector comparator, the 
bargaining process will tend to be long and arduous. The level of gap between the 
Consortium's offer and the public sector comparator is heavily influenced by the ability 
of the private sector Consortium to understand what the public sector wants. 
Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1988), in their works on face-negotiation theory stated that 
face influences conflict behaviour because the parties to a conflict tend to consider 
protecting self-interest conflict goals. According to Brown (1977), some of the most 
troublesome problems that arise during negotiation are the intangible issues related to 
loss of face. He found out that in some instances, protecting against the loss of face 
becomes so central an issue that it literally swamps the importance of the tangible issues 
at stake and generates intense conflict that can impede progress towards reaching an 
agreement and thus increases substantially the cost of resolving the conflict. To him, such 
issues may arise in general as spin-offs of one or more of the tangible issues in the 
dispute, and/or as a result of certain situational factors. Citing the empirical evidence 
from the works of Brown and Garland (1976), threats to face may be experienced when 
one is exposed to another who among other things, makes bids or proposals that reflect 
excessive interest and refuses to make reasonable concessions, or worst still makes 
negative concessions. The level of the first offer as reflected by the tariffs proposed by 
the Consortium could thus become an element of threat to the public sector procurer 
where these tariffs appear to rather excessive relative to the public sector comparator. 
Considered in the light of the fact that the public sector organizations are highly sensitive 
to public accountability, any excessive elements of profits whether real or disguised in 
the level of tariff1shadow toll proposed by the private sector is likely to aggravate the 
threat to face within the public sector organization. 
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According to Tadesci and Bonoma (1977), where goals are incompatible and seen to be 
vital to the individual parties, this may breed suspicion regarding motives and 
trustworthiness and reduces the effectiveness of positive modes of influence such as 
promises, persuasions, or moral exhortations during negotiations. The result is that each 
party begins to resort to threats in order to force compliance and parties begin to view 
themselves as defending themselves against the intrusion of the other. What then 
happens during such negotiations is a spiral of counter-productive arguments and 
prolonged negotiations. The public sector negotiators could regard a rather high level of 
the first-offer as an indication on the part of the private sector to be exploitative and thus 
induce the above form of reaction from the public sector negotiators. 
Other elements of the offer which may or may not reflect the amount of altruistic 
predisposition of the Consortium to the Public Sector client may include the level of 
financial guarantees required of the client, and the payment mechanisms proposed. 
Added to these are the technical elements of the proposals as to level of clarity, 
innovativeness and robustness. 
3.4 The Public Sector Procurer 
Public sector organizations, like any other institutions tend to operate within cultures of 
their own which evolve over time. The concept of organizational culture as 
conceptualized by Hofstede (1991) could be described as being holistic in the sense that it 
refers to a whole which is more that the sum of its parts; and historically detennined 
which refers to the history of the organization. It could also be related to what 
anthropologists may refer as a rituals and symbols. It is created and preserved by the 
group of people who together form the organization, i. e. socially constructed and 
therefore soft and difficult to change. Hofstede's research at the Institute for Research on 
Intercultural Cooperation (IRIC) provided six dimensional variables to organizational 
culture. These dimensions are process vs. result oriented, employee vs. job oriented, 
parochial vs. professional, open vs. closed system, lose control vs. tight control and 
finally normative vs. pragmatic. All these forms of cultural orientation within an 
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organization tend to reflect in the way the individual working in such an organization 
views things and handles issues. 
Within a proccss-oriented organizational culture, people perceive themselves as avoiding 
risks and only making a limited effort in their jobs, whereas in a rcsults-orientcd 
organization people perceive themselves as comfortable in unfamiliar situations and put 
in maximum effort, perceiving each day as bringing in new challenges. People in loose 
control units feel that no one thinks of cost, meeting times are only kept approximately, 
whereas those in tight control units describe their work environment as cost conscious, 
meeting times arc kept punctually. For closed systems, the organization and its members 
arc considered as secretive in their dealings with both the outside world and even among 
its on members. In the same vcin, pragmatic institutions are market driven while 
normative ones perceive their tasks toward the outside world as the implementation of 
inviolable rules by correctly following organizational procedures which are more 
important than results. The IRIC research found out that privately owned organizations 
are more pragmatic while public institutions tend to be more normative. 
Some of the key organizational attributes including the technical and financial ones of the 
public sector procurer identified in literature and through the interviews and public 
forums that have significant influence on the PPP pre-contract procurement processes up 
to financial close arc further elaborated on within this section. 
3.4.1 Top-level commitment 
The support of a power holder is indispensable in every organization, especially in 
decisions that are novel. Such persons preferably should have charisma and not pure 
administrators (I lofstede, 199 1). S/he will not only play crucial roles in ensuring that the 
right expertise and other resources are available to undertake the project including 
negotiating with the private sector, but would also make a conscious effort of realizing 
his/her crucial and lasting role in the process towards achieving the desired goals. One of 
the cffcctive tools usually deployed during negotiations is that of referent power where a 
party rcfcrs to a higher status authority in order to obtain compliance from the other party 
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(McCall & Warrington, 1989). Support from the top level management to the negotiating 
team is therefore vital in concluding deals timely, especially where the private sector 
party believes in the authority and commitment of the public sector top level 
managcment's commitment to outcome of the negotiations. In negotiation, high status 
contributes to the believability of a source's communication. 
3.4.2 Level of Institutional bureaucracy 
Though die negotiating literature strongly suggests that personality traits play an 
important role in influencing the conduct and outcome of negotiations, negotiators are 
also role-incumbcnts whose performance are evaluated by well-defined constituencies. In 
this respect, they arc held accountable to these constituencies for the outcome of the 
negotiations. This is particularly the case when the negotiations are being monitored. 
Every public sector institution is accountable for the use of the public purse and as a 
result various burcaucrafic structures are put in place to make this happen. These forces 
begin to moderate the natural personal traits of the individual negotiators most especially 
where the checks are very severe. The implication of this is that negotiators, in an attempt 
to save face before their superiors by appearing as hard bargainers, may create costly 
deadlocks during the negotiations. 
According to Brown (1977), for negotiators to be cffective, they must normally be firm 
without appearing too rigid, and at the same time they must be willing to yield without 
appearing too conciliatory. To him, by being too firm and creating an impression of 
rigidity, a negotiator may 
i) forgo timely opportunities to clinch a good and early deal, 
ii) cause the opposing party to become exceeding tough and resistant, and 
iii) cause oneself to be seen as unfair or unwilling to negotiate in good faith. 
Ilowcvcr, during instances where the negotiator appears to be too conciliatory and 
yiclding too readily, s/he risks creating a situation of being seen as overly anxious to 
reach an agreement, or cause oneself to be seen as willing to settle for less than might 
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othcrwise be expected to seek. nis may allow the opposing party to exploit the situation 
to his/her advantage. 
3A. 3 Attitude to cost 
When setting realistic goals and making concessions during negotiations, the ideal of 
integrative bargaining is served best where each bargainer is able to clearly distinguish 
between issues of greater and lesser importance. This allows him/her to adopt a strategy 
of holding firm on high priority issues while conceding on the low priority ones. This 
approach encourages the development of trade-offs and valid information exchange. 
Within the traditional form of procurement where the lowest bidder takes the project, 
public sector organizations have naturally developed the attitude of considering price as 
the predominant determining factor in deciding who wins a contract. This attitude to cost 
if carried over to the PPP ncgotiadon table may have effect on the trade-off necessary in 
order to secure early agreements. The PPP procurement requires of bidders to provide 
innovative design alternatives that meet the public sector service requirements expressed 
in the form of output spccirications. In this respect, price is obviously not the only 
requirement in assessing a successful bid. It is therefore important that explicit 
consciousncss-raising among the public sector organizations that intend to undertake 
projects using the PPP be emphasized for them to clearly understand the basic differences 
between the modalities for procuring projects using the traditional approach and those 
using the PPP concept. 
A piece of research conducted by Pruit and Lewis (1977) indicated that integrative 
agreements during negotiations are more likely to emerge where bargainers demonstrate 
what they called flexible rigidity in their behaviour - while remaining relatively rigid 
with respect to their ends (goals and aspirations), they must be flexible with respect to 
means by trying out various options in search for one that satisfies both sides. Integrative 
bargaining is a process by which negotiators seek to maximize joint utility, often through 
finding non-obvious solutions to their common problems. 
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3.4.4 Technical Strength 
Bargaining only occurs in situations where each of the parties believes s/he can gain 
something from making an agreement. Where one of the parties believes s/he is much 
more powerful than the other, s/he or he may try to coerce the weaker party into giving 
up resources without receiving any in return. It is therefore necessary that the parties to a 
bargaining table should not be too asymmetrical in power. An established 
social/psychological principle is that an expert is superior to a non-expert in gaining 
conformity to his/her persuasive communications, in that expertise enhances the 
effectiveness of warning and communication, since a source's reputation in expertise 
apparently leads others to assume that his/her credibility is high (Tadesci and Bonoma, 
1977). It is for this reason that the public sector organizations engaged in negotiating 
with the private sector Consortium be equally competent and powerful in all the relevant 
disciplines to be able to withstand the might of Consortium which may be made up of a 
group of companies who in themselves are already individually powerful in terms of the 
human and technical resources they command. 
One of the key attributes that emerged from the interviews is that the public sector 
organization should have within its set-up a strong in-house expertise in infrastructure 
procurement that is able to understand the private sector's technical, financial and 
innovative approaches proposed in their offers in order to be able to effectively negotiate 
those areas that can meet their requirements. Strength also comes from experience, and 
experience is only gained through having been exposed to situations of similar nature. 
Previous experience of the public sector organization and its staff in general 
infrastructure procurement provide both the organization and its staff the necessary 
ability to deal with issues relevant to a successful negotiation. 
Again, the level of experience will reflect in the quality of the preparatory work done by 
the public sector organization before inviting tenders. The experience level of the 
organization and its staff will influence their ability to effectively establish the project 
parameters in the form of output specifications. Additionally, their ability to establish 
clear and concise statements of the evaluation criteria will guide the negotiation team in 
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arriving at an early decision on the optimal offer and what to consider during the 
negotiations. An informed public sector procurer who understands what is needed and 
who has sufficient expertise to communicate them is an obvious asset in obtaining value 
for money and timely processing of the various procurement stages. 
According to Tedesci and Bonoma (1977), where parties to a negotiation are both equal 
in their relative strengths, coercion and escalation of conflict become counter-productive 
for both sides since each side will adopt retaliatory measures when the other tries to push 
things unnecessarily down the throat of the other. What then happens is that norm- 
formation and rule-setting may occur as protective measures, as each participant agrees to 
give up his/her usual damaging capabilities and rather focus on the issues that can help 
both sides to gain from the relationship. The result is that there is a more win-win attitude 
towards the negotiations. Such norms, some of which include equity, reciprocity and 
equality, help to ease difficulties of reaching solutions to the bargaining. 
It is therefore not surprising that in the Gershon report which culminated in the 
establishment of the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) in April 2000 on how best 
to improve efficiency in procurement within the public sector and obtain value for 
money, there was a strong emphasis on the training of public sector procurement staff 
and providing them with the necessary incentives to have them retained within the public 
sector organizations. Among the number of recommendations contained in that report for 
which time scales were set, included a professional Government Procurement Service to 
cover designated procurement staff in all departments and agencies; by 2000, seventy 
five percent (70%) of the members of the Government Procurement Service in key 
designated posts should have or be working towards a graduate level procurement 
qualification (HM Treasury, 1998). This is quite an important recommendation because 
earlier research indicated that the private sector was more ready to employ highly skilled 
and experience professionals to handle the tendering and negotiation processes of their 
PPP/PFI projects than the public sector infrastructure procurement organizations (Ahadzi 
& Bowles, 2001 a) 
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Other recommendations contained in the Gershon report included Government 
departments emphasizing procurement as a core skill in non-procurement training 
programmes for managers; the Civil Service College, in consultation with departments, to 
offer enhanced training of fast-stream graduate entrants; and that departments deploying 
non-procurement staff to manage contracts to ensure they receive specific procurement 
training beforehand. The report also recommended strong collaboration between 
departments in order to tap knowledge and expertise gained by others. The then Scottish 
Office (now the Scottish Executive) did consult extensively with the Highway Agency in 
developing the PPP/PFI project for the development and maintenance of the 
A74(M)/M74 Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) road project linking Scotland with 
England (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2001b). 
The above are quite important recommendations that need to be implemented if the 
power balance is not to be tilted heavily in favour of the private sector Consortium during 
the negotiation of the PPP projects. In fact, in a report to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on the implementation of the PPP/PFI concept, W. S. Atkins (1996), for 
instance noted that within those organizations that have been involved most frequently 
with project procurement such as the Department of Transport, the level of efficiency in 
handling the process has been greater, whereas those less familiar with project promoted 
appeared less comfortable with the process. Though these inadequacies are often made up 
for by engaging external consultants, it imperative to note that managing these 
consultants effectively enhances the chances of not only obtaining a good deal but also in 
pushing the process forward in a timely manner. Research conducted by Anderson et al, 
(2001) on the means of optimizing client/contractor core competencies for major 
infrastructure projects identified that the use of in-house resources may not only be more 
cost effective in areas where their competency levels are high but also that the client 
organization may be in a better position to obtain higher quality products at the end of the 
day. 
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3.4.5 Documentation 
According to Brehmer and Hammond (1977), disagreements are never easy to resolve 
and successful negotiations are difficult to achieve, not only because the judgment tasks 
are complex, but because judgments are produced by a poorly understood process, since 
they are not always the product of an explicit and fully analytical procedure that is easily 
retraceable. To them, human judgment is characterized by a mixture of analysis, intuition 
and experience; a process which can be very uncertain at times, relying on different 
information at different times -a condition that can induce prolonged disagreements and 
frustrate negotiations. Citing the works of Summer et al. (1969), Balke et al. (1973), they 
indicate that a general finding of studies of human judgment is that the subjects studied 
are seldom able to describe consistently, accurately and completely how they arrive at 
their judgment. The very fact that introspective description of decisions within 
negotiations are likely to be incomplete and inaccurate because of human inability to be 
precise, a third person may likely attribute any inconsistencies, inaccuracies and 
incompleteness to an intention to be devious and assign evil intent on the part of the 
negotiators. 
The respective central and local institutions responsible for the propagation of the PPP 
such as the Treasury Task Force (now Partnerships UK), the Office of Government 
Commerce, have recognized the above weakness in human behaviour and have therefore 
made attempts to disseminate information as much as possible in the form of guidelines 
and reviews of major projects. Some of these guides now include the development of 
standard bidding documents to aid the process towards the realization of the project 
objectives. The Scottish Executive, for example, has developed standard contract 
documents for the implementation of PPP school projects . In a similar vein, the Office of 
Government Commerce has also produced similar standards. 
Every negotiating team requires factual information and specialist advice coupled with 
management decisions. Hence there is the need for the necessary back-up data to be 
assembled to enable answers to be given to each question to be foreseen as coming form 
the other party. These could be related to the technical submissions and/or the 
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commercial aspects of the bid proposed by the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). The 
quality of the information provided by the public sector procurer has a tremendous effect 
on the quality of the proposals submitted by the bidder. Clear and precise output 
specifications should generally enhance the quality of the bids and that should enable 
early resolution of any gray areas during the negotiations. 
One of the difficulties in negotiation is to ensure that the two sides have identical 
understanding of what is being discussed. Differences in terminology, the use of words 
which are terms of the art to one side but not to the other, and differences in language 
especially in international contract negotiations, all contribute to misunderstanding during 
negotiations. It is therefore important that at the time the two sides meet at the bargaining 
table they both have identical understanding of the terms to which they are agreeing. 
Expert knowledge in the areas that have to be negotiated upon and knowledge about the 
opponent's aspirations and circumstances are thus essential in pushing forward the 
negotiation process (Kennedy et al, 1987). Since both parties to the negotiation operate 
against a background of urgency they are generally ready to accept the principles of 
standard conditions to avoid negotiation of specific terms for each transaction. When they 
know that every contract will be regulated by known conditions, they can apply 
themselves to negotiating what they view as important, such as the output specifications, 
delivery, the tariffs, and the service level. 
A tender document and the resulting tender or offer therefore attempt to fulfill the above 
requirements by covering such areas as guarantees on performance, limitations of 
liability, settlement arrangements in respect of disputes, and other contingencies. During 
major infrastructural procurement where complex * transactions are negotiated and 
involving large and powerful buyers such as the Highway Agency, these organizations 
have developed their own conditions of procurement. This is because there will be 
perceived lack of control if supplier's own terms were to be used or if all items had to be 
negotiated in each instance. At the start of the PPP/PFI programme in the early 1990s the 
idea was to make the process a 'deal-making' arrangement. The result was protracted 
negotiations and in some instances abortive procurement processes. 
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3.4.6 Financial strength and support from the central government 
The negotiating literature clearly recognizes that who the source of influence is, what s/he 
is like, the resources s/he possesses, the scope of his/her legitimate authority, all affect 
the believability of what s/he communicates to the other negotiating party including the 
believability of even threats issued by him in the event of the other party not responding 
positively to his/her concessions. Perceived trustworthiness, control over resources and 
legitimate authority are therefore characteristics that influence the way a target responds 
to influence attempts (Tadesci and Bonoma, 1977). 
The fact that a local government agency that is able to receive financial support 
/guarantees from the central government to undertake such massive projects as envisaged 
under the PPP should send signals to prospective private sector consortia that the agency 
has the strong banking of the central government. This would therefore increase the 
comfort zones of the Consortium and reduce some of the perceived risks. Some PPP 
schemes especially those that derive their revenue via shadow tolls/tariffs rather than 
through tariffs and tolls directly charged on the end-users require alternatives to be put in 
place for the end-user to have the option of choice. This will mean the public sector 
procuring organization will have to provide funds to put in place these alternatives. In 
other instances, certain facilities are required to be provided under the contract by the 
public sector procurer such as reliable access roads to the toll road. Any meaningful 
support from central government to the local authority undertaking PPP project of this 
nature will send a strong signal to the private sector bidders as to not only the financial 
support accorded the project from the center but also the political support it enjoys. 
The ability of the public sector organization to offer tax concession and flexible tax 
regimes is not only an indication of its capabilities but also a demonstration of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the private sector. One of the difficulties faced by some of the local 
government agencies in undertaking the early PPP programme was that of ultra-vires 
issues. A number of those public sector departments and agencies that did not have the 
appropriate legal authority to negotiate and enter into contract of the PPP types were 
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bogged down with legal tussles that ended in prolonging the process towards reaching 
early agreement 
In the same vein any agency that is able to partially support projects by raising funds 
through bonds raises its credibility level in the eyes of the prospective bidders and 
therefore has an added clout in negotiating terms on equal footing with the private sector. 
This financial capability is an indication of the possession of an abundance of relevant 
resources that go to enhance the believability of the party and contributes to the success 
of the negotiations. In November 1997 for example, Paribas raised bond finance in the 
sum of E88 million for a PPP project where the borrower was a local authority heralding 
the introduction of long-term cost effective financing of PPP projects (Akintoye et al 
2001). 
According to Akintoye et al (2001), bonds come in two main forms - publicly issued 
bonds or privately placed bonds. The privately placed ones are those bought by large 
financial institutions. Publicly placed bonds are generally of two types - Monoline or 
Credit Enhanced Bonds where for instance insurance companies guarantee the bonds and 
the payment of the principal and interests. Hence the risk of project default is removed 
from the ultimate purchasers of these bonds, thus giving comfort to the investor in the 
bond. The other type is the Non-enhanced Bond where in the event of project collapse, 
the purchaser or investor in the bond takes a direct hit. 
Equity generally represents a small proportion of funding for major PPP/PFI projects. 
They are generally in the region of 5-20% of the funding requirements. The provision of 
equity is an indication of the provider's strong interest and faith in the project. To arouse 
private sector interest in a particular project, the public sector client may want to 
demonstrate this through the provision of some form of equity funding towards the 
project. 
The concept of revenue dependent project is structured around two major means of 
obtaining the revenue - those that are chargeable on user-fee basis in the form of tools 
and tariffs and those that are based on shadow tolls where the public sector organization 
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pays for the services provided under the scheme. The UK model principally operates the 
shadow toll approach. The capability of the public sector to pay the shadow tolls 
proposed in the bids is an indication of the its financial strength and this should naturally 
reflect in their approach and behaviour during the negotiations. It should also give an 
indication to the private sector that they are dealing with a powerful institution that can 
force compliance and would therefore be much more ready to reciprocate concessionary 
moves by the public sector client and thus speed up the process towards a negotiated 
settlement of the issues that may arise during the bargaining. 
3.5 The Project 
A principal behaviour observed in large-scale negotiations is the process of adapting to 
the complex environment created by the demands and offers of each negotiating party. 
Negotiators tend to proceed towards agreement by first tabling a position that is 
exploratory at best, because at this stage, the negotiating teams scarcely have an idea of 
what a final acceptable agreement would look like for a number of reasons one of which 
has been identified as the fact that serious thought seem to be given to what is acceptable 
only after the negotiation has begun. The second reason is that what is acceptable is a 
function of what is available, and this is demonstrated during the act of negotiating 
(Winham, 1977). The process therefore involves both parties incrementally exploring the 
interface between the bargaining positions of the other party. In so doing they will be 
carefully examining what is at stake, the value they can derive from it as the negotiation 
progresses. At the core of the PPP negotiation therefore is the project and its 
characteristic attributes in relation to its nature, complexity and the inherent value it 
commands. This section therefore reviews PPP projects in terms of nature and 
complexity including the inherent values in terms of marketability and how these 
characteristic elements may influence the outcome of the negotiation process. 
3.5.1 Project size and complexity 
Project complexity tends to increase the number of issues and viewpoints that must be 
accommodated in the negotiation process. These issues are complex in themselves and 
97 
Chapter 3 Formulation of the preliminary model and research hypotheses 
important aspects of them may be misunderstood because information is inadequate and 
the cost of improving it is high due to the very fact that some of these issues may be 
unknown at the start of the negotiations or at the planning stages of the project. As a 
result, the style and content of negotiators' behaviour in these complex issue areas are 
affected by these complexities of the issues at stake. Research in the area of decision- 
making, documents findings that decision-making in complex situations differ from those 
involving cases of clear-cut and unambiguous issues and alternatives (Cyert and March, 
1963). This evidence has also been documented in construction management literature 
where for example, Diekmann and Girard (1995), in there research into developing 
Dispute Potential Index for construction projects came to the conclusion that though large 
and complex projects, in terms of complexity in both design and constructions, tend to 
have inherently higher levels of disputes during there implementation, it is people who 
either greatly help or hinder the progress of settling disputes on projects -a confirmation 
of the assertion that the style and behaviour of actors in these situations is influenced by 
the complexity of the situation. 
Under complex negotiations, the mastery of materials become a problem and therefore 
involves a great effort to gather, maintain and process information needed to make 
intelligent and strategic decisions -a situation observed by Winharn (1977) in his 
research on the multinational negotiations relating to the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariff. An element introduced by complexity in the negotiation is the problem of not 
having any firm guidelines with which to evaluate agreements and thus leaves the parties 
to the negotiating table in the difficult position of having to negotiate over the measures 
to be used as well. Complication therefore tends to inhibit rational choice and value 
maximization. Complexity therefore tends to challenge negotiator's comprehension due 
to in part to information overload, and to uncertainty that creates the problem of 
discovery or generation of information. Citing the research works of Druckman, (1973), 
Winham, (1977), suggests that complexity affects negotiators' perception of the situation 
and thus presumably affects their expectation and negotiating behaviour as well; and that 
complexity affects a negotiator's ability to understand an opponent's strategy. 
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Walton and McKersie (1965), in their study into labour negotiations, also came to the 
conclusion that complexity of a decision situation increases the ambiguity of information 
available to negotiators and makes it subject to more varying interpretations. They 
however found that where information was made more succinct and the issues were made 
clearer, the negotiations progressed to a more success end. In the negotiating literature 
therefore, complexity is an important factor in understanding a negotiator's behaviour 
during bargaining and hence the outcome of the negotiations in terms of how long it takes 
to come to an agreement. In order to make the PPP projects financially attractive to 
investors, client organizations tend to package them in typically large chunks not only in 
terms of contract values but also in terms of numbers of packages. For example a PPP 
schools projects could be packaged as an aggregation of up to five existing schools to be 
rehabilitated and a couple of new schools to be built such as The Edinburgh Schools 
Partnership Project. 
3.5.2 Novelty in Project 
One of the underlying philosophies of the PPP procurement strategy is to tap private 
sector innovation not only in the management of resources but also in the design of the 
projects. In the same vein, the private sector consortium would like to produce designs 
that are innovative enough by making use of current state of the art in order to minimize 
cost and optimize their profit levels. However, as can be gleaned from the literature on 
negotiation theory, not only does novelty inherently creates information problem, but 
perception of situations are likely to be dissimilar (Walton and McKersie, 1965). The 
PPP in itself is by and large a novel concept to most of the public and private sector 
organizations because over the past three decades or more, the traditional form of 
procurement had dominated the landscape of public infrastructure procurement where 
rules for the choice of the winning bid are clearly laid out, in the form of the lowest bid. 
The result is that there have not been rigorous levels of negotiation involved in the 
process at all and hence lack of past experience in the processes of negotiations. Added to 
the general lack of experience in contract negotiations, novelty in both the design and the 
process as a whole would create uncertainty in the minds of both parties and thus affect 
the negotiation process. 
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Again, since lender will be relying on the project to service their loans, they will insist 
that the total cost of the project be determined at the outset. They, including other 
investors, must have the confidence that the project can be built at the cost initially 
estimated and be operated within the funds being committed. The result is that proven 
technology will normally be required since experimental or state-of-the-art technology 
would add to the risk of the project and make funding difficult to obtain. The result is that 
the less predictable the total cost, the more lenders will insist on stand-by commitments 
from the consortium and/or from the public sector institution (UNIDO, 1996). According 
to Leiringer (200 1), banks and financial institutions tend to be generally risk-averse when 
it comes to project financing. To him, they are known to be particularly cautious when 
new techniques and procedures are proposed and that the technical competence of their 
staffs with respect to the assessment of innovative infrastructure projects, can at times be 
lacking, and that this limited ability to evaluate proposed solutions impedes the amount 
on new thinking that can be exploited by the private sector Consortium. 
3.6 The External Environment 
It is important to recognize that the physical, social, political and economic environment 
shapes the potentials within any human venture in a profound manner, because people 
and organizations operate within this larger environment of which they are individually 
only one part or component. It is therefore necessary to understand the relationships and 
the interdependencies between the parts before one can predict or understand the 
behaviour of one or more components. It is in this light that the elements relating to the 
external environment are being identified in this part of the research in order to analyze 
the extent of their influence on the pre-contract negotiation phase of the PPP 
procurement. 
3.6.1 Availability of traditional projects 
A major variable that structures interorganizational relationships such as those envisaged 
under the PPP philosophy is dependency. According to Stem et al. (1977), what 
dependency means is that two or more organizations must take each other into account if 
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they are to accomplish their goals. To them, dependence of party A upon party B is (a) 
directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goal mediated by B and (b) 
inversely proportional to the availability of the goals to A outside of the A-B relation. 
They cited Schmidt and Kochan, (1972) who posited that a relatively high level of mutual 
interdependence induces the parties to seek further the relationship and thus seek to 
invest in mediational mechanisms for the containment or management of conflict. In an 
environment where there are sufficient traditional projects, contractors may not feel the 
urge to come together to undertake projects through the PPP strategy, the process of 
which they may find daunting and expensive to pursue by avoiding to delve into the 
unknown. 
An essential element for any meaningful negotiation that induces the reaching of early 
agreement is that of power possessed by both parties - an element that could be used 
intelligently as a subtle form of threat to induce compliance (Tadesci and Bonoma, 1977). 
Within an economic environment where there are only limited numbers of traditional 
projects and the level of competition among the respective bidders for the PPP project is 
keen, the public sector employer's hand may be strengthened by his ability to keep the 
second lowest bidder as a reserve bidder. This can act as a subtle form of pressure to 
induce the lowest bidder to concede on issues being negotiated in a manner that can 
benefit the client and the process in general. This approach to the negotiation could act as 
powerful indicators of intentions to call the lowest bidder's bluff and invite the second 
lowest in - an indication of resoluteness on the part of the public sector procurer. This 
will not only act as a deterrence to the lowest bidder to unnecessarily prolong the 
negotiations but will induce better value for money as competitors will endeavour to put 
in their utmost and most innovative bids. Worthy of note however is the findings of 
Druckman (1973) and Rubin and Brown (1975) about the effect of time pressure during 
bargaining. They indicated that though a moderate time pressure when applied to both 
bargainers in the form of deadlines or penalties promotes reaching agreement and making 
the concessions necessary to do so, it also has the unfortunate effect of worsening the 
individual outcomes of the bargainers than for bargainers not under pressure. Hence there 
should be careftil balancing art here in the use of the second lowest bidder as a bait to 
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induce early negotiated settlement as both sides may end up being worse-off, most 
especially for the public sector in obtaining value for money. In fact, where one party 
feels aggrieved, the likelihood is that negotiations will reopen no sooner than the project 
is underway. The World Bank for example reported that most concession contracts are 
renegotiated on average only after 2.1 years of signing the contracts, with some 
degenerating into expensive legal battles over payment and contractual terms (Bell, 
2003). Naquin (2003) refers to this kind of situation in negotiations as counter-factual 
thinking on the part of the parties where each parties goes home feeling s/he could have 
got a better deal from the negotiations if s/he had pushed a little further with his/her case. 
3.6.2 Strong public-private sector relationships 
This sort of relationship may be viewed at two levels. The first level may be that of the 
macro level relationship such as the general public sector's attitude and perceptions 
towards the private sector and at the micro level, which relates to the relationship 
between individual public sector organization and the private sector firms involved in the 
PPP procurement. 
Taken at the macro level, one of the main objectives of the PPP is to bring the private 
sector directly into the provision of services, with the public sector acting as an enabler 
and where appropriate guardian of the interests of the users and customers of the public 
services. This would evoke the exploitation of the full range of private sector 
management, commercial and creative skills. This, it is hoped, would promote efficiency, 
improve services and stimulate fresh flows of investment and bring into operation a 
whole range of activities and services traditionally regarded as the exclusive domain of 
the public sector. 
Yates & Mukherjee (1993) noted that the changing political situation world-wide has 
fostered an emerging desire to create long term financial commitments and presence in 
foreign countries in the form of build-own-transfer and privatization projects. At the 
same time the forces of global economic competition has forced a rethinking of national 
strategies to reduce the burden on the central government and taxpayers without denying 
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any services. Hence there is an increasing global trend towards reduced government 
involvement in the provision of basic services, and one reason cited for this trend is the 
natural consequences of monopoly systems that create inefficiencies. He also indicated 
that government involvement in national economics is steadily decreasing, through 
deregulation, the sale of government-owned assets, and privatization -a trend that holds 
true for both developed and developing countries. 
Governments are therefore now focusing on the creation of the enabling environment that 
will promote the growth of the private sector and their full participation in the rebuilding 
of their countries' infrastructure. The challenge for the transition to a private sector-led 
economy is to transform the public sector into an instrument that promotes private sector- 
led development by enhancing the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector 
institutions through capacity building and the acceleration of the privatization process. 
Complicated bureaucratic procedures and the lack of administrative decisions are often 
cited as major obstacles. Hence the private sector and lenders tend to carefully evaluate 
the organization, their experience and procedures of the procuring administrative entity 
critically to test their preparedness to understand the private sector's culture before 
deciding to participate in such projects. At the institutional level, most governments have 
appointed an internal focal point to formulate and co-ordinate the government's policy on 
privately financed projects. Examples are the Water & Power Department in Pakistan, the 
Ministry of Public Works in Chile, the Ministry of Finance in Argentina, the State 
Planning Commission of China, and the Office of the Prime Minister in Malaysia. In 
other countries, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the governments have established 
high-level intergovernmental committees as the institutional focal point to formulate and 
administer privately financed project policy (UNIDO, 1996). Here in the UK, 
Partnerships UK (formerly known as the Treasury Taskforce or the Private Finance 
Panel), of the HM Treasury is the focal point of policy formulation and dissemination. 
In the same vein, public sector agencies that interact with the private sector need to 
consider entrepreneurs as clients with needs and preferences as well as with views that 
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must be taken into account. The relationship between the public and private sectors may 
also be expressed in the types of general business legislation that exist in the system. A 
country's business legislation may have an impact on the implementation of a PPP 
project. Legislations such as those covering property rights, enforcement of contract 
rights, and protection of intellectual property, corporate laws and other legal avenues'to 
promote private participation within an economy, are indicators of the level of the public 
acceptance of the involvement of the private sector within the economy. 
At the micro level, a well-established existing relationship developed between the public 
sector institution and private sector contracting institutions, may make a substantial 
difference in the way the negotiations are conducted. This level of relationship is what is 
referred to in the negotiation literature as intensity which represents the degree of 
involvement demanded of the parties. This may be measured by the size of the resource 
investment and the frequency of interaction. According to Stem et al. (1977), where the 
resource investment and/or the frequency of interaction are high, the intensity of a 
relationship has a positive effect on its persistence. To them, organizations in an intense 
relationship realize the ongoing contingencies that their actions will create for each other. 
As a result, they will strive to arrive at mutual solutions. This may be the situation with 
frequent and big time buyers of contractors' services such as the Highway Agency and 
the National Health Services (NHS). 
3.6.3 Public acceptability of the PPP philosophy 
The negotiation literature vividly demonstrates that constituents or their subgroups can 
create conditions that threaten a representatives' face during negotiations. According to 
Brown (1977), various public institutions and individuals not directly involved in the 
negotiation may provide the impetus for the negotiator to save face. There are those other 
referents that may seen non-personal but can be vaguely defined in the negotiators mind 
and have an influence on the way s/he approaches the negotiations. Such institutions as 
the media, pressure groups fall into this category. 
PPP projects, because of the fact that they reside in the public domain, tend to attract a lot 
of public attention. The stakeholders are many and are varied and therefore interests 
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groups are very diverse. A number of major projects have been known to be disrupted as 
a result of protester attacks. According to the NAO (2001), the security costs of E25m to 
prevent disruption from protesters during the construction of the F- I 05m Newbury Bypass 
linking the Midlands to the south coast constructed between 1996-1998, accounted for 
the f 35 cost overrun on the project. 
3.7 The preliminary generic model 
On the basis of the literature review and information gathered during interviews, the 
underlying dimensions of the generic model are represented in Figure 3.5 below. 
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Figure 3.5 PPP & Contract Negotiations: Dimensions of the Generic Model 
105 
Chapter 3 Formulation of the preliminary model and research hypotheses 
3.8 The Research Hypothesis 
On the basis of the objectives and scope of this study, the following hypotheses have 
therefore been proposed for testing and validation: 
a) The twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns are real in the PPP 
infrastructure procurement and therefore remain a serious issue to be addressed if 
the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among all stakeholders. 
b) That a generic model can be developed that will capture in a hierarchical order of 
significance the key attributes that positively influence the efficient and effective 
implementation of the negotiations phase of the PPP procurement process in 
terms of minimizing time and cost overruns to the parties. 
C) That though there is a broad agreement between the key stakeholders, (the public 
and private sectors), on the relative significance of the main centers of influence - 
Consortium Attributes, Public Sector Client Attributes, the Project Attributes and 
the External Environment Attributes, differences do exist amongst them on the 
underlying dimensions to these main influence center as to their effect on the 
outcome of the PPP contract negotiations. 
3.9 Summary 
A preliminary contextual model has been developed highlighting key attributes that 
influence the efficient procurement of PPP projects based on negotiation theory. Four 
main elements have been identified - the Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the 
Project, and the External Environment. The underlying attributes of these elements that 
influence the negotiation process have also been identified in detail. The next chapter 
reviews current literature on research methodologies as a guide to the choice of 
methodology to be adopted for the study. 
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Chapter 4: Review of Research Methodologies 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to avoid any likely problems and difficulties relating any piece of research, 
adequate steps need be taken to guide the research process from start to finish. A 
number of steps are therefore needed to guide the research strategy. These must 
include an understanding of the fundamental issues likely to affect the investigation 
and measures to overcome them; an understanding of research typologies and 
justification for their selection; and last but not the least, a clear definition of all the 
elements and components that comprise the investigation (Then, 1996). This chapter 
reviews the literature on research methodologies including the empirical properties of 
a valid research so as to gain valuable insight that can be used to guide the research 
approach. 
There have been debates over the respective merits and demerits of the two main 
research paradigms - qualitative vs. quantitative. The aim of this chapter however, is 
to draw on the very essence of these paradigms and state where this research sits and 
why the choice of the particular paradigm. Citing the works of Thomas Kuhn on how 
scientific innovations are brought about, Hofstede (1991) indicated that in a given 
period, certain common assumptions called 'paradigms' dominate the scientific field 
and constrain the thinking of the scientists at the time. Kuhn labelled research carried 
out within these paradigms as 'normal' science, but every now and then normal 
science runs into limits because it is unable to explain new facts or unable to meet 
new challenges. The result is that a paradigm change is initiated which initially may 
not sit favourably with those involved in the normal science. However, gradually 
more and more people move to the new paradigm which then becomes part of a new 
type of normal science. Though this statement refers to works in the natural sciences, 
the social/management sciences dealing with individual and collective human 
behaviour have their paradigms too, but there are fewer consensuses at a given time as 
to which paradigm dominates. 
The paradigm issue in construction management related research also generated 
considerable debate in the mid 1990s where there were strong arguments for or 
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against the two main research paradigms in this field - qualitative vs. quantitative 
(Raftery, et al 1997; Seymour et al, 1997; Runeson, 1997; Seymoure and Rooke, 
1995). The conclusion that could be drawn from these debates was that project 
management is a multi-paradigmatic discipline and the choice of emphasis on a 
particular paradigm is governed by the main objectives of the research and the 
projected outcome and the audience to which it is meant to be addressed. As noted by 
Punch (2000), it is not a case of which strategy is best but rather the strategy is 
detected by the research questions. 
4.2 The Nature of Scientific Enquiry 
Research is the orderly search for truth and as such, according to Sekaran (1992), it 
must have some distinguishing characteristics to make it truly scientific. To him, there 
should be purposiveness in scientific research where the researcher must have a 
definite aim or purpose for the research, in addition to rigor in the search for that 
truth. A rigorous research involves a good theoretical base and a well thought-out 
methodology. He also added that the findings must be testable and should have 
elements of replicability, generalizability, objectivity and confidence ofprecision. To 
him these elements form the hallmark of sound scientific research. 
Then (1999) citing the works of Buckley et al. (1995) also gave an operational 
definition of research that requires the satisfaction of a number of conditions. These 
conditions include: 
a) the orderly investigation of a defined problem; 
b) the use of appropriate scientific methods; 
c) the gathering of adequate and representative data; 
d) logical reasoning uncoloured by bias being employed in drawing 
conclusions on the basis of the evidence presented; 
e) a demonstrable prove of the validity or reasonableness of the conclusions; 
f) the cumulative results of research in a given area should yielding general 
principles or laws that may be applied with confidence under similar 
conditions of the future. 
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of a valid scientific enquiry which Sekaran (1992) 
refers to as the building blocks of science. 
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4.3 Quantitative vs. Qualitative methodology 
Empirical research according to Punch (2000) involves data which are of two types - 
Quantitative and Qualitative. In distinguishing between these two forms of empirical 
data, he defines quantitative research as empirical research where tile data is in the 
form of numbers while qualitative research is empirical research where the data is not 
in the form of numbers. Giving a historical overview of social research he pointed out 
that the traditional dominance of quantitative methods as a way of doing empirical 
research has been challenged over the past thirty years, leading to the emergence and 
major growth of interest in using qualitative methods. However as the debate over 
which approach is more appropriate for a particular piece of research matured, interest 
has recently been generated in combining both approaches. 
Figure 4.2 provides an indication of the Quantitative versus the Qualitative research 
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Figure 4.2 The Quantitative vs. Qualitative research continuum 
Source: Punch (2000 pp 23) 
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Quantitative research is based on well-developed research questions, conceptual 
frameworks and tight designs linking the variables, and highly structured data. This 
form of research is therefore more towards the left hand end of the continuum, where 
the research question, the focus, the data, and the design of the research instruments 
are specified and structured ahead of the empirical work. Qualitative approach is 
much more diverse and therefore more towards the right side of the continuum where 
the focus in the research questions, the structure in the design and the data unfold as 
the empirical work proceeds. According to Punch (2000), by comparison with 
quantitative research, qualitative research is multidimensional and pluralistic with 
respect to paradigms. The effect of this development in qualitative research is that 
social research is a human construction, framed and presented within a set of 
discourses and sometimes ideologies, and conducted within a social context. 
Creswell (1994) outlined the role of theory and the deductive or inductive mode in 
these two research paradigms as shown in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
Researcher tests a Theory 
Researcher tests Hypotheses or 
Research Questions derived from the 
Theorv 
Researcher operationalizes Concepts 
or Variables derived from the Theory 
Researcher uses an Instrument 
to measure Variables in the Theory 
Figure 4.3 The Deductive Mode of Research 
in Quantitative Study 
Source: Creswell (1994 pp 89) 
Researcher forms Categories 
Researcher asks Questions 
Researcher gathers Information 
Figure 4.4 The Inductive Mode of Research 
in Qualitative Study 
Source: Creswell (1994 pp 88) 
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4.3.1 Quantitative 
The quantitative approach generally holds that the researcher should remain distant 
and independent from the researched. Hence in survey and experiments, researchers 
attempt to control for bias by selecting systematic samples and objectively assessing 
the situation. The quantitative methodology therefore uses a deductive form of logic 
by testing theories and hypotheses in a cause and effect order. Hence according to 
Creswell (1994), concepts, variables and hypothesis are chosen before the study 
begins and remain fixed throughout the study with the intent of developing 
general izat 1 ons that contribute to the theory so as to better predict, understand or 
explain a phenomenon. The quantitative approach therefore involves the review of 
substantial amount of literature in order to provide direction for the research question 
and hypotheses and thus setting the study firmly within a theoretical body of related 
literature. The literature is thus used deductively as a framework for the research 
questions with the objective of testing or verifying a theory rather than developing it. 
Hence the theory is first advanced, followed by the collection of the relevant data to 
test it, and then reflecting on whether the theory is confin-ned or disconfin-ned by the 
results of the study. The quantitative methodology is therefore employed for 
confirmatory, explanatory and hypothesis-testing purposes (Punch, 2000; Creswell, 
1994). 
In principle the quantitative methodology as modelled by Sekaran (1992) and outlined 
in Figure 4.5 involves the process of developing the conceptual framework and the 
hypotheses for testing. 
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4.3.2 Qualitative 
An important feature of qualitative research is that it focuses on naturally occurring 
and ordinary events in natural settings in order to have a handle on what 'real life' is 
like. Data is generally collected in close proximity to the specific situation rather 
through mail, hence the emphasis is on specific case and thus obtaining data that 
would provide a rather thick descriptive nature (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For the 
data to be made powerful to studying a continuous process, they need to be collected 
over a sustained period so as to be able to assess causalities. According to Miles and 
Huberman, (1994), qualitative research therefore involves intense and prolonged 
contact with a field or life situation which is reflective of the everyday life of 
individuals, groups, societies and organisations, with the researcher's role being to 
gain a holistic overview of the context under study, its logic, its arrangements and its 
explicit and implicit rules. 
In qualitative research, the logic of the research design is generally inductive - 
developing patterns from detailed categories or themes, thus suggesting an emerging 
design where categories emerge from the informants during the study rather than are 
predetermined a-priori at the start of the study by the researcher. Qualitative design is 
therefore more towards theory generation that help explain a phenomenon than theory 
testing as in quantitative approach (Rudestam and Newton, 2001). In this respect, 
researchers tend to interact with those they study over a prolonged time or through 
actual collaboration (Creswell, 1994). 
According to Krueger (1994) a distinctive feature of qualitative enquiry is that data 
enquiry and data analysis are simultaneous activities. The inductive nature of 
qualitative research assumes that the researcher makes decisions and refines and fine- 
tunes the questions for knowledge en route, including the sample size and the analysis 
protocol being responsive to the en route signals from the researched environment. In 
contrast, for numeric or quantitative analysis, the researcher waits until all data is 
available. A feature of qualitative research is the danger of the analysis becoming a 
stumbling block where the shear volume of data could be complex and time 
consuming, leading to the accusation that the critical facts are either ignored or 
twisted. 
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Again under qualitative research, the researcher would attempt to capture data on the 
perception of the respondents from the inside through the process of attentiveness and 
empathy, with the task of attempting to explicate the ways people in particular setting 
come to understand, account for, take action and otherwise manage their day-to-day 
situations. Qualitative data collection therefore involves adopting observation 
strategies. Qualitative research has therefore been categorised into two broad 
generalised groups - phenomenological and ethnographic. The former refers to 
interpretivism where the line of enquiry should lead to a deep understanding, empathy 
of indwelling with the subject under observation. The phenomenologist therefore 
works with the interview transcripts in order to capture the essence of the account. 
The interpretivist therefore insists that the researcher is no more detached from their 
objects of study than are their informants. The methodology therefore tends to lean 
more towards descriptive data presentation. Researchers in grounded theory, narrative 
studies and other applied studies therefore take this line of research. Qualitative 
research is therefore exploratory in nature in order to build or have a theory emerge. It 
can, however, be designed to be confirmatory of an existing theory (Punch, 2000; 
Creswell, 1994). 
Qualitative research is therefore generally more of theory building which relies on a 
few general constructs which are embodiments of a large host of other sub-constructs 
and are based on a grounded approach to data collection. Here the conceptual 
framework therefore emerges from the field in the course of the study, although as 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue, the a pre-conceptual framework could first be 
developed based on existing theory, experience and the objective of the research. - 
Turning to the sampling for qualitative data, a key feature is that the sample tends to 
be small and studied in-depth unlike quantitative research which aims at establishing 
statistical significance and therefore deals with larger samples. Miles and Huberman 
citing Firestone (1993) stated that sampling for qualitative data also turns to be 
purposive rather than random since with small numbers the data could be biased. The 
sampling is also theory-driven either up-front or progressively as in grounded theory 
research. 
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4.4 Strengths and Weaknesses in both Paradigms 
Both methods have their inherent strengths and weaknesses. But as has always been 
argued, the choice of a particular approach should depend on the purposes, the 
context, the circumstances and practical considerations of the study than on 
philosophical considerations (Punch, 2000; Creswell, 1994; Sekaran, 1992. ) 
4.4.1 Quantitative 
Some of strengths in the Quantitative (Positivist) research method are that it provides 
wide coverage of a range of situations, and there is an advantage in speed and 
economy where statistical data are aggregated from large samples. However the 
weakness in it is that the methods used tend to be inflexible and artificial and are not 
very effective in understanding processes or the significance people attach to actions; 
and are also not helpful in generating theories (Then, 1999). 
According to Hofstede (1991) hard, quantitative studies have the advantage of 
reliability in the sense that they are independent of the person of the researcher, and 
that there is stability of the instruments over time, thus allowing 'longitudinal' 
research. Unlike soft-data-based research (qualitative research), quantitative research 
helps to overcome resistance to bad news among the people concerned with such 
questions as "On how many interviews did you base this opinion? " To him, 
Managers who operate in a hard-data, bottom-line culture can incorporate it more 
readily in their consciousness. However, the disadvantage is that it can easily become 
mechanistic giving rise to the idea that the outcomes can be manipulated. Hence in 
order to get the best of both worlds, both the qualitative and the quantitative approach 
can be adopted by way of in-dept interviews as well as paper-and-pencil survey. 
4.4.2 Qualitative 
In the Qualitative approach, data gathering methods are seen to be more natural than 
artificial, and affords the possibility of looking at change processes, including the 
ability to understand the meaning people assign to an issue, and the ability to adjust to 
new issues and ideas as they emerge. The weaknesses however is that data collection 
can be tedious and would require more resources including difficulty during the 
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analysis and interpretation of data. It involves conducting the research through an 
intense and /or prolonged contact with a field or life situation (Then, 1996). 
Qualitative data may at times involve case study research. However such studies 
inevitably raise questions of reliability and generalizability, in terms of whether 
another observer could perceive the same phenomena, or whether the findings could 
be said to be representative of the general order of things (Punch, 2000). 
One difficulty with the qualitative approach is achieving access to a sufficient number 
of respondents and/or organizations. There is also the added problem of time 
limitations and financial cost of travelling and conducting the interviews and the 
respondents making up time for the interviewer. 
4.5 Benefits of combining the two paradigms 
Miles and Huberman (1994) citing Greene et al (1989), suggested three broad reasons 
for linking qualitative research with quantitative research. These include the ability to 
confirm or corroborate data via triangulation, to elaborate or develop analysis, to 
initiate new lines of thinking through attention to surprises or paradoxes by turning 
ideas around and providing fresh insight. 
It is also argued that by combining the two approaches in a sequential manner, the 
study results can inform the manner in which the next stage and/or approach can be 
structured. Using the two approaches for one study can also help expand the scope of 
the study. Again quantitative data can help with the qualitative study during the 
design by finding a representative sample and locating the deviant cases. It can also 
help during data collection by supplying background information and helping to avoid 
bias. During analysis the quantitative data can help by showing the generality of the 
specific observations and cast new light on qualitative data. On the other hand, 
qualitative data can help the quantitative side of the research during design during the 
conceptual development and instrumentation. Qualitative design can also help during 
the data collection by making access and data collection easier and during analysis by 
validating, interpreting, clarifying and illustrating quantitative findings in addition to 
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strengthening and revising theory. The combined approach could adopt any of the 
following sequences proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994). These sequences are: 
1) A steady and integrated collection of both quantitative and qualitative field 
data as needed to understand the case at hand. 
2) A sort of multi-wave survey where both qualitative and quantitative data are 
collected in parallel with the first wave of data analysed to inform the nature 
of collection of the second wave of data collection. 
3) Alternating the two kinds of data collection such as qualitative (to explore the 
field) followed by quantitative (through questionnaires) and then qualitative to 
deepen and test findings. 
4) An initial quantitative survey to help point the researcher to phenomena of 
importance, moving to the qualitative stage to develop a close-up, strong 
conceptual understanding of how the things work, then followed by a 
quantitative experiment designed to test some results or competing 
hypotheses. 
4.6 Empirical properties of a valid research 
According to Hofstede (1991), for infonnation about a population to be considered 
valid, it has to meet four basic criteria. 
It should be descriptive and not judgemental otherwise it will only contain 
more information about the value system of the informant than about the 
particular population. 
It should be verifiable from more than one independent source, other than that 
it will only reflect one subjective perception. 
It should apply, if not to all members of the population, at least to a statistical 
majority, otherwise it risks being labelled as a false generalization. 
It should discriminate, i. e. it should indicate those characteristics that apply to 
this population but not to others, otherwise it is trivial. 
A sound research therefore needs to meet five somehow overlapping basic criteria 
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o intemal validity/credibility/authenticity; 
9 extemal validity/transferability/fittingness 
o utilization/application/action orientation. 
A good piece of research should provide enlightenment by lifting understanding to a 
new level. The potential for this has much to do with how the study is framed, who 
was selected to participate and the nature of the questions. This would involve the 
analyst in seeking strategies that will attempt to find out answers to what was known 
and then confirmed and/or challenged by the study; and finally what was new that was 
not previously suspected. Others include comparing and contrasting the result with 
established theory or present the results in ternis of typologies that provide 
classification systems to enable users to identify critical parts of a larger system, by 
representing a phenomenon and visual forms such as models or diagram as symbolic 
images that debit relationships that are critical to the understanding of the processes 
(Krueger, 1994). 
Generalization therefore becomes an important element of a sound piece of research 
work. The generalization process in quantitative research in particular may involve 
generalization from sample to the population, but may also include analytic or theory 
connected generalization or case-to-case transfer in case study research (Punch, 
2000). In this respect sampling plays a crucial role in determining the reliability of a 
research outcome. Fundamental to any piece of sound study is how to obtain a 
representative sample of a population since a biased sample makes it impossible to 
make accurate predictions about the population or make any sound inferences from 
the data collected. A number of sampling methods have been proposed in the 
literature, each with their respective strengths and weakness. Carter and Williamson 
(1996) for example, categorised the various sampling methods into two broad 
categories - probability methods and non-probability method. The later includes such 
methods as convenience sampling, judgment sampling and quota sampling. Though 
economical and practical in many circumstances, it is normally referred to as non- 
scientific since it cannot guarantee that every individual in the population has had an 
equal chance of being included in the sample. Probability sampling involves selecting 
at random the required number of subjects for the sample; hence each member of the 
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population has an equal chance of being selected. Methods here include simple 
sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling and cluster sampling. 
4.7 Validating and confirming findings 
Testing against independent data is called validation and scores need to be correlated 
strongly enough with the scores obtained by the model to eliminate a chance 
explanation. In order to assess data quality, there is the need to check for 
representativeness in the data, weighting the evidence, and checking for researcher's 
effect. There is also the need to look for patterns in the data, and following up 
surprises and looking for negative evidence. Testing for explanations involve making 
if-then tests and rule out spurious relations and replicating the finding and checking 
out rival explanations. A good explanation also deserves attention from the very 
people who provide the initial data through feedbacks. 
Checking for representativeness refers to the procedure necessary to confirm that the 
findings could be generalized. The pitfalls for inappropriate generalisation include 
sampling non-representative informants, generalising from non-representative events 
or activities and drawing inferences from non-representative processes. The resulting 
sources of error include over-reliance on accessible and elite informants, over- 
weighting dramatic events and heavy reliance on plausibility (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
4.7.1 Feedbacks 
Checking for feedbacks is one of the most logical sources of corroboration of the 
results of the data analysis as the respondents or informants can act as the main 
repository of the relevant knowledge and therefore in a better position to comment 
effectively on the findings of the research. Feeding findings back to informants is 
therefore a venerated practice in research and should effectively not only act as an 
important means of validation and confirmability of the research findings but also as 
an ethical way of recognising the contribution of the respondents to the outcome of 
the research. Analysis is improved with feedbacks because it benefits from multiple 
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insights and perspective. Corrective feedback could come from respondents, co- 
researchers, experts and decision-makers (Krueger, 1994; Guba, 19 8 1; Stake, 1976). 
There are however pitfalls in feedbacks. A respondent may have a new view of the 
situation or take some new action as a consequence of an experience in the 
intervening period between the initial data collection and the feedback time which 
may change his/her views on the situation under study. As suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994), where such observations are noticed in the feedback information, 
an effective way to check for the change in the opinion is to do a telephone follow-up. 
What informants do is to comment on or respond to the results of the analysis and the 
degree of its accuracy and the reasons given to justify them. The predictions/analysis 
are drafted and then submitted to the informants to which the respondents/informants 
will respond. A key to getting a good response is to choose informants/respondents, 
who have proven to be reliable in their response to and have interest in the study; in a 
position to know the current situation; and occupy differing roles and somewhat 
differing perspectives on the research focus. 
One of the drawbacks in feedback is a situation where the informants are not familiar 
with the information due in part to sophistication in presentation or use of jargons or 
not being an expert in the field. Another drawback is where the report conflicts with 
the informant's values and beliefs or thinks he/she thinks the report is biased (Guba 
and Lincoln, 198 1). 
One other approach to validation is replicating the findings by looking at multiple 
cases by finding a pattern in a cross case display and tracking through the all the cases 
to see whether the pattern is repeated. Alternatively, to improve the confidence scale 
of the findings, the hypothesis can be tested in another part of the case or data set. 
Stronger still is to replicate in a totally new case in a new environment, or to check 
out rival explanations and hypothesis to confirm or disprove the findings (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). 
4.7.2 Objectivity 
Objectivity in research refers to the extent to which the conclusions depend on the 
subjects and conditions of the enquiry rather than the enquirer, and the ease with 
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which the research can be replicated by others. This may sometimes be referred to as 
external reliability (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). This bring into mind whether the 
methods and procedures are described explicitly and in detail for a complete picture to 
emerge in the minds of readers; whether the data collection and transformation 
processes have been clearly stated; and whether the conclusions are explicitly linked 
with the displayed data. Others include whether study data are retained and available 
for analysis by others; and whether records are made available of the study methods. 
4.7.3 Reliability 
The issue of reliability relates to consistency in the process of the study and covers 
such areas as to the clarity of the questions and the research design being relevant to 
the questions; and clearly specifying basic paradigms and analytic constructs i. e. 
whether the research is founded on existing or emerging theories. Others include 
collecting data across the full range of settings and from relevant respondents; 
checking for the quality of data against biases and infonnants knowledgeability; and 
effective colleague and peer review. Within quantitative research, principally two 
methods can be adopted to check for reliability - the test-retest approach where an 
identical measure is tested on the same sample over two distinct periods and the 
reliability coefficient is obtained; the split-halrapproach where data obtained during a 
single survey is split into two halves and the reliability coefficient is obtained (Punch, 
2000; Sekaran, 1992). According to Punch (2000), either method can be used to 
estimate the reliability of a measuring instrument. 
4.7.4 Internal validity 
Internal validity involves the process of checking and questioning in order to find out 
whether the findings make sense. This would involve finding out whether the 
accounts rendered are comprehensive enough; whether the validation of the findings 
produce converging results and whether the rules used for the confirmation of the 
propositions or hypotheses are made clear and explicit. Others include checking to 
find out if the conclusions arrived at are confirmed by the original informants and if 
not whether there is a coherent explanation for this; and replicating the findings in 
other parts of the database than the one they arose from. Internal validity according to 
Punch (2000) therefore refers to the internal logic and consistency of the study. 
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4.7.5 External Validity 
A piece of study is said to meet the requirements of external validity if the findings 
can have a larger import and therefore said to be fairly generalized. One level of 
generalization suggested is from sample to population (Sekaran, 1992). The process 
therefore involves the researcher clearly suggesting settings where the findings could 
be fruitfully tested further and that the replication effort can be made without any 
difficulties. Others include clearly defining the boundaries and scope of the research 
to allow for reasonable generalization, in addition to explicitly stating areas where the 
findings cannot be generalized; and clearly defining the characteristics of the original 
sample and processes, to permit adequate comparisons with other samples. Research 
analysis according to Krueger (1994), must be verifiable -a process that would allow 
another researcher to arrive at similar conclusions using available document or raw 
data. In order for analysis to be verifiable there must be sufficient data to constitute a 
trail of evidence. Generalizability of a research finding according to Sekaran (1992) 
refers to how far the research findings in one organisation or within a set up can be 
applicable to another. 
Every research effort should aim at not only contributing to knowledge but must 
enhance the quality of the way things are done. A sound research should therefore aim 
at enhancing the level of understanding and sophistication and to enable stakeholders 
to take necessary steps to improve their way of doing things. Miles and Hubermann 
(1994) raised such questions as whether the research findings are intellectually and 
physically accessible to potential users and whether the research report contains rich 
levels of useful knowledge such as the development of insight, consciousness-raising, 
corrective recommendations and action plans. Others include whether the outcome of 
the research could improve and or develop new capacity among the end-users of the 
research findings. 
For quantitative research, checking for external validity towards the generalization of 
the findings involves what has been termed population validity based on the adoption 
of an appropriate sampling (Punch, 2000). Punch, citing Zeller (1997) stated that there 
is no foolproof procedure to establish validity. In this respect it is suggested that a 
validation strategy may include both qualitative and quantitative approaches in the 
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sense that a valid inference occurs when there is no conflict between results obtained 
as a result of the use of different methodologies. 
4.7.6 Types of validity tests 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the various types of validity tests available for 
assessing the soundness of a measure or model. According to Sekaran (1992), these 
validity tests could be grouped under three main categories - Content Validity which 
will also include face validity; Criterion-related Validity which encompasses, 
concurrent validity and predictive validity; and Construct Validity that includes 
convergent validity and discriminant validity. 
Table 4.1 Types of Validity 
Validity Description 
Content Validity Does the measure adequately measure the concept? 
Face Validity Do "experts" validate that the instrument measures what 
its name suggests it measures? 
Criterion-related Validity Does the measure differentiate in a manner that helps to 
predict a criterion variable? 
Concurrent Validity Does the measure differentiate in a manner that helps to 
predict a criterion variable currently? 
Predictive Validity Does the measure differentiate individuals in a manner 
as to help predict a future criterion 
Construct Validity Does the instrument tap the concept as theorized? 
Convergent Validity Do two instruments measuring the concept correlate 
highly? 
Discriminant Validity Does the measure have a low correlation with a variable 
L_ I that is supposed to be unrelated to this variable? 
Source: Sekaran (1992 pp 172) 
4.8 Models 
Models are a means of providing an understanding of something that cannot be 
visualised or studied as a whole and could therefore be described as a simplified 
picture of part of the world so as to explain and appreciate the world, the essence of 
which is to idealise and simplify the problem so as enable one to observe or predict a 
phenomenon or occurrences. Models are therefore a representation of reality made 
sufficiently explicit to enable inferences to be drawn. Models communicate ideas and 
facts about a system, generate new ideas for designing and operating a system, help to 
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predict how the system will behave in different circumstances, and to provide insight 
into why the system behaves in a certain manner (Raftery, 1998; Lave and March, 
1975). 
Raftery (1998), citing the works of Churchman et al (1957) and Tate and Jones (1975) 
indicated that there are three types of models - iconic models, analogue models, 
symbolic models, and conceptual models, each with varying levels of abstraction as 
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Conceptual models take into account the variables that are relevant and how they are 
related and often take the form of flow charts. Iconic models are scaled 
transformations, examples of which include architectural models. At a slightly higher 
level of abstraction than iconic models is the analogue model examples of which 
include the cash flow curve. Symbolic or the mathematical representations of a 
phenomenon, are the most abstracts of all the models. They are of a greater degree of 
precisions where the system being studied lends itself to quantitative analysis. 
Examples may include linear regression equations. According to Ferry et al (2003), 
another form of model is statistical model where some collected information indicates 
a certain trend. This study will make use of the conceptual model in identifying the 
attributes that account for the efficient and effective implementation of the PPP 
procurement strategy during the pre-contract stages; these would then be subjected to 
statistical analysis to develop a hierarchy of the top significant attributes. 
Model building according to Beakley and Chilton (1974), therefore involves a think 
process, the development of interesting implications, and lookingfor generality. The 
process therefore includes the formulation of an objective or a set of objectives that 
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need to be investigated such as time and cost outturns or client satisfaction. Then the 
underlying dimensions and assumptions about the contributing variables are 
identified, explicitly making clear what these assumptions are. This is then followed 
by the formulation of hypotheses which are then tested and validated. Figure 4.7 
graphically represents the model building process in a simplified form. 
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Models are therefore a representation of our understanding of a phenomenon at the 
time and therefore have limitations. As knowledge is advanced, an existing model 
may be found to be deficient either totally or partially. A good example was the 
earlier perception of the model of the universe with the earth as flat and at its centre. It 
was not until the development of the telescope by Galileo that Copernicus's version of 
the sun rather being at the centre of the universe was proved right (Raftery, 1998). It 
is therefore imperative that the assumptions made in developing a model and its 
limitations have to be explicitly stated to guide users of the model. 
4.9 Summary 
The review of the literature on research methodologies has provided an insight into 
the two main research paradigms, by highlighting when it is appropriate to adopt a 
particular paradigm to meet the objective of a study and their relative merits and 
demerits. The review also highlighted what constitutes a valid research and how to go 
about validating a piece of empirical study. The next chapter brings this review into 
perspective by identifying the methodology appropriate for this study and elaborating 
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on the approach adopted, the rationale for the choice of approach, and the steps taken 
to validate the findings of the study. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the main methodology adopted for this research - the 
quantitative approach, the reasons for the choice of this approach and the steps taken 
to ensure the outcome of the study meets the requirements for a valid research. The 
study utilised a cross-sectional survey designed to investigate the extent of pre- 
contract cost and time overruns when using the PPP philosophy in procuring 
infrastructure projects. The same research instrument was used to obtain data to 
develop a multi-attribute hierarchical model that captures the key attributes relating to 
the Public Sector Client, the Consortium, the Project and the External Environment, 
that impact on the successful negotiation of the PPP contracts. The chapter also 
outlines the validation processes adopted. 
5.2 Rationale for the approach 
The subject matter and the sources of information provide a direction towards the 
choice of research methodology to adopt. The focus of this research is not to capture 
the how of the negotiation process of the PPP procurement but to unveil the key 
contributing factors that make the process work effectively. Additionally, the very 
commercial confidentiality attached to the contract negotiations only allows for 
exclusivity, in the sense that only the parties involved are expected to attend and 
participate in the negotiations. Designing a research instrument that requires 
observation of the process by an independent researcher will be a near impossibility in 
this case except he/she is part of the negotiating team or he/she is afforded a special 
privilege to do so. 
Secondly, the aim of the research is to capture opinion from the very active 
participants within the entire spectrum of the main sectors involved in the PPP project 
procurement, with a view to gathering a more generic data for analysis. Finally the 
main focus of the research has an explicit connection to an existing body of 
knowledge and theory - negotiation theory. Viewed against the set objectives and the 
scope of the research as outlined in Chapter 1, the review of the literature on research 
methodology therefore points to the choice of predominantly the quantitative 
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approach. As indicated in Figure 5.1, this chapter therefore outlines the strategy 
adopted to achieve the set objectives of the research. 
The questionnaire approach to the collection of data forms the bedrock of this 
research methodology. Though a number of weaknesses have been reported in 
questionnaire surveys, such as biased or distorted responses due to the inability of the 
respondents to clarify any doubts about particular portions of the questionnaire; poor 
response rate especially for mail questionnaires; and the inability of the researcher to 
verify the responses (Sekaran, 1992; Kerlinger, 1973; ), these weaknesses are more 
than offset by the advantages. One of such advantages is the ability to cover a wider 
geographical area especially when the respondents are widely dispersed, as is the case 
for this research. Data collection by mail questionnaire method is also efficient as cost 
and time are minimal in obtaining relevant information on a broad range of topics 
from a large number of respondents, without unnecessarily disturbing their normal 
activities. This form of survey also allows the respondents enough time to reflect on 
the questions and the answers that they may want to provide (Sekaran, 1992; Brook, 
1977). 
5.3 Conceptual definition of the research strategy 
Based on the conceptual model of research typologles developed by Danny (1999), 
the strategy for the current research is as outlined in Figure 5.1 in bold fonts. 
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On the basis of the strategy outlined in Figure 5.1, the methodology adopted for this 
research is as shown in Figure 5.2 below. 
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Figure 5.2 The Research Methodology 
Having decided on the hypothetico-deductive methodology as the suitable approach 
that meets the objectives set for this research, the study commenced with an initial 
review of existing literature on the processes involved in the PPP procurement and 
then followed by a thorough review of the literature on negotiation theory. This was 
followed by contacts made with practitioners in the field through person-to-person 
interviews. These were practitioners who have had relevant experience in the area of 
PPP procurement. Workshops and public forums on a major PPP schools project in 
Edinburgh, Scotland were also attended to gather both public and private opinion on 
the process. Most of these workshops and forums were designed to sensitise public 
and end-user opinion on the projects. 
This author was privileged to also attend a major international congress held in 
London that drew major players both from the public sector and the private sector all 
over the UK and the world active in use of the PPP strategy. During this two-day 
congress a number insightful issues relating to the way the PPP projects are procured 
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and the difficulties encountered were thoroughly discussed at workshop levels. The 
information obtained during these formal interviews and forums and from the relevant 
literature helped in understanding how the PPP procurement process evolves. This 
insight, coupled with the knowledge provided through the literature review, shaped 
the development of the paper-pencil survey and the rest of the quantitative aspects of 
the research. 
5.4 Questionnaire design and data collection 
The first objective of the study was to establish the extent to which the problems of 
pre-contract time and cost overruns are real when procuring infrastructure projects 
using the PPP concept. In order to address this objective, Part 1 of the questionnaire 
was designed to capture hard data on projects procured in the recent past using the 
PPP concept. The data required included project values, planned pre-contract time 
estimates, and actual pre-contract time up to the time the contracts were signed. 
Others included the initial estimated advisory cost to the participating parties and the 
actual costs to them up to the signing of the contracts. 
In order to collect data to effectively address the second and third objectives of the 
study, ordinal scale was used to enable respondents rank the attributes. The second 
objective of the research involves the development of a hierarchy of significant 
attributes that influence the PPP procurement process, while the third objective 
involved the examination of the perceptual differences between the public and private 
sectors on these attributes. The ordinal summated rating procedure is widely used not 
only in social research but also extensively in construction management related 
research (Punch, 2000; Wong et al, 2000; Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka, 1998). 
The ordinal scale has the properties of effectively measuring central tendency through 
the median, dispersion through semi-interquartile range, and for testing significance 
using rank-order correlation (Sekaran, 1992). The complete questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix A. I 
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The second part of the questionnaire was thus structured as per the following abstract. 
The significance of the consortium attributes refers to the extent to which these 
attributes influence the ability of the parties to successfully conclude the PPPIPrivate 
Finance procurement processfrom the OJEC NoticelAdvert to the eventual signing of 
the contracts in a timely and cost effective manner. 
Please tick the appropriate scale asfollows: 
Scale: insignificant = 1, slightly significant = 2, significant = 3, very significant =4, 
extremely significant =5 
ID 
No: 
Consortium Attributes Level of significance 
12345 
CS Nature and Strength 
csl Previous experience in PPP procurement. 00000 
CS5 Readiness to accept risks. 0000 
The results of any research can be as good as the instruments or measures that tap the 
concepts. Hence there is the need to use well-validated and reliable instruments. In 
order to check for consistency and reliability the initial draft of the questionnaire was 
piloted internally among a numbers of researchers and professors active in project 
management related research. Valuable comments on the questionnaire were also 
received from colleagues who have had substantial experience in this form of 
procurement strategy. 
Sekaran (1992), citing Kidder and Judd (1986), noted that a test designed to measure a 
specific phenomenon can be considered as having validity if it is evaluated by a group 
of expert judges. This is referred to in the research methodology literature as content 
validity which ensures that the research instrument or measure includes an adequate 
and representative set of items that would tap the concept under investigation. 
Secondly, against the backdrop of this author's long years of experience in 
infrastructure procurement - close to 20 years, the structuring of the questionnaire 
rendered it to be understood much more easily by the practitioners in the field. As a 
result, unlike situations where some respondents chose not to complete the 
questionnaire on the ground of confidentiality, those that were completed were done 
fully and therefore fully usable. 
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Data was collected through a cross sectional questionnaire survey approach using the 
sampling frame described in section 5.5 below. The questionnaires were thus mailed 
to the respondents accompanied with stamped, self addressed envelopes to facilitate 
the return of the completed questionnaires. Although mailed questionnaires may have 
the disadvantage of low return rate, it is a much more effective means of collecting 
data than the other modes of data collection such as face-to-face or telephone 
interviews, or personally administered questionnaires where responses to the 
questionnaires have to be obtained from a sample which is geographically dispersed. 
It is also a better approach where when a substantial amount of information is to be 
obtained through structured questions at minimal cost (Sekaran, 1992). This study not 
only required collecting data from respondents who are geographically dispersed but 
also a large amount of structured information was required for the study. 
5.5 Sampling of Respondents 
As indicated earlier in chapter 4, sampling plays a crucial role in determining the 
validity of a research finding. As Punch (2000) points out, for any empirical study, the 
logic of the sample should fall in line with the overall logic of the study. Again the 
more representative the sample of the population, the more generalizable are the 
research findings (Sekaran, 1992). Hence in order to obtain a representative sample 
which fits this research context and purpose and whose response to the questionnaire 
would represent the views of the industry players within this new form of 
infrastructure procurement - the PPP, a thorough attempt was made to draw sample 
from a credible population which is active in this form of procurement, and not from 
the general construction industry population. As a result of the network established 
from the contacts made at a major international congress held in London in 2000 on 
the PPP strategy, this author was privileged to be provided access by Centaur, to their 
database. This data base contains the list of key organizations, which are actively 
involved in the procurement of projects using the PPP/PFI strategy within the UK. 
Centaur are the publishers of the PFI Report and the principal organizers of major 
conferences and workshops on the PPP/PFI concept throughout the UK. They 
developed the database in conjunction with the HM Treasury. The database was 
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arranged in a form of a league table in the order of number of signed contracts these 
organizations and institutions (both public and private) have participated in since the 
inception of the PFI/PPP concept within the UK in 1992. A detailed profile was also 
provided on these institutions and organisations including the names of individuals 
that played key roles in the procurement process. Profiles were also given on the 
projects these individuals and organisations were involved in. The list was further 
broken down into the respective categories of institutions and organisations - Funding 
Institutions, Consultants and Advisors (legal, technical and financial), Property 
Management Consultants, Contractors and Public Sector Clients. Additionally, the 
database also contained a comprehensive list of all PPP/PFI projects within the UK 
which have either progressed beyond the pre-contract stages, in the pipeline or 
abandoned during the planning stages. The database therefore represented a credible 
and relevant population frame from which a reliable population sample could be 
drawn for the purposes of this research. 
In all a total of 300 respondents were selected from each of the categories of the 
institutions and organisations listed. These categories included public sector 
organisations; consultants such as architects, engineers and project managers; and 
contractors and facilities managers. Others included funding institutions and financial 
advisors; property developers/advisors; and legal advisors. In compiling the sample of 
respondents care was however taken to place emphasis on both experience of the 
individuals and organizations in terms of the number of projects handled and the a 
balance of the numbers of the public and private sector respondents as a 
representative view is required to meet the research objectives. 
In effect, a stratified sampling approach was adopted as the respondents were divided 
into mutually exclusive groups that are relevant, appropriate and meaningful to the 
context of the study. Stratification, according to Sekaran (1992) is an efficient 
research sampling design since it provides more information with a given sample size. 
As Sekaran points out, stratification ensures homogeneity within each stratum in that 
very few differences or dispersions occur on the variables of interest within each 
stratum, but there is heterogeneity between strata. Put in another way, there will be 
more between-group differences than in-group differences. One of the main 
objectives of this research is to assess the conceptual differences among the subgroups 
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of the population on the significance of the attributes identified. For a study of this 
nature the choice of the stratified sampling design has been recommended as the most 
appropriate form (Sekaran, 1992). Due to the fact that both sides actively engage 
consultants during the pre-contract stages of the PPP procurement, in order to clearly 
group the respondents into the two main subgroups - Public Sector and Private Sector 
Consortium - one of the questions requested respondents to state which one of these 
sectors they represented on the specific project for which their answers to the 
questionnaire applied. 
The questionnaires were posted to the selected respondents during the first week of 
June 2002. By mid June, a total of 45 completed questionnaires were received. 
Thereafter, a number of telephone calls were made to respondents who could be 
contacted on phone. By the end June 2002 additional 17 were returned making a total 
of 62, representing a response rate of 21%. As a check for non-response bias, this 
response rate was compared with response rates obtained for similar UK wide studies 
on the PPP in the recent past. Bing Li et aL, (2002) reported 12% rate (61 out of 500) 
for their research on Risk Management in PPP and 9.9% (68 of 700) for the Institute 
for Public Policy Research's (IPPR) call of evidence for consultations on the PPP. 
According to Roscoe (1975), sample sizes larger than 30 and less than 500 are 
appropriate for most research. 
To facilitate the analysis of the data towards testing the third hypothesis of this 
research the completed questionnaires were grouped into two respondent categories - 
Public Sector Client and, Private Sector Consortium. In all a total of 24 suitable 
responses were received from the public sector and the remaining 25 came from the 
private sector. The next stage was to break them down into the three main sectors of 
the UK economy where the PPP/PFI philosophy is being vigorously pursued - health, 
education in the form of schools, and major civil engineering project. One major aim 
of these subdivisions was to check for any differences in efficiency in terms of the 
time and cost overruns experienced on their respective projects during the pre- 
contract stages. The other aim is to demonstrate the robustness of the findings and the 
resulting model since the model needed to be representative of the entire spectrum of 
infrastructure procurement using the PPP concept. 
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A further analysis of the completed questionnaire showed that respondents have had 
substantial experience in the PPP/PFI mode of procurement and therefore information 
provided by them could be relied upon. Detailed analysis relating to the profile of the 
respondents is covered in Chapter 6. 
5.6 Statistical Instruments used for data analysis 
5.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In order to achieve the objective set under proposition 1, descriptive statistics was 
deployed to analyse the data. Descriptive statistics is a technique for summarizing and 
describing data and usually deploys mean, mode, median, range, variance and 
standard deviations; the first three of which are used to measure central tendency 
within the data and the last three are for measuring dispersion or variability within the 
dataset. However the mean and standard deviation are the most commonly used 
statistical tools for descriptive statistics (Punch, 2000; Sekaran, 1992). Project 
management and construction related research relies extensively on the use of 
descriptive statistics to explain the outcome of the findings. Ye and Tiong (2003), for 
example used it in assessing Tariffs and Internal Rate of Return for different tariff 
adjustment frameworks in BOT projects. Songer and Molenaar (1997) also used 
descriptive statistics in determining the key success factors for public-sector design 
and build projects. Others include Tiong and Alum (1997), Anderson et al, (2001), 
and Wong et al (2000). 
5.6.2 Multi-Criteria Decision Theory 
The analytical instrument used in examining the data in order to address the second 
and third objectives of this research is that of Multi-Criteria Decision Theory which is 
based on the principle that among all achievable, scores for any ith attribute, there is at 
least one extreme or ideal value that is preferred to all others. This may be called the 
'anchor value' and denoted as x*i. This ideal place plays a prominent role in decision- 
making. There is thus the axiom that: Alternatives that are closer to the ideal are 
Preferred to those that are further away. To be as close as possible to the perceived 
ideal is the rational to human choice (Zeleny, 1982 pp 156). Hence as all alternatives 
are compared with the ideal, those farthest away are removed from further 
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consideration. The principle is thus based on the assumption that there is an ideal 
level of attributes for objects of choice. Figure 5.3 provides a graphical representation 
of this ideal point within a constrained utility space. With limitations to alternatives of 
choice imposed by the possibility boundary P, conflicts between what is preferable 
(the end) and what is possible (the means) begin to set in. According to Zeleny 
(1982), as decision makers attempt to gasp the extent of the emerging conflict 
between means and ends, they begin to explore the limits attainable with each 
important attribute. The highest achievable scores with all currently considered 
attributes form a composite - an ideal alternative x *. 
Figure 5.3 The ideal point x* in constrained utility space. 
Source: adapted from Zeleny (1982, pp 144) 
There are two fundamentally different ways of eliciting weights of attribute 
importance: 
(i) direct explication through interviews, questionnaires, preference or trade-off 
interrogation or similar; and 
indirect explication in which the decision maker performs a series of overall 
evaluation through a number of alternatives via ranking where the decision 
maker's overall evaluations are related to the corresponding attribute levels of 
the alternatives. 
The simplest approach is to have the decision maker range the attributes in order of 
their significance e. g.: low significance = 1, average significance = 2, and so on. 
Such ranking of significance could be pre-emptive or additive. Pre-emptive ranking 
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means that only the highest ranked attribute is considered and all other remaining 
ones are excluded from the analysis i. e. they are assumed not to be important. 
Additive ranking or weighting means that all weights have a simultaneous effect. 
They can be summed and normalised i. e. each weight can be divided by the sum of all 
weights so that they add to unity. A special case of ranking is rating which asks 
questions like "what is the relative importance of a given attribute on a scale of one to 
five? " (Zeleny, 1982). 
According to Zeleny (1982), decision-making can be viewed as an information 
processing activity. Decision-relevant information about available alternatives is 
transmitted, perceived and processed via attributes. In this sense, the attributes serve 
as the information sources. The more information is emitted by the ith information 
source, i. e. the ith attribute, the more relevant or more salient is the attribute in a given 
situation. Attributes are the physical or the physiological characteristics, the scores of 
which can be obtained through an objective measurement e. g.: size, weight, etc. For 
example, using one of the components under investigation in this study - the 
Consortium, organisational strength, the quality of the technical or financial 
proposals, could be considered as main attributes with such other underlying 
dimensions as readiness to accept risks, level of financial guarantees provided, etc, 
considered as the sub-attributes. 
Obviously, most subjectively assessed a priori declared weights are independent of 
the actual information transmitted. In such sense, they are to be used for the initial 
selection of salient attributes only. From the entire universe of relevant attributes, a 
smaller number is selected by assigning weights, wi. This primary weighting is 
intended to identify which attribute will be considered initially. Then these attributes 
again become undifferentiated in terms of their importance. Scores are then assigned 
and evaluated with respect to a particular set of alternatives. The informational 
significance is thus established and a secondary weighting (actually the more 
important one) can take place. Some of the initially important attributes might fail the 
information criterion and later be discarded. Under special circumstances, for 
example, when most a priori attributes do not transmit sufficient decision information, 
some originally none salient attributes can be added to the initial set. In this respect in 
order to satisfy this aspect of the process, the initial interviews and the literature 
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search identified hosts of attributes for the main components under study. The 
preliminary questionnaire drawn up was subjected to intensive scrutiny by two 
practitioners and two other academics in order to screen and eliminate the non- 
significant attributes. As a result the sub-attribute considered being least by the 
respondents during the final questionnaire survey - ability of foreign investors to 
repatriate earnings from PPP projects - even yielded a score of 0.4. 
For the purposes of this research the relative significance of the attributes has been 
determined by the index: 
(isub) r /(r*x n) 
n 
and (Imain) r /(r*x nx N) 
where (isub) = the relative significance index for the sub-attributes; 
(imain) = the relative significance index for the main attributes; 
r= the degree of significance assigned by each respondent to the ith attribute; 
r* = the ideal or anchor score i. e. highest score (5 in this case); 
n= the number of responses; 
N= the total number of sub-attributes under each main attribute. 
The derived indexes were then ranked according to their level of significance using 
the Microsoft Excel function RANK. This methodology has been extensively used in 
project management and construction related research (see for example Mangitung 
and Emsley, 2002; Cheung et al., 2000; Wong et al., (2002); Kumaraswamy and 
Dissanayaka 1998; Okpala and Aniekwu, 1988). 
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5.7 Assessing the Research Findings and the Model for Reliability 
and Validity 
In order to check that the findings of this research are reliable, nonparametric 
inferential statistical tool was deployed using Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. 
The choice of this statistical test was considered appropriate since the questionnaire 
survey adopted the ordinal scale as the measurement instrument. The Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient, according to Conover (1980), is often used as a test statistics 
to test for independence between two random variables. As such it can be used for 
hypothesis testing of the following forms. 
A) One tail-test for positive correlation: 
Ho: The Xi and Yi are mutually independent 
HI: There is a tendency for the larger values of X and Y to be paired together. 
B) One tail-test for negative correlation: 
Ho: The Xi and N are mutually independent 
HI: There is a tendency for the smaller values of X to be paired with the larger values 
of Y, and vice versa. 
Q Two-tailed test: 
Ho: The M and N are mutually independent. 
HI: Either (a) there is a tendency for the larger values of X to be paired with the larger 
values of Y, or (b) there is a tendency for the smaller values of X to be paired with the 
larger values of Y 
Ho, refers to the null hypothesis where HI refers to the alternative hypothesis. The 
alternative hypothesis states the existence of correlation between X and Y, whereas the 
null hypothesis indicate no correlation between X and Y 
The Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient is also a measure of association and as 
such a measure of the degree of correspondence between the ranks of the sample 
observations rather than between the observations themselves. It also measures the 
strength of the relationship between the sample X and Y values, and also as an 
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estimate of strength of the relationship between X and Y in the sampled population 
(Daniel, 1990). 
Mathematically, the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient p (rho) is expressed as 
follows: 
Ply i 
COV(X, Y) (3) 
ox. cy 
Where: 
-1:: ý pxy <1 
and: 
1n 
Cov(X, Y) =- (x! - x*) (yi - /ly) n, 
Statistical tables give critical values of p with the following decision rules (Daniel, 
1990): 
A. (Two-sided): Reject Ho at the ot level, if the computed value of p is 
greater than the tabulated value for N and a given in the tables or 
less than the negative of this value. 
(One-sided): Reject Ho at the (a) level if the computed value of p is 
greater than the tabulated value of N and cc. 
C. (One-sided): Reject Ho at the a level if the computed value of p is 
less than the negative of the tabulated value of N and ct. 
Where: 
N is the number of observations; 
cc is the level of significance (usually 0.05 or 5% for the behavioural sciences); 
p is the computed value of the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. 
As a further check on the accuracy of the analysis in testing the hypotheses, the 
dataset was further analysed using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance to test the 
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degree of agreement or association based on the following statistical relationship 
(Siegel, 1956): 
IkW-1I 
Irhoav=I I (4) i k-i I 
From which W is derived as: 
F---ý rhoav(k - 1) +1 (5) 1W = 
K 
Where: 
W is Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance, 
rhoav is the average of the computed Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients, and 
k is the sets of rankings. 
According to Daniel (1990) and Siegel (1956), for values of N>7, the probability 
distribution takes the form of Chi Square with N- I degree of freedom (dj). The value 
of Chi Square can be computed from the formula: 
FT- , X2 =1 
The statistical test of significance of the observed or computed value of W is done by 
determining the probability associated with the occurrence under the Ho. Hence the 
null hypothesis can be tested that the k sets of ranking are independent. For larger 
values of N if the computed value of Chi Square equals or exceeds that shown in the 
statistical tables of critical values of Chi Square for a particular level of significance 
and a particular value of df =N-1, then the null hypothesis that the k rankings are 
unrelated may be rejected at the level of significance. 
The Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance measures the extent of association among 
several (k) sets of rankings of N entities, and is useful in determining the agreement 
among several judges or the association among three or more variables. 
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According to Siegel (1956), nonparametric statistical tests play a prominent role in 
research in the behavioural sciences where in many of the statistical tests the data are 
changed from scores to ranks, most especially when the scale of measurement is the 
ordinal rather than interval or ratio scale. Parametric statistics tests are more suited to 
data obtained using interval and ratio scales. 
Nonparametric statistical tests have the advantage of being used safely on sample 
sizes as small as N=6 (a situation where parametric statistics will be inappropriate). 
They also have the advantage of being suitable for treating samples made up of 
several difference populations. Added to these, the Spearman coefficient is much less 
affected by outliers in the data than other forms of correlation coefficient such as the 
Pearson. It is therefore much more robust to the presence of outliers in the dataset. 
With respect to the power of efficiency, the Spearman rank correlation is as good as 
the most powerful parametric correlation, the Pearson coefficient, at about 91%, 
provided all the assumptions of the parametric statistical model are met in the data 
(Siegel, 1956). 
One difference between the Kendall's and the Spearman's methods of expressing 
agreement among k rankings is that p may take values between -1 and +1, whereas W 
may take values only between 0 and I (Siegel, 1956 pp 232). 
In developing the model, the split-half approach was adopted. Split-halve procedure 
involves the partitioning of a measure into two halves for administration 
simultaneously. The correlation between the two halves is the reliability estimate 
(Zeller and Carmines, 1980). This approach was taken due to its practicality in 
administering the measure only once as opposed to the test-retest approach. Obtaining 
survey data within the construction industry has of late proved to be increasingly 
difficult, resulting in poor response rates (Root and Blismas, 2003). This research 
targeted top executives during the survey. These groups of people have limited time at 
their disposal. Hence subjecting them to a further questionnaire survey in a test-retest 
mode to check for reliability was not only likely going to produce poor response rate, 
but only obtaining opinion from the same set of people twice as the population set for 
expert knowledge on the PPP is currently small. Owen (2002) was confronted with a 
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similar dilemma when using the triangulation approach to validate his research on the 
PFI in transportation projects as the number of respondents or participations dwindled 
significantly during the second and third trials. Moreover sufficient data has been 
collected for this research to allow for the split-half approach to be adopted without 
sacrificing the statistical requirements for the analysis of the data. 
As a further check to test for the robustness of the model, sample data were extracted 
for schools, hospitals and major civil engineering projects procured through the PPP 
strategy. These separate pieces of data were used to validate the model using the same 
inferential statistical method. This final test acted as a diagnostic analysis to assess the 
generalizability of the results to the total population and as a means of further 
validating the model (Hair et al 1998). 
According to Hofstede (1991), two measures are said to be correlated if they vary 
together, for example height and weight correlating together. However correlation 
between two measures may never be perfect. The coefficient of correlation expresses 
the strength of the relationship. Where the correlation is perfect, i. e. the measure 
follows entirely from the other, the correlation coefficient takes the value of 1.00. 
Where the correlation is nonexistent, i. e. the two measures are completely unrelated, 
the coefficient is 0.00. The coefficient can become negative (-) if the two measures 
are each other's opposite. The lowest possible value is -1.00, in which case the two 
measures are again perfectly correlated, only one is positive when the other is 
negative, and vice versa. In statistical analysis, one can expect a coefficient to be 
about 0.80 or even higher (Hofstede, 1991). 
Inferential statistics is a tool that assists in making decisions based on the analysis of 
the data. Because data is obtained from a sample of the population and not from the 
entire population, statements need be made of the outcome of study in relation to the 
entire population, nonetheless; or it may be necessary to know the differences in a 
variable among different subgroups, or the relationship between two variables 
(Sekaran, 1992). Hence inferences are being made from the sample to the population 
by way of generalization. Inferences are therefore based on probability statistics 
expressed in the form of confidence levels or statistical significance levels and are 
usually expressed as p<0.05, p<0.001, etc. For a 5% probability, it means that the 
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likelihood of being incorrect is 5 times in 100. The 5% significance or confidence 
level is usual for social research (Punch, 2000; Sekaran, 1992). 
According Punch (2000), there is no full proof procedure to establish validity and that 
the validation method used should depend on the situation. Citing Zeller (1997), 
Punch indicated that because all methods have limitations, quantitative or statistical 
inferences about validity need to be buttressed with qualitative methods. To Zeller, a 
valid inference occurs when there is no conflict between messages received as a result 
o the use ofa variety oftlifferent methodological procedures. f 
A second approach was therefore adopted to further validate the resulting model for 
content validity, practical relevance and robustness. According to Sekaran (1992) 
content validity ensures that adequate and representative dimensions have been 
included in the measure that seeks to tap the concept. It is a function of how well the 
dimensions and elements of a concept have been delineated. A total of 10 experts 
were selected, eight (8) of whom were randomly picked from the group of 
respondents who participated in the initial questionnaire survey. The other two (2) 
who did not participate in the initial survey were chosen based on their experience in 
procuring infrastructure projects using the PPP/PFI concept. The feedback 
questionnaire is included in this thesis as Appendix A. 2 
Additionally, the rigorous peer review of the journal paper and the three conference 
papers generated from the research, lends credibility to the research approach and the 
outcome (Ahadzi & Bowles, 2001a; Ahadzi & Bowles, 2001b, Ahadzi & Bowles, 
2003, Ahadzi & Bolwes, 2004). As indicated by Hofstede (1991), for any research 
finding to be valid, it should be verifiable from more than one independent source; 
otherwise it would only reflect one subjective perception. 
5.8 Summary 
The foundation for any sound and valid research lies in the approach adopted to solicit 
information and to analyse the data generated. This chapter provided an in-dept 
description of the methodology adopted for this piece of study and the steps taken to 
validate the findings. Central to the study approach is the use of descriptive statistics 
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to investigate the first objective of the research, and inferential statistics based on 
Speannan's Rank Correlation and Kendal's Coefficient of Concordance to investigate 
the remaining two objectives. The next chapter provides a detailed account of the 
above statistical analysis. 
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Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Model Validation 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter elaborated on the methods adopted to realise the research 
objectives, and the processes adopted in other to validate the preliminary model and 
the research propositions. This chapter reports on the findings of the questionnaire 
survey and the various statistical analyses carried out to develop, test and validate the 
preliminary model proposed in Chapter 3 and processes taken to validate the 
propositions of the research. For ease of reference, the research objectives as outlined 
in Chapter I and the propositions under investigation are hereby briefly restated. The 
research has three objectives. 
To highlight the extent of pre-contract cost and time overruns when the 
PPP philosophy is used in procuring infrastructure services. 
To identify those characteristic attributes of the Private Sector Consortia 
and Public Sector Client Organisations, the Project, and the External 
Environment, that significantly contribute to the successful negotiation of 
PPP/PFI contracts in a timely and cost effective manner; and then develop 
a Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model capturing these respective 
attributes, the main components of which is illustrated in Figure 6.1.1. 
To explore the differences in perception between public and private sector 
on the relative importance of these attributes in contributing to the 
negotiation success. 
Public Sector Attributes 
C. p. bililieý 
Technical Cmpabifitlcý 
Fi .... W(p. hilitic, 
Consortium Attributes 
Org, oo-o ... I Nature and Strength 
Qu. 1i" P,,, p,.. l 





External Environment Attributes 
Project Attributes 
N. I. -of pr. j,, t 
Nl. rk". bili" f pr. j-t 
........... .......... .... . 
Zýý 
Figure 6.1.1 PPP & Contract Negotiations: Outline of the 
Generic Model 
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The research propositions are also hereby restated: 
a) The twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns are real in the PPP 
infrastructure procurement and therefore remain a serious issue to be addressed 
if the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among all stakeholders. 
b) A generic model can be developed to capture in a hierarchical order of 
significance the key attributes that positively influence the efficient and 
effective implementation of the negotiations phase of the PPP procurement 
process in terms of minimising times and cost overruns to the parties. 
C) Though there is a broad agreement between the key stakeholders (the public 
and private sectors), on the relative significance of the main attributes of the 
Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the Project, and the External 
Environment on the outcome of the PPP contract negotiations, differences do 
exist amongst them on the underlying dimensions to these main influence 
centres". 
Negotiation outcome in this research refers to time and cost efficiency during the pre- 
contract stages of the PPP procurement, where efficiency relates to the ability of the 
parties to minimise and/or eliminate unnecessary time and cost overruns and yet strive 
to conclude the deals in a satisfactory manner in terms of obtaining value for money. 
This chapter has therefore been structured into four main parts. The first part deals 
with the analysis of the general information provided by the respondents on 
themselves as to their levels of experience in the procurement of infrastructure 
projects using the PPP/PFI strategy. This part also covers the profile of the projects 
used in the research analysis. 
The second part analysed the pre-contact time and costs out-turn data obtained 
through the questionnaire survey using descriptive statistics. The third part covers the 
development, testing and validation of the multi-attribute hierarchical model based on 
the principles of inferential statistics, including the analysis of a feedback survey to 
assess the model for practical relevance, robustness and comprehensiveness. The 
fourth and final part covers the testing of the third research proposition - the 
perceptual differences between the private and public sectors on the significance of 
the attributes. 
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oa Lienerai intormation on resiDondents and the analvsed Drolects 
6.2.1 Profile of Respondents 
Part I of the questionnaire was structured to gather general information on the 
respondents. The list of respondents was drawn from a database compiled by Centaur 
in collaboration with Her Majesty's Treasury (Centaur, 2002). This database contains 
a comprehensive listing of the names of top ranking firms, financial institutions, 
public sector clients and individual experts involved in project procurement using the 
PPP/Private Finance strategy including the list of PPP/PFI projects they were 
involved in. 
In all 300 questionnaires were sent out to the individual experts between May and 
June 2002. These experts were selected primarily on the basis of their names being 
attached to concluded deals either as project managers, legal, technical or financial 
advisers, out of which 62 were returned representing a response rate of 21%. As a 
check for non-response bias, the response rate for this study compares favourably 
with the level of responses obtained for other UK wide research in the area of the 
PPP. Bing Li et al., (2002) reported 12% rate (61 out of 500) for their research on 
Risk Management in PPP and 9.9% (68 of 700) for the Institute for Public Policy 
Research's (IPPR) call of evidence for consultations on the PPP. 
Out of the 62 responses received the questionnaire for 49 of them were found 
adequately completed for detail analysis. The others were either not fully completed 
or returned uncompleted with an indication that information they had were of 
commercial confidentiality. Twenty five (25) of the fully completed responses came 
from respondents within the private sector and remaining twenty four (24) came from 
respondents who either work directly within the public sector or acted as advisers or 
consultants to the public sector for the specific projects that they provided their 
responses on. 
Table 6.2.1 overleaf provides an overview of the respondents and their levels of 
experience in procuring infrastructure projects using the PPP/PFI strategy or delivery 
method. 
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'rable 6.2.1: General Profile of Respondents 
ceteac-ry of Mlýrlewme sectow Rep se"taticon Sub 
ReSpC> Clep7rS CaV. J70 *fJ'JIJIAP" PNVý FIrAO-Ore f"Nowe radef 
Chief Executive/M D 7 3 3 - 6 
Project Manager 6 11 12 23 
Legal Adviser >10 1 0 1 
Financial Adviser 9 3 6 9 
Property Adviser >10 0 2 2 
Senior Lender >10 1 0 1 
Cost Adviser >10 1 0 1 
Architect >10 1 0 1 
Engineer a 1 0 1 
Technical Adviser 4 0 1 1 
Planning Adviser 6 1 0 1 
Bid Manager 10 1 0 1 
Pro ect Director >10 a 1 
24 
Figure 6.2.1 gives a pictorial representation of the general profile of the respondents. 
of Chief Exem*KWM D. 
III Project M anager 
a Legal Adviser 
0 Finarnal Adviser 
a Property Adviser 
a Servor Lendet 
III Cost Adviser 
a Architect 
a Engineer 
0 Tachrical Adviser 
0 Plamng Adviser 
a Bid MaFinger 
a Proiect Director 
Figure 61.1 General Profile of Respondents 
To facilitate the analysis of the third objective of the research - the assessment of the 
perceptual difference in opinion between the private and public sectors on the relative 
significance of the identified attributes on the outcome of the PPP negotiation process, 
the respondents were further re-profiled into two main categories as shown in Table 
6.2.1 and Figures 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 
Figure 6.2.2 Profile of Private Sector Respondents Figure 6.2.3 Profile of Public Sector Respondents 
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Specific project data were collected through the questionnaire survey on concluded 
PPP projects that have been taken through the procurement stages up to the signing of 
contracts and/or at construction and operation phases. Table 6.2.2 gives the profile of 
the categories of projects analysed. 
Table i 5.2.2 General Profile of analvsed Projects 
Figure 6.2.4 represents the proportion of each category of projects to the analysed 
total. 
WCW Engirmering Projects 
E Hospital Propects 
0 Sdool Propcts F13 ; Z 
(fi. stations, offim, 
Figure 6.2.4 Profile of the analysed projects 
Questions 4 and 5 under Part I of the questionnaire survey employed the respondent 
to indicate the type and name of the specific project in which he/she had been mainly 
involved and for which his/her answers to the questionnaire applied. The respondents 
provided the names and types they had been involved in and for which their answer 
the entire questionnaire referred. For reasons of commercial confidentiality, a few of 
them declined to provide the capital value and/or the bidding costs of the projects. 
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Tables 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 respectively list educational/school projects and health sector 
projects for which the respondents made specific data available. 
Table 6.2.3 Profile of Education/School projects 
l-E3I; ac:: E3ln; RvE--r-l I t: 1 
E-=clinburgh E3r-hc: )c: )I: s Fzll; ar-tnEar: ship E3! 5 
E3irrningharn 10 Sýt--hool: s 40 
F; Eolkirk 70 
F=I; arr! s VVood 'School 12 
^bE)rdete, shire E; chc3ol! s 24 
Caerphilly I-et(--andary Sýc--hooltE3 26 
-Fovver C-: roup of E3chocDI! s 152 
InVE31! sting in E=ducation ý3 1 
FEE College, 20 
C, -roupEB, c] E3chool: s Flrc3jEB! ct a! s 
Yýý3C3, (DL- (--YFýUN F"EENNEEIDIDIN 12 
^ Navv \. FV; ay Fýorvvarcl (Fýifia C: ounc--il) 40 
VVE3,: st L-othian E3(--hc)cd: Fý Fz'F="F: l 27 
Table 6.2.4 Profile of Health Sector project 
Proje c- t Afa m elTitle Cýapftaf Vallie (EM) 
HOCLAS 200 
New Royal Infirmary, Edinburgh 215 
Chester Le Street Community Hospital n/a 
Dudley Group of Hospitals 140 
Stoke Maideville Hospital 30 
Central Manchester 250 
Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital 229.2 
Bromley Hospital 160 
Table 6.2.5 also provides a similar listing of civil engineering projects, whilst Table 
6.2.6 covers others such as offices, courts, fire stations, etc. 
Table 6.2.5 Profile of Civil Engi 
Project AfamalTitle 
neering projects Table 6.2.6 Proffle of other proj 
Capital Value (EM) P tN Tid 
ect types 
C it lV l Broadlands Flood Defences 120 rojec ama e ap a a ue 
M6 Toll Road 500 Fire Training Centre (South Wales) 8 Pevesey Bay Sea Defences 30 
Moray Coast Wastewater Project 60 R (Property Development) 100 
Sky Bridge 
Birmingham Highway PFI 
95 
1300 Central London Accommodation (Hore Ofte) 30] 
Tyne & Wear Metro Extension 
KA-I. --I, 
98 
cnn Ofice Buildino (Cambiidue) 20 
In order to find out how representative the analysed projects were to the population of 
PPP/PFI projects nationwide, a comparison has been drawn using data provided by 
the Bank of Scotland called The PFI Map of Great Britain 2002 which listed all the 
signed PPP/PFI projects within the UK by the end 2001. This national data was 
compiled by the Bank in association with the Office of Government Commerce and 
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Centaur, the publishers of The PFI Report. Table 6.2.7 provides an indication of this 
representation. 
Table 6.2.7 Proportion of analysed projects to signed PPP/PFl projects UK wide 
Projed Category Used in the rch Anaois Signed PPPfPFl , up Io 2DDI * %af&*s@dpm*ft 
N. -*&. d I CpiW Vhx pili Tow no C*W VOW woesoww" 
Civil Engineering Pro)mt 13 25-1300 37 5-4178 35 
Health Proýecls 14 30-300 103 3-404 14 
School Projects 18 12-91 38 0.2-127 47 
Others (in t*m, osms. mwtk mun imsom poice soms) 
14 
8-300 62 7-164 6 
TON I 49 1 1 240 1 1 2D I 
Va somv Bank of Scolland (The PFI map of Great &7tain 2002) 
Figure 6.2.5 gives an indication of the percentage of the analysed prOjects to signed 
PPP/PFl projects nationwide. 
m Civil Ergineefing Projects 
35 m Health Projects 
a School Projects 
47 
Others (fire stations, 
14 offices, courts, 
houskV, 
prisons, police stations) 
Figure 6.2.5 Percentage of analysed projects to signed PPP/PFI project UK wide 
The national data contained signed PPP/PFI contracts since the inception of the 
concept in 1992 to the end of 2001. Although the national data has other non- 
infrastructure based projects such as waste management and IT provisions, the above 
comparison considered only infrastructure-based projects since the focus of this 
research is purely on the infrastructure-based contracts. Twenty percent (20%) is quite 
a representative sample of the population. 
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6.3 Analysis of pre-contract Time and Cost Out-turns 
6.3.1 Pre-contract Time Out-turns 
This section of the analysis seeks to investigate the extent of pre-contract time 
overruns when the PPP philosophy is used in procuring services through 
infrastructure projects. Delays resulting in spiralling bidding costs during the pre- 
contract stages have frequently been cited as a problem in the implementation of this 
philosophy. The analysis is principally based on descriptive statistics using the data 
provided by the respondents. On the time out-turris, Questions 7 and 8 of Part I of the 
questionnaire sought information on specific projects as to the original indicative time 
schedule provided by the client organisations in the invitations to bid. This should be 
the date of the OJEC Notice/Advert to the date when the deals were supposed to have 
been concluded and the contracts signed. This period is referred to in the research as 
the pre-contract time period. 
In all, data on a total of forty-five (45) projects were analysed. The overall overrun in 
the pre-contract time for the 45 projects averaged 62.5%. In terms of months, there 
was an average overrun from the initial estimated time of 18.3 months to 28.5 
months, with some recording as high as 38 months of time overrun. Only one of the 
projects recorded a time saving of 3 months, which incidentally happened to be a civil 
engineering project. The data was further grouped into a range of time out-turns in 
order to provide a picture of the extent of the time overruns or otherwise. Table 6.3.1 
provides a representation of the time out-turns in terrns of percentage variances. The 
complete detail of the data is shown in Appendix B. 1. 
Table 6.3.1 Pre-contract time Out-turns (%) 
1: 31 ir 43 - 4-- cp " it ires o=t 
F0 ir co 1 4ED 
win ep Xf; im ir 122 p7 lep Cp JFjCM-4aft3i W- r., ý 5k-, CýI-Jr irC3'9ýW 
-< 02 
0 2> 0 E3 1B 
2> 1A0S11 
41 EýO 1 E3 40 
E31 BO S la 
E31 -1 00 4 !D 
>- 1 00 1 :317 
-relt; al 1 4S 1 100 
In order to have a feel of the data in terms of absolute values, it was further grouped 
into ranges of the time out-turns in months. This is represented by Table 6.3.2 below. 
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Table 6.3.2 Pre-contract Time Variance (months) - for all categories of projects 
F- a- *a -cr d: x " O=It --Ir 5 W" ý F' lr. CP_§ MEW d=*ýM 
am. or I as WU Cwaim w3p "it "! z&I ". C3. 
C) PRE]; C3 
I : Z2 
-1 CO 
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pre-contract time variance (0/6) 







0 <0 0-5 6-10 11- 15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 '36-40 
pre-contract time variance (months) 
II 
Figure 6.3.2 Pre-contract time variance (months) - for all categories of projects 
The data was further regrouped into three major sectors - schools or educational 
facilities, hospital or health facilities and major civil engineering projects, with a 
minor group comprising a small number for fire stations, courts, offices, etc, termed 
as others. The idea was to find out how each of these sectors performed. This may 
help highlight some of the underlying reasons behind why some sectors perform 
better than the others. 
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6.3. LI Civil Engineering projects 
Data for thirteen (13) projects of civil engineering nature were analysed. The projects 
consisted of rail and road transport infrastructure, waste disposal plants, water and 
sewage systems, and major flood and sea defence works. The pre-contract 
procurement time out-turns for these projects are as represented in Table 6.3.3. 
Table 6.3.3 Pre-contract Time Out-turns for Civil Engineering projects 
P4rcp#enct to CGIA of Valum 
CAD-2 
10'riginmi Tiwrvq-- ActUal ThIlle vewhance 
44 '1000 12 18 SOL 0 
37 so 16 20 11.11 
30 300 12 12 OLO 
22 200 24 27 
20 25 12 24 0 
18 1300 15 is 20L 0 
43 n/a is 30 66.7 
16 98 is 12 -20.0 
4 1600 30 42 4(PL 0 
36 120 12 24 IOGL 0 
26 30 215 36 -44.0 
24 60 21 30 42-9 
10 90 24 36 Smo 
322.75 10 25 39.2 
Of the thirteen projects analysed, the average time overrun was 7 months representing 
38.2% over and above the original times. One particular project performed above 
expectations by actually saving on the pre-contract time by as much as 20%. Only two 
of the projects exceeded their time targets by 100%. The average capital value for the 
projects was f322.75. 
A graphical representation of the time variances is also shown in Figure 6.3.3 




4567a9 lo 11 12 13 
Figure 6.3.3 Pre-contract time out-turns for civil engineering projects 
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6.3.1.2 HealthlHospital projects 
Pre-contract time data for twelve (12) health projects were analysed. None of the 
projects showed any savings in time. The average time overrun was 10 months over 
an average of 20 months of estimated planned pre-contract procurement time -a 50% 
average overrun for projects of average capital value of V66.3m. One of the projects 
had time overrun of 18 months, which was 100% of the original time. 
Table 6-3.4 Pre-contract time out-turns for Health projects 
SID 200 24 36 Sao 
49 SO 21 30 -#Zý9 
40 200 18 24 3 
33 n/a is 24 . 32L3 
31 140 2-1 33 57.1 
19 300 is 21 1&7 
15 100 9 15 66.7 
13 30 27 40 4&jr 
12 250 24 34 41 7 
3 229,2 18 30 6&7 
2 160 18 36 
1 170 24 36 50.0 
Figure 6.3.4 provides a pictorial representation of the pre-contract time out-turns for 
these health projects. 
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6.3.1.3 EducationalISchool projects 
Sixteen of the valid data returned contained information on the pre-contract time out- 
turns for educational/school projects. The analysed data revealed a rather high 
percentage of time overruns for projects procured within this sector. The average 
overrun was 64% despite the fact that the average capital value is much smaller - 
f43.5. The average time overrun in terms of months was 10.5 months. One of the 
projects recorded as high as 344% overrun. 
Table 6.3.5 Pre-contract time out-turns for educational/school projects 
I-ff-CWJqM. =t In. <3wklm"401 -war" ^. Crt%Aed 7rfWIM4o 
4-7 015 
-0 
E3.0 12-0 50-0 
415 40 0 2G. 0 360 _ýPVL !5 
4S 70 CI 9ý0 13 
- 
C) 
42 7! 5-0 240 : 24 C) CLO 
41 : 37.0 1 E3.0 3FI_ 0 WOOL 0 
as n/a 120 : 21 -0 7ML 0 
3-4 : 240 2so _S006-5k 
32 : 2s. 0 15.0 26 0 ýr3L -3 
28 S2 0 90 40 0 31.4"L-4 
27 191 0 : 24 
- 
C) 3s, o f50L 0 






-0 SOL a 
49 1: 2.0 1: 2_0 IE3_0 MOL 0 
e ýWci 01 sý a 2-d- 0 WAA-0 
Is 20 18-0 24 
s 27 1 C3 20 
4: 3 .5 . 16 4 20-! P 64 
"- 31 --!! S "-; e - IIS 
The educational sector projects tend to be aggregation of projects comprising in some 
instances some four to six schools with a mix of new-build and rehabilitation. Each of 
these schools may have their own unique peculiarities. The analysed data for the 
educational/school projects is shown in Figure 6.3.5 
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Figure 6.3.5 Pre-contract time out-turn for educationat/school projects 
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415 VC). 0 9ýo 130 . 4v4F ýor 
42 7! S-0 240 : 24 
-0 GLO 41 ý37.0 1 E3.0 ý3F5- 
- 
C) 
: 3ý- rt/. a 120 : 21 -0 3-4 : 240 1: 2-0 2-5-0 
32 : 2L-D. 0 lE5.0 2E3.0 
20 s2-0 90 400 




23 200 1 E3 -0 
3e: ) C) 
14 z345.0 : 24-0 3ei C) 
09 1: 2.0 1: 2-0 IE3-0 
L: 4 ý&Ei C) 1 -ý- ý 
Li : 2-&. 0 
G 20 1 E3 
-0 
24 
1 27 11 E3 1 20 1 ly 11- -ff 
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6.3.1.4 Others (offices, courts, fire stations, etc) 
Data was also obtained for a number of projected which could not be clearly 
delineated into any of the three main categories. These were grouped together as 
I others'. Table 3.16 provides an indication of how they performed in term the pre- 
contract time outturns. One of the projects also recorded a rather high outturn. 
Table 6.3.6 Pre-contract time out-turns for others project types 
Project 10 Capital Value Original Time Actual Time Variance 
A- - (CW) oveý MI 
21 8 24 36 SOL 0 
17 100 12 18 Sike 
11 300 36 60 6667 
7 20 12 50 31CL 7 
Average 107 21 41 121 
n=4 n=4- n=4 n=4 









Figure 63.6 Pre-contract time out-turns for other building types 
6.3.1.5 Sector by Sector Compatison 
Table 6.3.7 provides an overview of the data in respect of how each sector performed, 
whilst Figures 6.3.7 and 6.3.7 graphically represent this. 
Table 6-3.7 Sector by sector pre-contract time comparison 
SeCtAW Capital VekAe Owigkwd Tkvw Actual Time VerieFw, @-- 
J6WdP. Vt** (MoirtAs -mv leyo) 
Civil En'q 322.75 18.3 25.3 38 
Health 166.3 20.0 29.9 so 
Schools 43.5,16.41 26.91 641 
Secttw Capital Value Owiginal Time Actual Time VerienciL- 
Mw - Arv. ) 6wovt** -. Irg (moirtAs - ov) IYO) 
Civil En'q 322.75 18.3 25.3 38 
Health 166.3 20.0 29.9 so 
Schools 43.5, 16.4 1 26.9 1 64 
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Figure 6.3.7 Sector by sector comparison Figure 6.3.8 Percentage variance in pre- 
of pre-contract time outturns contract time outturn for each sector 
6.3.2 Pre-contract/Bidding Cost Out-turns 
Questions 9 and 10 sought information from the respondents on initial estimated 
direct pre-contractibidding cost to the organisation represented in respect of the 
specific project. A comprehensive listing of the pre-contract/bidding cost out-turns as 
provided by the respondents is included in this report as Appendix B. 2. 
6.3.21 Civil Engineering Projects 
Pre-contract/bidding cost data was provided for seven (7) of the civil engineering 
projects of which three (3) came from the private sector. Table 6.3.8 below gives an 
indication of the costs to both the private sector and the public sector. 
Table 6.3.8 Pre-contract/Bidding costs - Civil Engineering projects 
ProW Prow 0 Capital VAw Pre4: 0111tr cost out-tums SKtK 
Caiegory (im) OrWal(W) WtW(fffll) VaFialfion(rim) S 
civil eng 30 300 6600 private 
18 1300 1.25 1.25 00 public 
16 98 1 0.5 -0.5 -50 public 
4 600 8 11 3M public 
36 120 0.5 1 0.5 MAN private 
26 30 0.5 1 0.5 104LOO private 
1 24 60 1.5 3 1.5 10100 ublic 
Figure 6.3.9 shows how the bidding costs incurred by the private sector vaned over 
the duration of the bidding process mainly as a result of the time overruns due to the 
ProW ProW 0 Capkall Vakm Pre4: 01* cost OUMUMS sedK 
Calegoiry (f-M) original(im) actuall(fm) VaIriation(fim) 
civil eng 30 300 6 6 0 0 private 
18 1300 1.25 1.25 0 0 public 
16 98 1 0.5 -0.5 -50 public 
4 600 8 11 3 M public 
36 120 0.5 1 0.5 10&00 private 
26 30 0.5 1 0.5 100.00 private 
24 60 1,5 3 1.5 lomoo public 
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Figure 6.3.9 Private sector bidding cost - 
Civil Engineering projects 
Figure 6.3.10 Public sector pre-contract 
costs - Civil Engineering projects 
6.3.2 2 Health Sector Projects 
Nine (9) pre-contract/bidding cost data was provided for health sector projects as 
indicated in the Table 6.3.9. Out of the nine projects the private sector provided its 
bidding costs for seven (7) of the projects whilst the public sector provided pre- 
contract costs for two. 
Table 63.9 Private Sector Bidding Costs - Health sector projects 
Project Project ID Capital Vakse Pro-contract cost OLIIIAW I sector 
Category (ran) oriakw (iRm) actual (am) variation (Sao 1 % Variation 
health 50 200 2 3 1 so private 
49 50 0.25 0.75 0.5 200 private 
40 200 0.4 0.5 0.1 25 public 
33 rda D'i 0.1 0 0 private 
15 100 0.28 0-3 0.02 7.1 private 
13 30 0.39 0.6 021 Sa a private 
3 229,2 3 45 1.5 so public 
2 160 1 2 1 Too private 
1 1 170 1 0,5 1 0.5 1 0 10 1 prvate 
I Figures 6.3.11 and 6.3.12 represent these costs to the private and public sectors. 
Figure 6.3.11 Private Sector Bidding Cost 
- Health sector projects 
Figure 6.3.12 Public Sector Pre-contract 
Costs - Health sector projects 
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6.3.23 EducationalISchool Projects 
The largest data was returned for educational or school projects. In all, cost data was 
provided for thirteen (13) projects within this sector of which six came from the 
private sector. This data is represented in Table 6.3.10 overleaf With the exception of 
only one project, all of them exhibited excess pre-contract/bidding costs over and 
above their original estimates with one of them recording as high as 133% excess 
bidding cost to the private sector participant. 
Table 6.3.10 Pre-contractlBidding Costs for Educational/School projects 
Prow project ID Capital Value Re-coriltactAilikkiiing Cost Out-turns Sector 
Category (EM) origiinall (1m) actual (fAn) variallion (im) % variation 
schools 46 40,0 1 00 2.20 1ý2 120 private 
45 70.0 0.20 0.40 0.2 100 pnvate 
42 75.0 0.50 1.00 0.5 100 public 
41 37.0 1.85 3.70 1.85 100 public 
35 rda 0.13 0.28 0.145 111.5 PrIlvate 
34 24.0 0.8 1.20 0.4 50 public 
32 25.0 0.35 0.55 0.2 57.1 public 
28 52.0 0.6 1.40 0.8 1313 private 
27 91.0 0.75 1.00 0.25 33-7 public 
14 35.0 0.4 0.7 0.3 75 private 
9 12.0 0.4 0.4 0 0 public 
8 40.0 1.19 1.2 0.01 0.6 public 
6 20 0.4 1 0.5 1 0.1 1 25 pnMe 
Figures 3.2.13 and 3.2.14 overleaf respectively provide a graphical representation of 
the data for the private and public sectors for the analysed educational/school projects. 
2.50 4.00 
2.00 






Figure 3.3.13 Private Sector Bidding Costs Figure 3.3.14 Public sector Pre-contract 
Educational/School projects 
Costs - Educational/School projects 
Project Project ID Capital VMue PFe-cot*actANd dM Cost Oul-turns Sector 
Category (EM) or*W (WO achW (fAn) variatim (EM) % YwWm 
schools 46 40,0 1 00 2.20 1ý2 120 private 
45 70.0 0.20 0.40 0.2 100 pnvate 
42 75.0 0.50 1.00 0.5 100 public 
41 37.0 1.85 3.70 1.85 100 public 
35 rda 0.13 0.28 0.145 111.5 PrIlvate 
34 24.0 0.8 1.20 0.4 50 public 
32 25.0 0.35 0.55 0.2 57.1 public 
28 52.0 0.6 1.40 0.8 1313 private 
27 91.0 0.75 1.00 0.25 33-7 public 
14 35.0 0.4 0.7 0.3 75 private 
9 12.0 0.4 0.4 0 0 public 
8 40.0 1.19 1.2 0.01 0.6 public 
6 20 0.4 0.5 0.1 25 pnvate 
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6.3.2 3.4 Others (offices, courts, fire stations, etc) 
The pre-contract/bidding cost data was provided for three other projects within this 
category, details of which are provided in Table 6.3.11 below. There was no data 
made available for the private sector. 
Table 6.3.11 Pre-contract/Bidding Cost for other project types 
projeo PfojeO ID Caphl Value Pie. cotaflidding CW Otturns Sedor 















Again the data here revealed high levels of pre-contract/bidding cost overruns with 
one of them as high as 167%. 
In summary, the data analysed revealed very high levels of time and cost overruns 
during the pre-contract stages of the PPP project procurement. The average time 
overruns for the projects studied were 38% for Civil Engineering projects, 50% for 
Health projects and 64% for School projects. In some instances the time overruns 
were as high as 100 to 300%. In absolute terms, the overall times taken to take the 
projects to contract signing stage were in the range of 12 to 60 months,. The 
bidding/pre-contract cost overruns were found to be equally high, with one project 
recording as high as 200% overrun to the private sector. Not only were the overruns 
high but also cost in monetary terms to the private sector was high from a range of 
E0.1in to [6.0in. The public sector costs were equally high, ranging from [0.41n to 
f8m. Evidently, the educational/schools sector projects witnessed the highest 
overruns followed by the health sector projects. The least overruns were those of 
major civil engineering projects. 
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6.4 Attribute Analysis 
This section of the analysis deals with the main thrust of the research - developing 
and statistically testing a hierarchy of attributes that significantly and positively 
influence the PPP/PFI pre-contract negotiation process towards achieving satisfactory 
outcomes in a timely and cost efficient manner. As indicated in the main introduction 
to this chapter, based on the rating provided by the respondents to Parts 11 to IV of the 
research questionnaire, the underlying attributes of the main centres of influence - the 
Consortium, the Public Sector procurer, the Project, and the External Environment, 
have been subjected to rigorous statistical analysis in order to develop, test and 
validate the hierarchy. The details of the methodology have been outlined in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. Table 6.4.1 provides the summary statistics for the analysed data. The 
analysis shows high level of statistical significance with p<0.001 and equally high 
levels of correlation for the split half analysis. 
'Fable 6.4.1 Surnmary Statistics for the spit half analysis 
The Model Result (n: 49) SpHaResult Rim" 
Min Component Min AbWes SpM I (n - 24) Spk 2 (n - 2ý ýearmin's Corid& KmWs UAW ted of 
Rkve Siptw RaNffg R6k &0= R" ReWrie Wme R" COMTKW of CWdW won 
hdex hdeX WIX LT W (o*itd) 
Wri nd Wm$k U38 0.14 1 0.7% 1 
The ConsMum Qlfký of w1kil P(OPNJ 0.723 2 0,7311 2 1710 2 0.936 095 P<0.11 
Qnfiýofaffilnýilpr"l 092 3 BAR 3 U56 3 
0A 2 03ý 1 0,737 2 
The Public Secor Client Tooliul CIP86II& O. M 1 0.726 2 0.751 1 0.19 0892 P <011 
Filigiii UPONWIS 0678 3 53 3 0-92 3 
The Projw U111 of projKt 0.665 1 OL57 1 00 1 ON 0966 P<0 001 
A640640y0rojed 0a2 0133 2 9178 2 
The Extemal Enviionment wo-aunk U73 I OU 1 0.19 1 ON H32 P <011 
Ifyiel U23 2 OSM 2 OA 2 
The sections that follow provide detailed analysis of each component from which the 
above summary has been extracted. Taking the Consortium as an example, a 
hierarchical order of the sub-attributes under the respective attributes - Nature and 
Strength, Quality of Technical Proposal and Quality of Financial Proposal, has been 
established and tested statistically. 
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6.4.2 Consortium Attributes 
The analysis carried out to determine the hierarchical order of attributes in terms of 
their level of relative significance with respect to the time and cost efficiency in the 
PPP negotiation process is based on the formula stipulated in Section 5.6.2 of Chapter 
5. Only the key results of the analysis are presented in this section. The detailed 
analyses of the data have been presented in the respective appendices. The derived 
hierarchy was subjected to analytical statistical tests using the Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient and the Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance. The 
computations relating to the derivation of the hierarchy, and the detailed test analysis 
have been included in the thesis as Appendix C. I 
Consortium Attributes 
Organizational Nature and Strength 
Qualit" of'rechnical Proposal 
Quality of Financial Proposal 
Public Sector Attributes PPP Project Attributes 
CONTRACTS 
Organisational Capabilities NEGOTIATION Nature of project 
. 'rechnical Capabilities OUTCOME 
Marketability of project 
Financial Capabilities 
External Environment Attributes 
Socio-Economic 
Political and Legal/Regulatory Regime 
6.4.2.1 Organisational Nature and Strength 
Table 6.4.2 lists in the hierarchical order of relative importance of the underlying 
attributes for organisational nature and strength for the Consortium. Within the table, 
isub refers to the relative significance index for the sub-attributes whilst inlain refers 
to the relative significance index for the main attributes. 
163 
Chapter 6 Data Analysis and Model Validation 
Table 6.4.2 Hierarchy of Consortium Attributes- Organisational Nature and Strength 
ý"Cjý ^ttrlltvcjitýý F ýý, b raýjkiýa I Mao" 
CS fflw-tmýe "-. f lstýemirptal, 0.738 
-9 -, ppoirding ý I-iiceteU bid manager 0-865 1 
-1 0 Unclmrýtancling the public -tor neecl- 0.863 2 
Cý6 ýDpen"-k commuini-tion. 0.841 3 
-1 5 Emrly inýol-ment of other ýtekeholcfe- 0-833 4 
Cýl 1 ^bility to ýork hairmoniQuisly. 0.820 5 
-5 Reacflneý. to ccept riýk. 0.6116 6 
ýýl 7 Pern-ermnce cluring prcytraýtecl negotlýtio- 0.012 7 
-1 Preýioun experience in PPP. O. ZS2 a 
OS16 Ch-pion's pe-on. 1 ýttribute 0.7156 9 
cý7 Commitment to earlier negotiýtecl termý- 0. -il 5 11 10 
ýý2 Con-rtiuim'ý reput-tion. 0.702 11 
-3 PPP being ý -t, ýtegic b-ine- irtereýt 0.686 12 
. s4 Ability to tie equity for e long period. 0.11182 1-3 
. ýIa Muittidi-iplineiry te- 0.669 14 
ýýl 2 Previo- experience -ý te- 0.11366 is 
-1 4 Timely pl-ning permi-i- 0.657 16 
-1 3 Proaýtiýe role in initmUng the proji-t. 0.629 17 
-6 C-rent job holding. 0-6 4 18 
ýýj 9 
1pre io- e. perien- -ith ýJient . 
I-b: 6 19 
The top five attributes include the appointment of a dedicated Bid Manager, the 
ability to understand the public sector procurer's needs for the projects, open and 
frank communication during the negotiations, the early involvement of the 
stakeholders, and the ability to accept the risks being passed over from the public 
sector. The Consortium's previous experience with the public sector client 
organisation though related as being the least significant among the hierarchy of 
attributes, still had a relatively high index of 0.596 
6.4.2.2 Quality of the Technical Proposal 
Similar analysis was carried on the attributes relating to the quality of the technical 
proposals and the hierarchy as developed and tested statistically is as listed in Table 
6.4.3 below. 
Table 6.4.3 Hierarchy of Consortium Attributes- Quality of Technical Proposal 
code Attributes i sub ranking i main 
ct Quality of Technical Proposal 0.723 
ct2 Clarity of submissionskesponses 0.800 1 
cti Robustness of outline technical proposal. 0.780 2 
ct4 Provision of sound technical guarantee. 0.673 3 
ct3 Innovative technical solutions. 0.641 4 1 
Top among the attributes is the importance attached to the quality of the submissions 
and the responses to queries raised on the bids, followed by the robustness in terms of 
not only meeting the client's needs but also being judged to be able to meet the test of 
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time as the contracts are generally of long duration in nature. Though the submission 
of innovative technical solutions was regarded among the attributes as of 
the least significance, it also scored highly on the significance index, an indication 
that that it is also rated highly in contributing to the attainment of an efficient 
negotiation process during the procurement of PPP projects. 
6.4.23 Quality of the Financial Proposal 
The hierarchy of the underlying attributes relating to the quality of the financial 
proposals is listed in Table 6.4.4 with their respective relative significance indices. 
Table 6.4.4 Hierarchy of Consortium Attributes- Quality of Financial Proposal 
code Attributes I wb ranking I main 
QW&IRY of tke Financial Proposal 0.652 
c14 Levels of tariffAolls proposed 0.846 1 
cf5 Credibility of financiers 0.767 2 
cf6 Client's exposure to financial risks 8-763 3 
cf1 Financial guarantees provided/proposed 0.739 4 
cf2 payment mechanisms proposed 0.7311 5 
cf3 Government funding/guarantees required. 0.641 6 
C18 Length of concession period proposed. 0.567 7 
c17 Financial returns to the public sector client. 0.551 8 
cf1 0 High Equity/debt ratio to drive commitment. 0.465 9 
C19 Third party revenue to be generated. OL463 10 
Top among the attributes is the importance attached to the level of tariffs/tolls 
proposed by the consortium. This is not surprising as this is at the very heart of the 
PPP philosophy. The credibility of the project financier comes next. High equity/debt 
ratio and the amount of third party revenue generation incorporated the financial 
proposals received quite low level of considerations with relative significance index 
scores below 0.50 
Figure 6.4.1 shows how the main attributes relating to the Consortium compare in terms of their relative significance. 
Quality of Financial Proposal 
Quality of Technical Proposal 5-7ý3 
Organisational Nature and Strength 
I 
fmý, 2 O. 
J3 
8-- 
000 020 040 060 080 100 
Relative Significance Index 
Figure 6.4.1 Relative Significance of the main Consortium Attributes 
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6.4.3 Public Sector Client Attributes 
Consortium Attributes 
Organizational Nature and Strength 
Quality ofTechnical Proposal 
Quality of Financial Proposal 
Public Sector Attributes ppp Project Attributes 
CONTRACTS 
Organisational Capabilities NEG )I TION Nature of project 
Technical Capabilifies OU , 
)ME Marketability of project 
Financial apabilifies 
External Environment Attributes 
Socio-Economic 
Political and Legal/Regulatory Regime 
J 
ý'**,.. 
.. 1. .. -. 1 . 11. .11.11.11 -I 
The Public Sector Client's role in the efficient realisation of the negotiation process in 
order to minimize and/or eliminate the twin problems of pre-contract time and bidding 
cost overruns were considered under three main attributes - the organisational 
capability, their technical capabilities, and their financial capacities. These three main 
attributes also had their underlying sub-attributes, the hierarchies of which have also 
being derived and tested using the same methodology as in the case of the 
Consortium. The derivation and the test statistics can be found in Appendices C. 1 
including the graphical representation in Appendix C. 2 
6.4.3.1 Organisation Capabilities 
Top among the attributes relating to the organisational capabilities of the public sector 
client level of commitment to the project exhibited by top management, followed by 
collaboration within the negotiating team. 
Table 6.4.5 overleaf gives the rank order of the public sector client attributes relating 
to their organisational capabilities 
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Table 6.4.5 Hierarchy of Public Sector Client Attributes - Organisational Capabilities 
code Attribtstee i -Sob ranking I MA? j .n 
Po (: Wgamisatiolfal capabijritiý 0.736 
P05 Top level commilment 0.902 1 
po6 Team collaboration and commitment 0.866 2 
po7 Open/frank and flexible communication 0.849 3 
pol 1 Commitment to earlier negotiated terms 0.747 4.5 
P03 Level of bureaucracy in the decision making process 0.747 4.5 
pol 2 Ability to accept and absorb risks 0.714 6 
P09 Assisting in land acquisition and in obtaining permits 0.698 7 
po4 Right attitude to cost 0.694 a 
pol Ability to effectively sensitise public opinion 0.686 9 
pol 0 Tapping knowledge and expertise gained elsewhere 0.665 10 
P08 Pre-established PPP Unit 0.637 11 
po2 ILevel of reputation enjoyed by the organisation. 1 0.633 12 1 
6.4.3.2 Technical Capabilities 
The hierarchy of attributes relating to the technical capabilities of the public sector 
client organisation with respect to how best they could handle the PPP procurement 
process towards achieving efficiency by preventing excessive pre-contract time and 
cost overruns is indicate as shown in Table 6.4.6 
Table 6.4.6 Hierarchy of Public Sector Client Attributes - Technical Capabilities 
code Attributes i sob rimking 
I i main 
Pt Technical Gapabilities 0.739 
pt6 Clear output specifications 0.829 1 
PH Strong in-house expertise 0.759 3 
pt2 Sound preparatory work 0.169 3 
Pt5 Clearly established evaluation criteria 0.759 3 
pt4 Experience in infrastructure procurement 0.698 5 
pt7 The use of standard bidding documerds 0.690 6 
pt3 Previous experience in PPP procurement 0.678 7 
The ability to clearly spell out the needs in the form of clear and concise output 
specifications has come top among the attributes. Strong in-house technical expertise 
has also been recognised as a necessary vital element that must exist within the public 
sector organisation wanting to undertake projects using the PPP strategy. 
6.4.3.2 Financial Capabilities 
Within the group of the Public Sector Client attributes relating to their financial 
capabilities and/or strength, the capacity to pay the tariffs ranks top, followed by a 
strong financial support from the central government especially when the project is 
being initiated at the local level. 
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Table 6.4.7 Hierarchy of Public Sector Client Attributes - Financial Capabilities 
code AftrbAes i vb ranking i win 
finalicial wahifitips 0.571 
PE cv"y to pay 0.767 1 
pf2 Strong fiweial &WrUguarantees frm the central pt V47 2 
pf3 Flexible tax regimes. IL465 3 
pfl Ability to raise funds through Bonds. 0.457 4 
04 Ability to Proyide eauity finance. 0.463 5 1 
Comparing the three main attributes, the possession of strong technical capabilities 
was considered as the most important among the main attributes followed by the 
organisational capability as illustrated in Figure 6.4.2 below. Financial capability was 
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Figure 6.4.2 Relative Significance of the main Public Sector Client Attributes 
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6.4.4 Project Attributes 
.... ........................ 
Public Sector Attributes 
Org-1-11 ... I C, p. bIlIti.. 
T-h. k. 1 C. p. bIlIfl- 
Fi-nd. l C. p. bilki- 
........... .............. 
Consortium Attributes 
Orgsnlýationsl Nature and Strength 
Quality ofTechnical Proposal 
Quality of Financial Proposal 
ppl, Project Attributes CONTRALAS 
NEGOTIATION Nature of project 
OUTCOME Marketability of project 
External Environment Attributes 
Socio-Economic 
Political and LegaURegulatory Regime 
The effect of the project characteristics in influencing the process towards an efficient 
and timely negotiation of the procurement process was considered under two main 
attributes - the nature of the project, and the marketability of the project. As in the 
case of the others, the detailed analysis for derived hierarchy and the test statistics can 
be found in Appendix C. I 
6.4.4.1 Nature of Project 
The top three attributes among the hierarchy of attributes relating to project nature are 
the issues of size and complexity, the level of project risks to be managed, and the 
ability of the project to respond to future changes. The overall hierarchy is indicated 
in Table 6.4.8 below. 
Table 6.4.8 Hierarchy of Project Attributes - Nature of Project 
code Attributes i sub ranking I i main 
pn Arature of Project 0.665 
pnl Size and complexity 0.788 1 
pn3 Project risk management 0.759 2.5 
pn8 Ability to respond to f uture changes. 0.759 2.5 
pn7 Design completion required at tender. 0.702 4 
pn9 Project location and site conditions 0.694 5 
pn4 Impact on the environment 0.633 6 
pn1 0 Uniqueness of project 0.624 7.5 
pn2 Amenability to innovation 0.624 7.5 
pn6 Health and safety provoked 0.584 9.5 
pnl 1 Effect on existing public sector staff 0.584 9.5 
pn5 IThird party improving existing infrastructure 0.563 11 
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6.4.4.2 Marketability ofproject 
The very large size of most PPP projects calls for heavy capital investments both form 
the private sector consortium in the form of equity and from large investment banks in 
the form of loans. The projects therefore have to be both attractive to these investors 
and hence should be marketable. Table 6.4.9 lists in a hierarchical order the relative 
significance of the underlying dimensions of the marketability attribute. 
Table 6.4.9 Ilierarchy of Project Attributes - Marketabdity ofproject 
code AttrllbLutý I Sob ranking I main 
I 
pm AMmAretabfArty afpraJect 
prn: 5 Bankability of project 0.890 1 
pml Suitability for private participation 0-824 2 
pm2 Meeting general public needs 6.766 3 
PM1 0 Level of tariffs and tolls. 0.722 4 
pm4 Useful life after concession period. 0.6611 5 
pm3 Potential for land and property buyouts. 6-637 6 
pma Opportunities for future refinancing 0-584 7 
prn6 Monopolistic advantage 0.539 8 
PM9 Potential for property development rights 0.494 9 
pm7 Third party revenue potentials 0.463 10 
The sub-attribute referred to as the bankability of the project tops the list with a 
relative significance index of 0.890, followed by the suitability of the project for 
private participation, and then the ability of the project to meet general public needs. 
Least among them with a rather low significance index of 0.453 is the potential of the 
project to generate third party revenue. Figure 6.4.3 indicates how the two main 
project attributes compare with each other in terms of their relative significance. 
Marketabik of Prýect 
0.61% 
Nature of ýect 
OM5 
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0. 
ý 
too 
I? Wdive Sgrificave Irda 
Figure 6.4.3 Relative Significance of the main Project Attributes 
code AttwlbLutý I Sob 
I ranking I main 
pm AMmAretabfArty ofproJect 
prn: 5 Bankability of project 0.890 1 
PM1 Suitability for private participation 0-824 2 
pm2 Meeting general public needs 6.766 3 
PM1 0 Level of tariffs and tolls. 0.722 4 
pm4 Useful life after concession period. 0.6611 5 
pm3 Potential for land and property buyouts. 6-637 6 
pma Opportunities for future refinancing 0-584 7 
prn6 Monopolistic advantage 0.539 8 
PM9 Potential for property development rights 1111.494 9 
pm7 Third party revenue potentials 0.463 10 
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6.4.5 External Environment Attributes 
............ ................. ........................ ............................................ Consortium Attributes 
OrganUAtional Nature and Strength 
Quality of Technical Proposal 
Quality of Financial Proposal 
Public Sector Attributes PPP Project Attributes 
CONTRACTS 
Organisational Capabilities NEGOTIATION Nature or project 
Technical Capabilitie ME Marketability of project 
Financial Capabilitie: 
External Environment Attributes 
Socio-Economic 
Political and Legal/Regulatory Regime 
.................................................. ..................................................... 
Every project or scheme is subjected to a barrage of elements that are broadly terined 
as external to the project. These elements may be categorised as socio-economic, and 
political/legal/regulatory regimes 
The sub-attributes that have been identified as falling under the main External 
Environment Attributes have been analysed and a hierarchy developed on the basis of 
the relative significance with respect to the objective of this study. The detailed 
analyses are included in Appendix C. 1 
6.4.5.1 Socio-Economic 
The hierarchical order of the sub-attributes identified under the socio-economic 
element of the External Environment factor is as shown in Table 6.4.10 
Table 6.4.10 Hierarchy of External Environment Attributes - Socio-Economic 
code Attributes i wb rankinj i main 
es Socio-Evoiromic 0.673 
es2 Maturity of the financial markets. 0.735 1 
es5 Strong publiciprivate sector relationships. 0.722 2 
es3 Perceived future economic uncertainties 0.682 3 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase in PPP pfts 0.629 4 
esl JAvailability of traditional projects. 1 0.6001 51 
code Attributes i wb rankinj i main 
es Socio-Evoiromic 0.673 
es2 Maturity of the financial markets. 0.735 1 
es5 Strong publiciprivate sector relationships. 0.722 2 
es3 Perceived future economic uncertainties 0.682 3 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase in PPP pfts 0.629 4 
esl jAvailability of traditional projects. 1 0.600 15 1 
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6.4.5.2 Political and LegaIlRegulatory Regime 
The top ranking sub-attributc under the Political and Legal/Rcgulatory Regime is a 
clearly defined planning and regulatory framcworký followed by clearly established 
institutional and policy framework on the PPP philosophy. The entire hierarchy is 
presented in Table 6.4.11 
'Fable 6.4.11 Hierarchy of External Environment Attribute - Political and LegaIlRegulatory 
Regime 
code Attrixotes 1 wb I rankiij I min 
el PoliticallLegaIlRegalatoty Regime 0.623 
ell Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 0.751 1 
e15 Established institutional and policy frameworks on PPP 0.747 2 
epl Public acceptability of the PPP philosophy. 0.739 3 
ep2 Stability of the political system. 0.727 4 
ep3 All-party political support for the philosopy 0.718 5 
e14 intellectual property rights. 0.606 6 
e13 Clear regulations on foreign ownership of property. 0.400 7 
e12 I Ability of foreign investors to repatriate earnings. 1 0.396 1 81 
_j 
As shown in Figure 6.4.4, when comparing the two main attributes, the socio- 
economic attribute had the highest relative significance index of 0.673 whilst the 
political and the legal/regulatory regime though coming second also has a quite a high 
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Figure 6.4.4 Relative Significance of the main External Environment Attributes 
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6.4.6 Overall Assessment of the Key Centres of Influence 
Part IV of the questionnaire survey requested the respondents to provide their overall 
assessment of how the key elements - the Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the 
Project, and the External Environment Attributes influence the process towards 
achieving a timely and cost efficient negotiation process. Details of the statistical 
analyses have been included within the AppendLx C. I. The public sector client 
attributes came top with a relative significance index of 0.657 followed by the 
Consortium, the Project and the External Environments Attributes in that order as 
shown in Figure 6.4.5 
External Environment Attributes 
Project Attributes 0.588 
Consortium Attributes 
0.653 
Public Sector Client Attributes - 
0,657 
0.00 020 0.40 &60 080 1.00 
Relative Significance Index 
Figure 6.4.5 Relative Significance of the Main Components 
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6.5 The Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model (GmAHM) 
6.5.1 The Model 
Based oil the analysis and the statistical tests carried out, the results of which have 
been reported in section 6.4, the complete model is reproduced here as Figure 6.5.1 
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Figure 6.5.1 PPP and Contract Negotiations: A Generic Nlulti-Attribute Hierarchical Model 
(GrnAHM) 
For the purposes of parsimony, this model has been restricted up to the top five (5) 
sub-attributes in their respective hierarchical order of significance with respect to how 
they positively influence the efficient PPP procurement process toward achieving an 
early but satisfactory outcome. Supplemental to the model as Appendix C. 2, is a table 
for each of the key components of the model, listing in a comprehensive hierarchical 
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order, all the relevant attributes identified and analysed, including their graphical 
representations. 
6.5.2 Statistical Validation of the Model 
In order to check for the true generic nature of the model a validation exercise was 
carried out. The process involved reorganising the data set into distinct project types 
reflecting the main sectors of the construction industry where the PIT programme has 
been actively pursued. These were the Education/Schools projects, Health projects, 
and major Civil Engineering projects. The summary test statistics is presented below 
in Table 6.5.1. The comprehensive and detailed computations and the analysis have 
been presented in Appendix C. 3 
Table 6.5.1 Summary Statistics for validating the model 
N Moil Risub Pioýd Tpos 96W 
NO Caput mo WMIS cwwqR*dl(n: 9) spegmin'screft kdlcmTw twd 
Rdtý *ba FMq Wn *tcm Raiq Rdim *ýw Rriq RMm *km Rrfiý CNW dcmka W(M 
tox ox Ox ht N (ort4Wý 
Ul I Výl I Mi Ull I 
N Dahm ý1* a WWI ý"l I. M Ull I UN VE I 1.11i ý# p (Al 
ý106thblouPopmJ WI WI MI Un I 
ýYlivumlf*kw# 
Puilic 8edoi Glenl 1, killul Dow* 
fillell *kku# 
N Plojed O"Ohod W1 fill I B9 I W1 1.14 ý0 P(Al 
Akrllukl4ako#d WI Ed I W fill I 
N faml Wfumlo( wank MI ull 1 Vý I WI 
jPOWUl(, Yl"ktojwm jMI I hiq I IWI IMI I 
The validation statistical results showed high levels of statistical significance with p< 
0.001 in all the cases. The correlation coefficients and the coefficients of concordance 
were equally high. The detailed computations and the results for each component of 
the model are presented in the subsequent sections that follow. 
6.5.21 Consortium Attributes 
The rank orders of the sub-attributes for each of the main attributes for tile 
Consortium within the model generated were statistically tested in a series of 
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combinations with data for civil engineering projects, health projects and school 
proj ects. 
Table 6.5.2 provides a summary of the key statistical results obtained during the 
analysis. 
Table 6.5.2 Model validation results - Consortium Attributes 
Correlation Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients 
Combinations CWgfflHAWNffOIfffI Qm"fity 4W QmArfity of 
Alatmre Technical i-ropo&"I 
Modal/Ckpil IEWU Projýctu 0.882 0.954 
MadolMeaKh Pr"jýctss 0.837 0.800 0-863 
ModýI/Schýal Prajocto 0.856 0.942 
Caud En"UMealth Projoctu 0-837 0.800 0.822 
Ciusl En'U/Schýal Projocto 0.748 1.000 0.865 
Health/Schuýl Projý"%; 0.673 1.000 0.863 
P-0.001 coffe tai" 
The results reflect very high levels of correlation between the model and the other 
project types and between project-to-project types. Statistically, the correlations were 
equally significant with p<0.001 
6.5.2.2 Public Sector Client Attributes 
Table 6.5.3 provides the validation results for the Public Sector Client Attributes. 
Again the correlation coefficients were very high and the test statistics was equally 
significant with p<0.001 
Table 6.5.3 Model validation results - Public Sector Client Attributes 
Correlation SpeaFman*s Rank Correlation Coefficients 
Combinations CWg"Hisational Tqc*micaf Fialancial 
r4rPabolities C-fflpabifirtoss Ca abiliti" 
ModolfCiwil En'@ Projects 0.911 0.927 0.900 
Model/Heatth Projects 0.865 0.542 0.900 
Model/School Projecta 0.946 0.954 0.872 
Cowil En'UMeafth Projects 0.675 0.721 0.800 
Ciuil E"'g/School Projects 0.833 0.829 0.975 
"Calthischool Projects 1 0.768 1 0.418 1 0.718 
P -< a 001 Come tai" 
176 
Chapter 6 Data Analysis and Model Validation 
6.5.2.3 Project Attributes 
The validation results of the project attributes are presented below as Table 6.5.4. The 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients were very high generally and at very 
significant statistical level of p<0.001 also. 
Table 6.5.4 Model validation results - Project Attributes 




IhA alit" ProjeTc4ss 0-802 0.9-FIS 
Piroj"-ct*; 0-839 1.000 
-Cavel IEWUMetalt" PF-4: Pj4Evc-ti% 0-630 0-9418 
C--swil IEWUfScl-bool PircPilmetic; 0.6156 0-97191 
H. eaIt"/Sc"cb. [A 0.668 0.4976 
0,001 e;. Jwe ltfrf" 
6.5.2.4 E. vternal Environment Attributes 
There were equally positive correlations between the model and the other project 
types for the External Environment Attributes. The correlation between tile individual 
project types was also generally high. The level of statistical significance was equally 
good with p<0.001. Tile results are presented in Table 6.5.5 below. 
Table 6.5.5 Model validation results - External Environnient Attribute. v 
Correlation Spearman's Rank Correlation 
Combinations Coefficient 
Socio-Economic PoliticalLegaIlRegarlatory 
Model/Ciuil En'g Projects 0.949 0.898 
ModeMealth Projects 0.949 0.566 
ModeliSchool Projects 0.900 0.952 
Couil En'g4leatth Projects 0.949 0.703 
Ciud En'g/School Projects OJ38 0.838 
HealthfSchool Projects 0.700 0.530 
P<0.001 (Offle tail) 
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6.5.3 Feedback Validation of the Model 
The model was further subjected to external validation for practical relevance, 
conipleteness, robustness. The analysis of the feedback results is indicated in Table 
6.5.6 below. The criteria for evaluating the model are as follows: 
a) Completeness: Comprehensiveness in the coverage of tile key attributes. 
b) PracticalRelevance: The usefulness of the model in identifying competency gaps. 
C) Robustness: Tile extent to which the model reflects reality as a guide to decision making. 
The experts were requested to rate the model according to the above criteria as 
follows: 
12345 
Completeness Low High 
Practical Relevance Low High 
Robustness Low High 
They were also asked to add any further comments if they wished to do so. 
Table 6.5.6 Analysis of feedback on the generic model 
Criterion scores rating of individual criterion 
expert abCdefhi rated index % 
COMýIýImss 3333231140.660 66 3 
NOU Relemce 5323344530.720 72 f 
Rohslness 14131113131313111310.680 61 121 
The feedback survey returned very high rating of the model for all three criteria. The 
practical relevance criterion, which assessed the model as a useful tool in identifying 
competency gaps within institutions undertaking PPP projects, ranked topmost with 
72% rating. This was followed by robustness criterion with a rating of 68%, which 
assessed the extent to which the model could be used as a guide in decision making 
during the early stages of PPP procurement. The completeness criterion received 66% 
rating. This criterion relates the extent to which the model has comprehensively 
captured the key attributes. The detailed computations have been included in 
Appendix CA 
Criterion scores rating of individual criterion 
expert a b C d e f h i rated index % 
COMýIýImss 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 4 0.660 66 3 
NOU Relemce 5 3 2 3 3 4 4 5 3 0,720 72 f 
Rohslness 4 3 1 13 13 3 13 11 31 0.680 1 61 2 
178 
Chapter 6 Data AnalYsis and Model Validation 
Ten (10) industrial experts provided feedback on the model, eight (8) of whom had 
participated in the initial data gathering survey. The two others, who did not 
participate in the initial survey, were selected through contacts made with them during 
workshops and conferences at the later stages of the study. All the feedback 
participants were top ranking officials active in PPP/PFl project procurement ranging 
from Directors to Development Managers within both public and private sector 
organisations that are actively involved in PPP/PFl projects. 
Those who participated in the initial survey were selected from a list of organisations 
active in the PPP procurement within the UK. The experts were chosen from a data 
base compiled by Centaur, containing the list of key organizations and individuals 
who are actively involved in the procurement of projects using the PPP/PFI strategy 
within the UK. Centaur are the publishers of the PFI Report and the principal 
organizers of major conferences and workshops on the PPP/PFI concept throughout 
the UK. They developed the database in conjunction with the HM Treasury. The 
database was arranged in a form of a league table in the order of number of signed 
contracts these organizations and institutions (both public and private) have 
participated in since the inception of the PFUPPP concept within the UK in 1992. 
From Table 6.5.7 and Figure 6.5.2 below, nine (9) out of the ten (10) experts rated the 
model between 60-80% for completeness, seven (7) out of the ten (. 10) rated it 
between 60-80% for practical relevance, while all ten (10) of them rated it between 
60-80% for robustness. Two (2) of the experts gave the model 100% rating for 
practical relevance. 
Table 6.5.7 Distribution of the feedback 
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6.6 Analysis of Perceptual Differences 
The third objective of the research was to find out if there were any significant 
perceptual differences between the private sector and the public sector clients on the 
significance of the respective attributes in contributing to the efficient and effective 
negotiation process of the PPP procurement. The main purpose is that by identifying 
and highlighting such areas of difference, the research will enhance a greater 
understanding of the importance these key stakeholders place on the respective 
attributes. This will not only help the parties to be able to better understand the 
concerns of each other, but to also quickly look at those areas that can help push the 
process forward faster and to pull resources together if necessary to unravel some of 
the contentious aspects right from the outset of the procurement process. This 
situation should help lead to minimising disputes during the implementation of the 
project. 
In order to effectively assess these perceptual differences, the data set was split into 
two distinct groups each representing ratings from the private sector and the public 
sector respondents. Table 6.6.1 provides the summary statistics for testing these 
perceptual differences about the attributes. The sections that follow contain the 
detailed statistical analysis for the respective components. 
Table 6.6.1 Summary Statistics for testing perceptual differences between the Private and the 
Public Sectors 
The Model Results (n =49) Sectors 
Min Components Min Abbutes PhWe Sector ýn - 2ý Pubk Sectat (n - 24) Spearman'sCorrel" KenNsCoftentof RdWjcdted 
RWM Sgvkm RffhV Rdtye SqOcm Ruiq Reklm S9*w Rorg CoeffxWKM*) concordence(pWb) of 'pin, -" 
hdex hdex Nex UN (T"tw) 
Wro ad Wee9d L730 1 0.753 2 0.723 1 
The Consortium Qu**fTKbNka1Pr"1 (1723 2 0.176 1 0.6" 2 0.80 OW5 P<0,001 
QRR* of NO fillicill pt"I U52 3 ON 3 OfA9 3 
Orgorimuffil O. TJ6 2 0.49 2 0,724 1.5 
The Public Sector (lient TKkoal (. WsiWW 0139 1 0,753 1 0.724 15 0,562 0781 p< U025 
fisixiol Upab&W 0678 3 05A 3 om 3 
The Project NOUttelPropet Om 1 00 1 OJW 1 4,875 0.938 P<0 001 
AWN&WOrojod OS56 2 OS53 2 2 0S59 2 
The External Environment SO&'&OMk 0173 1 OB11 1 1 
1 
11152 1 
POWID981b9l4tory R1941 OS23 2 2 OJR OM 2 0.120 0910 P<0 001 
The results of the analyses revealed very high level of correlation between the private 
and public sectors on the relative importance of the main attributes. The test statistics 
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were also significant with p<0.001 for all the key components except that of the 
Project Attributes that recorded p<0.0025. The statistical tests therefore show high 
degrees of agreement between the two sectors on the main attributes. However, a 
careful examination of the analysis revealed some differences in perception on some 
of the individual sub-attributes, the highlights of which are presented under the main 
components in the subsequent sections that follow. Further discussions on these 
differences have been covered in Chapter 7 (Discussions and Conclusions). 
6.6.1 Consortium Attributes 
The computations relating to the statistical analysis of the Consortium Attributes with 
respect to the perceptual differences between private and public sectors is presented in 
Appendix D. The sub-attributes on which they differ are presented in tabular and 
graphical forrns hereunder. 
6.6. LI Organisational Nature and Strength 
Table 6.6.2 provides the rating and the ranking assigned to the respective attributes by 
the public and private sectors. 
Table 6.6.2 PrivatelPublic sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Organisational 
Nature & Strength 
Attributes Private Sector R ing J Publi c Sector R ing 
code sub r sub Mi2in r m.? in 
i sub r sub mao .n r main 
cs Notarre and Strengtk 0.753 1 OL723 1 
cs1 Previous experience in PPP 0.848 
14 
0.733 10.5 
cs2 Consortium's reputation 0.720 12 0.683 13 
cs3 PPP being a strategic business interest 0.704 13 5 0.667 14 
cs4 Ability to tie equity for a long period 0.624 is 0.742 9 
CS5 Readiness to accept risk 0.808 8 0.825 4 
cs6 Opentfrank communication 0.832 5 0.860 2 
cs7 Commitment to earlier negotiated terms 0.752 11 0.750 8 
css Current job holding 0.624 18 0.683 17 
CS9 Appointing a dedicated bid manager 0.864 1.5 0.867 1 
cs1 0 Understanding the public sector needs 0.864 1.5 0.842 3 
cs1 1 Ability to work harmoniously 0.824 6 0.817 5 
csl 2 Previous experience as a team 0.776 9.5 0.550 19 
csl 3 Proactive role in initiating the project 0.656 15 0.600 16 
csl 4 Timely planning permission 0.624 18 0.692 12 
csl 5 Early stakeholder involvement 0.856 3 0.808 6.5 
csl 6 Champion's personal attributes 0.776 9.5 0.733 10.5 
csI 7 Perseverance during negotiations 0.816 7 0.808 6.5 
csl 8 Multidisciplinary team 0.704 13.5 0.633 15 





1- relative significmce index, r ranking 
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Figure 6.6.1 represents the ratings graphically. 
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Figure 6.6.1 Private/Publik sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Organisadonal Nature & 
Strength 
The statistical analysis confirmed a general agreement between the two sectors on the 
relative merit of the main attribute. However, some differences existed over some of 
the sub-attributes particularly the in respect to the experience sub-attributes. 
6.6.1.2 Quality of Technical Proposals 
The differences in rating between the public and private sectors for the sub-attributes 
under the Quality of the Technical Proposals are as shown in Table 6.6.3. 
Table 6.6.3 Private/Public sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Quality of Technical 
Proposals 
Attributes Private Sector ng Public Sector Rating 
code 1, wb r sub i mium r win i sub r sub m2in r main 
ct Qrafify of Techiticirl Proporal OL 776 2 0.669 2 
ctl Robustness of outline technical proposal. 0.824 2 0.733 2 
ct2 Clarity of subrnissionstresponses 0.832 1 0.767 1 
ct3 Innovative technical solutions. 0.704 4 0475 4 
ct4 Frovision of sound technical guarantees 0.744,3,0.600,3.1 
1= refeUm sioniftionce index, r making 
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Figure 6.6.2 also provides the graphical representation of the ratings by the private 
and public sectors of the sub-attributes relating to the Consortium's technical 
proposals. The ratings from both sectors were quite close but with some differences 
on some of the sub-attributes. 





Provision of sound tech nicalquarantees larity su issionafresponses 
Innovative technical solutions, 
Figure 6.6.2 Private/Public sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Quality of Technical 
Proposals 
6.6.1.3 Quality of Financial Proposal 
Table 6.6.4 shows the differences in rating for the sub-attributes related to the 
Financial Proposals. 
'Fable 6.6.4 Private/Public sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Quality of Financial 
Proposals 
Attributes Private Sector R Ing I Public Sector ing I 
1 mb rwb i win r main j sub r wb main r main 
code Qvalify of t*@ Raeacial Proposal &655 3 0.649 3 
cf1 Financial guarantees proyidedtproposed 0.762 3.5 111.725 4 
02 Payment: mect a sms proposed 0.762 3.5 L708 5 
cf3 Goyerrunent funding/guarantees required. 0.648 6 L633 6 
cf4 Levels of tatiflAolls proposed 0.824 1 L867 I 
cf5 Credibility of financiers 0.762 3.5 L783 2 
cf6 Pubic sector client's exposure to financial risks 0.762 3.5 IL775 3 
cf7 Firwxml returns to tiv pubic sector cient. 0.644 8 L658 7 
cfa Length of concession period proposed. 11.611111111 7 ILS33 8 
cf9 Third party revenue to be generated. 1 " 9 IL425 10 
cf1 0 1 Fligh Equity1debt ratio to drive cortirribnent. 
: 
4 48 10 1 1 1 L483 19 1 
I- POI&Uv s &VWWWO hWW; r reMing 
I I 
Attributes Private Sector R Ing I Publ ic Se ctor ing I 
1wb rwb i win r main j sub r wb main r main 
code Qvalify of t*@ Hasecial Proposal 0.655 3 0.649 3 
cf1 Financial guarantees proyidedtproposed 0.762 3.5 &725 4 
02 Payment mect a sms proposed 0.762 3.5 L708 5 
cf3 Goverment fundmj/guarantees required. 0.648 6 L633 6 
cf4 Levels of tariflAolis proposed 0.824 1 L867 I 
cf5 Credibility of financiers 0.762 3.5 L783 2 
cf6 Pubic sector client's exposure to financial risks 0.762 3.5 L775 3 
cf7 Firwxml returns to ft pubic sector client. 0.644 8 L658 7 
cfa Length of concession period proposed. 11.611111111 7 ILS33 8 
cf9 Third party revenue to be generated. ' 4 " 9 L425 10 
cf1 0 1 Fligh Equity1debt ratio to drive commitment. 
: 
. 4 48 10 1 1 1 L483 19 1 
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Figure 6.6.3 gives an indication of the differences in opinion between the two sectors 
on the Consortium sub-attributes relating to the Quality of the Financial Proposals. 
Financial guarantees proviclad/proposed 
High Equityidebt ratio to drive 
Third party revenue to be genera 
Length of concession period propog 
Financial retums to the public 
nýhaniýs pmpýd 
3overnmnt funding(guararrt"s mquimd. 
ývels of tariMolls pmpoýd 
of financiers 
p, bk, ý. 
z - Mg 
Figure 6.63 Private/Public sector rating of Consortium Attributes - Quality of Financial 
Proposals 
With respect to the Quality of the Financial Proposals there was a high level of 
consistency in rating between the two sectors except for minor variations on the sub- 
attributes. 
The study clearly revealed that Nature and strength attributes of the private sector 
consortium are the source of most differences in opinion between the private sector 
consortium and the public sector procurer during the course of the tender negotiations. 
Half of the attributes in this category ranked quite differently between public and 
private sector respondents. In contrast, there was ftill agreement on the relative 
importance of those attributes related to the quality of bidders technical and design 
proposals. The quality of the financial proposals category highlighted some 
differences in opinion on relative importance of individual attributes, but no 
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substantial differences in their relative significance index. Discussions on particular 
attributes are detailed below. 
* Open andfrank communications during negotiations 
Public sector attached considerably more importance to this attribute than their private 
sector counterparts, rating this as third highest in importance among the attributes 
related to the nature and strength of the consortium organisation. This may reflect 
public sector suspicion or wariness that bidders, driven by maximising profits for their 
shareholders and investors, may approach negotiations with a different agenda. They 
may fear being disadvantaged by the overriding commercial concerns and hard-nosed 
approach to negotiations by bidders, whereas the client is subject to considerable 
scrutiny and accountability through auditing processes. Responses from the private 
sector reveal they do not perceive openness or otherwise in their own approach to be 
of major influence in improving negotiation process as do the public sector. 
* Early involvement ofstakeholders 
The private sector sees early involvement and commitment of stakeholders of greater 
importance than their public sector counterparts which is perhaps to be expected since 
they are responsible for forming the consortium. This can be a complex and time 
consuming process, often involving a large number of participants required in the 
funding, design and procurement of the asset as well as service delivery for the length 
of the concession. The public sector, acting as enablers, has largely divested 
themselves of these responsibilities to focus on the service actually being delivered 
which is consistent with PPP philosophy. 
9 Readiness to accept risk 
The public sector appears much more concerned about the consortium's readiness to 
accept risk. The public sector has been criticised by the National Audit Office (NAO) 
in some early projects for not demonstrating sufficient transfer of risk, and thus not 
obtaining sufficient value for money for the taxpayer. This has been uppermost in UK 
Treasury thinking since the outset of the initiative in 1992. As a key value for money 
test, the client will be keen to establish the consortium's acceptance of as many risks 
as possible early in the negotiations. Naturally, the consortium will be equally keen 
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not to expose themselves to too much risk. Experience has shown that the public 
sector has had to concede ground here in order to progress projects. 
9 Consortium's previous experience in PPP procurement 
The private sector rates this considerably more important than public sector. Again, 
the public sector's lesser degree of concern is to be expected since they are 
negotiating primarily on levels of output service and pricing. In principle it is not their 
concern how this is brought about which is compatible with PPP thinking. The private 
sector, on the other hand, will be concerned as to the experience of all the various 
elements of the consortium since an experienced and able consortium team reduces 
risk involved in delivering the asset and the resulting services, and in meeting their 
contractual commitments efficiently and profitably. 
9 Willingness to commit to earlier negotiated terms 
The public sector places significantly higher premium on the consortium willingness 
to commit to earlier negotiated terms. Clearly, they will be keener to tie the 
consortium down to contractual terms as early as possible. Price certainty and fixed 
budgets are traditionally important in public sector procurement, and as affordability 
limits are established early in the PPP process, the client will value early commitment. 
The consortium will naturally be reluctant to commit to terms early on, when much of 
the design remains to be developed and the many unknowns mean there is greater 
exposure to risk. 
* Ability to tie equity into the projectfor along period of time. 
The public sector rates this attribute much higher than the private sector on the 
possible ground that willingness of the private sector consortium of not only 
providing equity but also with a commitment to tie it to the project for a long period is 
an indication of their level of commitment to the project. Equity represents the 
consortium members' own source of funding towards the project unlike the others that 
may be coming from sources like the banks and other financial institutions. 
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Experience of consortium previously working together as a team. 
Previous experience of PPP procurement within the consortium is of greater 
importance to the consortium itself than it is to the client, because it largely influences 
how successful they are in efficient and profitable delivery of service. Previous 
experience of teamwork is a well-acknowledged factor of successful construction 
project management. In contrast, the public sector client is focussed on the service 
that the consortium team is ultimately contracting to deliver. 
* Ability to obtain planning permission timeously 
Public sector attaches rather more importance to this attribute. It is a feature of many 
projects that the responsibility, and therefore the risk associated with obtaining outline 
planning permission is retained by the public sector. Although detailed planning 
permission for the design remains within the consortium this is perhaps more 
straightforward to secure since any major planning issues will have been resolved by 
this stage. 
6.6.2 Public Sector Client Attributes 
The statistical computations for the perceptual differences between the two sectors for 
the Public Sector Client Attributes are presented Appendix D. The computations 
reflect high levels of correlation or agreement overall but with some variations in the 
rating and ranking of the individual sub-attributes. 
6AZI Organisational Capabilities 
The ratings for the both sectors are presented in Table 6.6.5 overleaf, Generally, both 
sectors were in close agreement on the significance of the organisational capability 
attributes in taking the PPP procurement process forward. There however some 
differences with some of the individual sub-attributes. 
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Table 6.6.5 Private/Public sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes - Organisational 
Capabilities 
Attributes PrlvffteSectorR ng I Public Sector R ngi 
code iWb rsabl i~m rmaj)) isub r wb 
I i nmm r ffmin 
orgamisatiOAF&I C&PRIVIfties d. 749 2 0.724 1.5 
pol Ability to effectively sensitise pubic op"on 0.720 6 0.650 9 
po2 Level of reputation enjoyed by the orgarisatio 0.824 12 0.642 10 
PCO Level of bureaucracy in the decision making p 0.760 5 0.733 4.5 
pcA RigM attitude to cost 0.696 105 0.822 7-5 
P05 Top level commitment 0.920 1 0.083 2 
po6 Team collaboration and commitment 0.432 3 0.900 1 
po7 Opentfrank and fle)dble communication 0.840 2 0.060 3 
P08 Pre-established PPP Unit 0.712 7 0.668 12 
POE) Assisting In land acquisition and in obtaining p 0.704 8.5 0.692 7.5 
pol 0 Taloping knowledge and expertise gained else 9.704 8.5 0.626 11 
pol 1 Comirribnent to earlier negotiated temis 0.776 4 0.717 6 
pol 2 Ability to accept and absorb risks 0.696 , 10.5 , 0.733 , 4.5 , 
1- PrAuUm sibaAk-, once jad&ý, r reMix g 
Although there was a close agreement on the main attribute, differences existed on 
some of the sub-attributes as shown in Figure 6.6.4 below. 
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Figure 6.6.4 Private/Public sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes - Organisational 
Capabilities 
6.6. Z2 Technical Capabilities 
Although, statistically there was agreement between the private sector and the publics 
sector on the significance of the Technical Capabilities of the Public Sector Clients, 
there some sipificant differences on two of the sub-attributes. The marked 
differences were on the attribute relating to the public sector client's previous 
experience in PPP procurement. 
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The second sub-attribute on which they differed significantly is the use of standard 
bidding documents. The private sector respondents regarded these two sub-attributes 
as much more important as compared to the importance the public sector attached to 
them. Whilst the private sector gave them a similar rating of 0.752 and thus giving 
them ranked them at the forth among the seven sub-attributes, the public sector rated 
them 0.600 and 0.625 respectively and which ranked them as seventh and sixth 
respectively. Details of these are presented in Table 6.6.6 
Table 6.6.6 Private/Public sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes -Technical Capabilities 
Attributes Private So or Rating Public Sector R ing I 
code i sob r sub i mem r n)ajn sob r sob i mom r main 
pt Tac*fflical "Pabifities OL753 1 OL724 1ý5 
ptl Strong in-house expertise 8.768 2S 0.760 3.5 
pt2 Sound preparatory work 9.768 2.5 0.750 3.5 
pt3 Previous experience In PPP procurement 0.762 4.5 0.600 7 
pt4 Experience In infrastructure procurement 8.680 7 0.717 5 
pt5 Clearly established evaluation criteria ? 44, : - 6 0.776 2 
pt6 Clear output specifications gas 1 
1 
0.850 1 
pt7 lThe use of standard bidding documents 0.762 4.5 0.626 6 
J= reWAM Jrpcanco 1"Oex , -. Rý I 
The use of standard bidchng 
Clear output specift 
Clearly established 
pmparatory ýrk 
mvims experience in PPP procurement 
infmatmctum procumment 
g 
priwto secW ratng] '(7 
1 --41ýpublic ýbr mat7ing 
Figure 6.6.5 Private/Public sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes - Technical 
Capabilities 
Figure 6.6.5 illustrates the differences in perception between these two sectors on the 
sub-attributes. 
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6.6. Z3 Financial Capabilities 
Statistically, there was very high level of agreement between the two sectors on the 
significance of the Public Sector Client's financial capabilities in influencing the 
negotiation process. 
Table 6.6.7 Private/Pubfic sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes -Financial Capabilities 
I Attributes I Private Sector Rating 1PUblic Sector RaU 
pf Fiffencial QWOMMIRS OLS78 3 OLS78 3 
ptl Ability to raise funds through Bonds. 0.416 5 6.64111111 3 
pf2 Strong financial supportkjuarenlees from the central govt 0.752 2 6.742 2 
pf3 Flexible tax regimes. 0.512 3 0.417 5 
pf4 Abildy to proyede equly finance 0.440 4 8.467 4 
05 Canabillitv to vay 0.768 1 8.767 1 
Difference however, existed between on them on two of the sub-attributes. These 
were the ability of the public sector client to raise bonds and the provision of flexible 
tax regimes specific to the project. These are shown in Table 6.6.7 above and Figure 
6.6.6 below. 
Capability to pay 
Abilitv to arovide anuitv fi 
Strong financial supportiguarantees 
fromthe central govt 
a tax rouimes. 
Figure 6.6.6 Private/Public sector rating of Public Sector Client Attributes - Financial 
Capabilities 
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Regarding public sector client qualities, there was broad agreement on the ranking of 
importance for the various descriptive attributes. The public and private sector 
perspectives differ significantly for only a small number of attributes relating to the 
organisational and technical capabilities of the client (5 out of 19 attributes). There 
was complete agreement on the relative importance of attributes relating to the 
financial capabilities of the client. 
9 Ability to accept and absorb risks 
The public sector is considerably more sensitive about their own ability to accept their 
share of project risks. This may reflect the attention given by the Treasury to the 
whole issue of risk transfer away from the client - an important feature of the PPP 
ideology. The public sector clients have been criticised for not adequately 
demonstrating value for money through sufficient transfer of risk in a number of PPP 
projects. Certain design and operational risks will remain with the public sector. The 
private sector does not attach such significance to the client's ability to accept and 
absorb risks; they are far more concerned about the project management strength of 
the organisation they will be negotiating with. 
* Ability to effectively sensitise public opinion on project 
It is not surprising that the private sector views this as a serious issue. Any misgivings 
expressed at a later stage by the general public and/or the end users of the services 
provided by the private sector consortium could seriously affect their ability to 
provide the services in an efficient manner especially where disruptions occur. This 
will in turn affect their earning capabilities as the unitary payments are tied to the 
quality and volume of service provided. The funding institutions are also equally 
worried about the public acceptability of projects and would only invest in those 
projects where there is clear assurance that there will not be any disruptions. 
e Existence ofestablished PPP unit. 
It is not surprising that the private sector is more concerned to see an established PPP 
unit within the client organisation. A PPP unit suggests an experienced and able client 
team that has the power and authority necessary for an effective negotiation process. 
The absence of such a unit may raise concerns about the public sector's project 
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management strengths. This will be particularly pertinent where the functions of the 
public sector client are fragmented across a number of departments. 
e Ability to establish clear statements of evaluation criteria in bidding 
documents. 
The public sector exhibits greater concern here. Accountability and transparency are 
key watchwords for any public sector organisation involved in major infrastructure 
procurement. Clearly established evaluation criteria should therefore be seen as 
achieving these twin objectives since the end result should ultimately lead to the 
choice of an optimal bid that should result in value for money in the long run. 
* Previous experience in PPPprocurement 
The private sector appears more concerned about the experience, and by implication, 
ability and effectiveness of the body with which they will be negotiating and making 
decisions. Experience provides expertise through learning, which then reflects in the 
quality of the discussions during the negotiations. With the private sector bidding 
costs being extremely high for PPP project procurement compared to those of the 
other traditional forms, it is natural that the bidders desire to work with a team that 
knows what it is about and is able to progress the process speedily. To the private 
sector, time is money and delays therefore represent lost opportunities. 
6.6.3 Project Attributes 
The project attributes were identified under two main categories - the nature of the 
project, and its marketability. The statistical computations for the perceptual 
differences in opinion on the significance of these attributes have been include under 
Appendix D. The agreement between the two sectors was very high. However, there 
were differences between them on some of the sub-attributes. 
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6.6.3.1 Nature of Project 
Table 6.6.8 gives an indication of how the two sectors respectively view the 
significance of the project nature attributes. 
Table 6.6.8 Private/Public sector rating of Project Attributes -Project Nature 
Attributes Private So Ratillim Public Sedor 
code i -sub ramb imain rmain isub 
Irsob JiMAM9 r~in I 
Afatmre of Project 0.671 1 OL658 1 
pnl Size and complexity 0.776 1.5 8.808 1 
pn2 Amenability to innovation 0.648 8 8.608 7.5 
pn3 Project risks 8.766 3 9.758 2 
pn4 Impact on the environment 0.664 6.5 9.609 7.5 
pn5 Third party Improving existing irifirestructure 0.544 11 0.583 9.5 
pn6 Heath and safety provoked 0.560 10 6.604 6 
pn7 Design completion required at tender 0.728 4 9.683 5 
pn8 Ablity to respond to ILALre changes. 0.776 1.5 0.742 3 
prig LocaWn and site conditions 0-672 5 8.717 4 
pnl 0 Uniqueness of project 0.664 65 0.583 9.5 
pnl 1 Effect on existing public sector staff 1 0.6001 91 11@. SB7 11 
I- re/R&M MIMANCence MCAM r F. RJAft 
The perceptual differences are represented in Figure 6.6.7 below. 
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Figure 6.6.7 Private/Public sector rating of Project Attributes - Nature of Project 
193 
Chapter 6 Data Anal-vsis and Model Validation 
6.6.3.2 Marketability ofProject 
The ratings of the two sectors are represented in Table 6.6.9. 
Table 6.6.9 Private/Public sector rating of Project Attributes -Marketability 
Figure 6.6.8 shows the level of perceptual differences between the private and public 
sectors on the sub-attributes for the project's marketability. 
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Figure 6.6.8 Private/Public sector rating of Project Attributes - Marketabifity 
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Although the test statistics showed agreement between the public and private sectors 
on the relative importance of the main project attributes, the sub-attributes within the 
relating to the project's marketability area where there were some marked differences. 
The most significant difference related to the level to which the project must meet 
general public needs. The public sector client is obviously representing the interest of 
the public; hence their emphasis on this sub-attribute is higher than that of the private 
sector. Another area of significance difference is the potential for property 
development rights where emphasis is being placed by the private sector more than 
the public sector. This is obvious as the private sector would be looking out for other 
investment opportunities within the project to make it more attractive to the funding 
institutions. 
6.6.4 External Environment Attributes 
The statistical tests for the External Environment Attributes on the perceptual 
difference are included in Appendix D. The assessment of the two sectors was 
considered under the two broad categories identified in the model. These were socio- 
economic attributes and the political and legal/regulatory regime. 
6.6.4.1 Socio-Economic Attributes 
The statistical analyses of the attributes relating to the socio-economic factors of 
influence indicate a general agreement between the public and private sectors in their 
relative level of importance. Table 6.6.10 gives the rating assigned to the socio- 
economic sub-attributes, whilst Figure 6.6.9 shows the differences. 
Table 6.6.10 Private/Public sector rating of External Environment Attributes - Socio-Economic 
Attributes Private Sector Rati gI Public Sector Ratin 
code isub rsub imain rmain lisub rsub limain rmain 
Socio-Evomohvic 0.694 1 0.652 1 
esl Availability of traditional projects. 0.592 5 0.608 4 
es2 Maturity of the financial markets. 0.760 1.5 0.708 1 
es3 Perceived future economic uncertainties 0.680 .50.683 2.5 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase in PPP pjts 0.680 3.5 0.575 51 
eS5 Strong public/private sector relationships. 0.760 1.51 110. 
i= reiative significance index, r ranking 
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Figure 6.6.9 Private/Public sector rating of External Environment Attributes - Socio-Economics 
6.6.4.2 Political and LegaIlRegulatory Regime 
Table 6.6.11 represents the rating of the two sectors on the sub-attributes under 
political and legaVregulatory. 
Table 6.6.11 Private/Private sector rating of External Environment Attributes - Political and 
LegaIlRegulatory Regime 
Aftrbutes Pd vde Seder * 
I Pd) k Sede r Ming 
code iwb r wb i main r main i sub r Wb i main r 
eptl PoWcal Dyffflogilatoty reore 9650 2 U95 2 
epl Public acce0abillily of the PPP phillosophy. V76 1 UN 4 
ep2 Stability of the political system. IL7% 5 IL717 3 
ep3 All-party political support for the philosopy V52 3.5 U83 5 
ell Clearly defined plannirg and regulatory frameworks. V68 2 M 2 
el2 Abiliý of foreign investors to repatriate earnings. IL440 7.5 U50 8 
e13 Clear regullefions on foreign ownership of property. MI 7.5 U58 7 
el4 Intellectual propet rights. US 6 0.95 6 
e15 Established institdional and policy frameworks on PPP 1 V52 , 3.5 1 1 1 V42 ,1 1 11 
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Figure 6.6.10 Private/Private sector rating of External Environment Attributes - Political and 
LegaIlRegulatory Regime 
There was a broad agreement between the two sectors on the relative significance of 
the key external environment attributes. However two sub-attributes - the potential for 
future equity purchase in PPP projects, and an exhibition of strong public/private 
sector relationships, were the areas where the two sectors differed significantly on the 
socio-economic attributes. While the public sector played down on the importance of 
the project having the potential of generating future equity interest, the private sector 
placed much more emphasis on this. This is not surprising as recent events indicate 
that the public sector clients were not very happy with the sort of windfall profits the 
private sector started making on some of the early PPP/PFI projects through 
refinancing (The PFI Report, 2001). For the political and legal/regulatory regime, 
though the relative ratings for the sub-attributes were very close, the main area of 
difference related to public acceptability of the philosophy where the private sector 
placed a higher premium, and established institutional and policy frameworks on the 
PPP where the public sector placed higher emphasis. 
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6.7.1 Research Proposition (a) 
The proposition for this study with respect to the first research objective was that: 
"The twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns are real in the PPP 
infrastructure procurement and therefore remain a serious issue to be addressed if 
the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among all stakeholders". 
The analysed data using descriptive statistics as reported in sections 6.3, clearly 
confirmed this proposition. The data revealed substantial time and cost overruns 
during the pre-contract stages of the PPP project procurement. The average time 
overruns for the projects studied were 38% for Civil Engineering projects, 50% for 
Health projects and 64% for School projects. In some instances the time overruns 
were as high as 100 to 300%. In absolute terms, the overall times taken to take the 
projects to contract signing stage were in the range of 12 to 60 months. The 
bidding/pre-contract cost overruns were found to be equally high, with one project 
recording as high as 200% overrun to the private sector. Not only were the overruns 
high but also cost in monetary terms to the private sector was high from a range of 
E0.1m to f6.0m. The public sector costs were equally high, ranging from EO. 4 to f8m 
These findings confirm earlier reported delays as outlined in the literature review and 
that of a very recent one in the Financial Times that Jarvis has experienced delays and 
dissatisfaction with some of its biggest schools PFI projects due to delays in the 
bidding process and increasing bidding costs, a situation which is reducing their 
profits by as much Min. in their financial year 2003 (FT, 2004). 
6.7.2 Research Proposition (b) 
The proposition for the second research objective posits that: 
"A generic model can be developed to capture in a hierarchical order of 
significance the key attributes that positively influence the efficient and effective 
implementation of the negotiations phase of the PPP procurement process in terms 
of minimising times and cost overruns to the parties". 
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The statistical analyses as presented in Section 6.4 and reported in Table 6.4.1 
indicate that this proposition is supported. The test statistics showed very high levels 
of significance throughout with p<0.001. The validation exercises carried out and 
reported in Section 6.5 and Table 6.5.1 on the model also confirm the reliability of the 
model in terms of its practical relevance to industry, comprehensiveness and 
robustness. The feedback from experts confirm the usefulness of the model as a 
practical guide in identifying competency gaps within organisations attempting to 
procure projects using the PPP strategy. 
6.7.3 Research Proposition (c) 
The proposition for the third objective was that: 
"Though there is a broad agreement between the key stakeholders (the public and 
private sectors), on the relative significance of the main attributes of the 
Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the Project, and the External Environment on 
the outcome of the PPP contract negotiations, differences do exist amongst them 
on the underlying dimensions to these main influence centres". 
This third proposition was also supported by the various statistical analyses carried 
out and reported in Section 6.6. The test statistics revealed very high levels of 
agreement between the two sectors on the relative importance of the main attributes in 
minimising the twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns. In all cases, the 
statistical tests indicated p<0.001. The analyses also however, highlighted the sub- 
attributes on which the two sectors differed in their judgement on their relative 
significance in contributing to pre-contract time and cost efficiency during the 
procurement of PPP projects. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and Research Recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
The basis for the research was to investigate the extent to which the pre-contract time 
and cost overruns were a major problem when procuring projects using the PPP/PFI 
approach. The focus was therefore to identify the key public sector client, consortium, 
the project, and the external environment attributes that contribute to pushing forward 
the process in more time and cost efficient manner. Earlier research having identified 
that negotiating the contracts has being the main cause of the delays and hence the 
excess bidding and pre-contract cost overruns, the theoretical foundation of the 
research was therefore based on literature on negotiation theory. This chapter 
therefore brings into focus the implications of the research findings for organisations 
undertaking to procure infrastructure projects the PPP/PFI delivery route. 
Following a comprehensive review of literature, the research was driven by three 
main objectives and propositions. These objectives and propositions are restated here 
as follows: 
The Research Objectives 
To highlight the extent of pre-contract cost and time overruns when the 
PPP philosophy is used in procuring infrastructure services. 
To identify those characteristic attributes of the Private Sector Consortia 
and Public Sector Client Organisations, the Project, and the External 
Environment, that significantly contribute to the successful negotiation of 
PPP/PFI contracts in a timely and cost effective manner; and then develop 
a Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model capturing these respective 
attributes, the main components of which is illustrated in Figure 6.1.1. 
To explore the differences in perception between public and private sector 
on the relative importance of these attributes in contributing to the 
negotiation success. 
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The Research Propositions 
a) The twin problems of pre-contract time and cost overruns are real in the PPP 
infrastructure procurement and therefore remain a serious issue to be addressed 
if the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among all stakeholders. 
b) A generic model can be developed to capture in a hierarchical order of 
significance the key attributes that positively influence the efficient and 
effective implementation of the negotiations phase of the PPP procurement 
process in terms of minimising times and cost overruns to the parties. 
C) Though there is a broad agreement between the key stakeholders (the public 
and private sectors), on the relative significance of the main attributes of the 
Consortium, the Public Sector Client, the Project, and the External 
Environment on the outcome of the PPP contract negotiations, differences do 
exist amongst them on the underlying dimensions to these main influence 
centres". 
7.2 Pre-contract time and bidding cost outturns 
The analysed data using descriptive statistics as reported in section 6.3 of Chapter 6, 
clearly confirmed the research proposition that the twin problems of pre-contract time 
and cost overruns are real in the PPP infrastructure procurement and therefore remain 
a serious issue to be addressed if the philosophy is to gain general acceptance among 
all stakeholders. The data revealed very high levels of time and cost overruns during 
the pre-contract stages of the PPP project procurement. Evidently, the 
educational/schools sector projects witnessed the highest overruns followed by the 
health sector projects. The least overruns were those of major civil engineering 
projects. 
The findings of this study confirm the reported delays and excessive bidding cost as 
unearthed during the literature review. The findings of also collaborate the audit 
report by the National Audit Office on a number of PPP/PFI projects that the process 
towards securing the PPP/PFI contracts could be frustratingly long and costly (NAO, 
1999a; NAO, 1999b). According to Owen and Merna (1999) these sorts of delays 
resulted in some high profile withdrawals by the private sector from the bidding 
process particularly during the early days of the PPP/PFl concept. Under such 
circumstances, competitions for PPP projects would fall -a situation that could 
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seriously erode the value for money objectives as contractors would begin to cash on 
it to make abnormal margins, and thus sparking public resentment towards the 
philosophy. 
An interesting feature of the findings is that the major civil engineering projects 
procured through the PPP route by way of Design Build Finance and Operate 
(DBFO), have had their pre-contract cost and time overruns better contained. The 
analyzed data showed a much smaller variation in the cost and time outturns for the 
civil engineering projects. Generally, major civil engineering projects are centrally 
procured through such institutions as the Highway Agency for the major road 
projects. These centralized institutions tend to be frequent and major buyers of 
construction services. This may thus explain the underlying principle in the 
negotiation literature that the outcome of any bargaining process is significantly 
influenced by such elements as the degree of mutual dependence and the distribution 
of power between the parties; previous experience and interaction; the organizational 
culture and strategy; and the extend of conflict of interest and perceptual distortions 
both within the individual organizations and that between the bargaining parties 
(McCall and Warrington, 1989). 
7.3 The Generic Model 
The research identified the role of the public sector client as the key in promoting 
efficiency during the procurement of projects using the PPP project delivery strategy. 
No doubt the public sector attributes came topmost in influencing the process towards 
efficiency in negotiating the PPP/PFI contracts. This was followed by those of the 
private sector consortium, the project, and those of the external environment. These 
key significant attributes are discussed in depth in order to highlight their implications 
for improving the process towards the efficient procurement of projects using the PPP 
route. 
7.3.1 Public Sector Attributes 
The study has clearly identified the role of the public sector procurer as key in making 
the process towards efficiency in the procurement of projects feasible. Of major 
importance in terms of technical capabilities of the public sector client organisation, 
202 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Research Recommendations 
is the ability to establish project parameters and prepare output specifications. Writing 
a comprehensive output specification of the services required for the project, rather 
than describing the asset, is one of the biggest differences between PPP project 
procurement and the traditional public sector capital asset procurement. It is clear that 
sound project specification and scoping are the bedrock of successful negotiations. 
Project parameters which may be susceptible to frequent changes and scope-creep 
will frustrate the progress of any negotiations as the negotiators may be in a dilemma 
as to the sort of provisions to make for such changes in the contract which would 
satisfy both parties. Ambiguous output specifications would mislead bidders into 
putting forward high initial offers -a factor which has been identified in the 
negotiating literature as the cause of high conflict-of-interest situation, which acts as a 
major impediment to effective and efficient negotiation with the negotiations tending 
to become deadlocked. 
In-house expertise within the public sector client organisations is vital to the process. 
No doubt this has featured as one of the strongest attributes necessary to move the 
PPP project procurement process forward. It is crucial for the public sector client 
organisation to have a strong team of experts in order to be able to set out the output 
specifications properly in the first instance and then be able to clearly appreciate the 
innovations introduced by the bidders in their proposals. Where this is lacking, it is 
strongly recommended that the current team is supported by expert consultants from 
industry. Failure by the public sector client to match the technical and negotiating 
capabilities of the team from the Consortium in order to unravel such intricate issues 
as performance measures for the unitary payments, redundancy of existing labour and 
related issues, third party revenue generation, obsolescence, and the role of the 
existing public sector management during the concession period, would only lead to 
protracted negotiations. It may also lead to counterfactual thinking where the parties, 
after concluding the deal, begin to start thinking they could have obtained a better 
deal. The result is that this could lead to the reopening of negotiations no sooner than 
the deal have been concluded, as was reported by the World Bank on a number 
concession contracts that they monitored (Bell, 2003). If both parties have quite 
different perspectives on the project then there will clearly be problems. 
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Adequate preparatory work as a key technical attribute relates to effective and sound 
pre-feasibility studies which should enable the public sector team establish a robust 
Outline Business Case, and an all-encompassing Public Sector Comparator before 
going to tender. Such high quality level of preparatory work should also enable the 
public sector client to clearly identify risks and be able to allocate them optimally 
between the parties. The identification by this research of the ability of the public 
sector to undertake a sound preparatory works reinforces Owen's (2003) findings with 
respect to the Dartford Crossing, M6 Toll road, and the Croydon Tramlink projects 
where the early project feasibility by the public sector client organisations, the 
Highway Agency, enabled them to identify a number of local concerns and fully 
investigated them before putting the projects forward. It also enabled them to identify 
the project requirements early and reflected them in the output specifications. These 
helped to eliminate doubts and uncertainties and other risks that the bidders might 
perceive. It then led biddersl to put forward relevant proposals and thus helped in 
eliminating unnecessary delays during the negotiation stages. It could be concluded 
that these early effective preparatory works accounted for what has been revealed by 
this current research that the pre-contract time and cost overruns were better contained 
within the major civil engineering projects procured using the PPP/PFI concept. 
The ability to organise effectively is always and important element in any project 
undertaking. Within organisational capabilities of the public sector institutions, the 
model identified commitment and the collaboration within the public sector team as 
the most influential attributes, perhaps reflecting concerns that large, multi-faceted 
clients can pose problems and frustrate progress. The level of bureaucracy in the 
decision making process is also rated highly. However the trend, in the UK at least, 
appears to be increasing levels of regulation and standardisation in contractual clauses 
and conditions, as the original 'deals not rules' concept did not work. A distinction 
has to be made, though, between best practice guidance and restrictive regulation. The 
ability to accept and absorb risk may have been expected to be rated higher given the 
major differences between public and private sector views on risk in early stages 
when private sector was expected to accept more or less all project risks. It seems 
more realistic attitudes prevail now. Perhaps rated surprisingly lowly, is the 
significance of being able to use experience and expertise of others in guiding the 
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procurement process. It seems not much premium is placed on the use of knowledge 
or the experiences of others. 
The PPP philosophy clearly placed emphasis on the private sector providing the 
necessary funding for the projects with little or nor financial support coming from the 
public sector for the directly into the project. It is there not surprising that the 
attributes relating to thefinancial capabilities of the public sector procurer attracted 
relatively lower rating. The sub-attribute relating to the ability of the public sector 
organisation to raise funds received particularly low ratings. Clearly very limited 
numbers of issues are therefore likely to arise during the negotiations relating to the 
public sector organisation's ability to provide financial support for the project. This is 
understandable because the main financial burden lies with the Consortium. However, 
where shadow tolls/tariffs are involved, the public sector's ability to pay becomes 
paramount. The sub-attributes, "ability to pay, and strong financial support/guarantees 
from central government", therefore received relatively higher ratings. The public 
sector client therefore needs to demonstrate beyond all reasonable doubt that it has the 
capacity to pay in order to boost the confidence of the Consortium in the viability of 
the project. 
7.3.2 Consortium Attributes 
The PPP/PFI concept involves the Consortium designing the project in order to 
deliver the services as specified in the client's output specifications. This would 
require of the Consortium to be able to fully appreciate the needs of the public sector 
procurer. Any misconception at the bidding stage would naturally prolong the 
negotiations. Added to the technical issues, is what has been emphasised in the 
negotiation literature as an early demonstration of altruistic/cooperative behaviour 
towards the opposing negotiating party during the negotiations through an attempt to 
maximise joint outcomes. Since the relationship between the parties within a PPP 
project are long term, an early indication of openness in the communication would 
signal the development of trust and thus induce a similar response from the public 
sector negotiation team and hence ease the process towards enhancing the partnership 
relationship for the effective delivery of the services. Frank and open communication 
should eliminate the dangers of high levels of conflict of interest, thus avoiding the 
tendency of creating deadlocks during the negotiations. No doubt, the group of 
attributes relating to the nature and strength of the Consortium comes top among the 
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hierarchy of attributes that influence the efficient negotiation of the tenders. These 
attributes include hard organisational and soft people issues such as appointing a 
dedicated bid manager, understanding the public sector needs, open and frank 
communication between the participants, and involving at an early other stake holders 
in the process. 
The setting up a consortium to participate in the bidding for a PPP/PFI projects 
involves bringing together a host of experts needed for the design and implementation 
of the project. This team of experts would include not only technocrats but also 
financiers, bankers, investment analysts, lawyers and in some instances sociologists 
and educationists. The research has rightly identified the importance of the role of a 
dedicated Bid Manager who could co-ordinate these individuals. These individuals, 
because of the nature of their training, may naturally tend to exhibit some elements of 
differentiation. The early involvement of the stakeholders has also received a higher 
weighting as ideas have to be galvanised quickly in order to not only to win the bid, 
but also for the efficient and profitable management of the resulting contract. The 
nature of the PPP contracts is such that the winning Consortium may have to live with 
any initial mistakes for the whole of the concession period; hence the pooling of ideas 
at the early stages is very essential. 
The early stakeholder involvement concept is currently being pursued by the Highway 
Agency in what they term as 'Early Contractor Involvement (ECI)'. According to 
their Chief Executive, Mr John McDonong, the ECI concept in their highway projects 
was better, in the sense that a contractor is selected through a preliminary screening 
process and then invited to participate in the design and costing of the project so that 
the bidding cost of the contractor is paid for through the process (Contract Journal, 
2003). This process should help eliminate the initial costs incurred by the public 
sector organisation in situations where the feasibility and outline designs are to be 
initially carried out by independent consultants for public sector before going to 
tender. 
Readiness by the Consortium to accept risks has also been identified as a key attribute 
in pushing forward the negotiation process. Though the concept of the PPP is to 
maximise transfer of risks to the private sector, it would be naYve to assume that they 
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would be prepared to take on all risks associated with the project. Hence the 
ineffectual identification and allocation of risks could bog down the negotiation 
process unnecessarily. The risk allocation among the parties should be optimal such 
that each party is allocated risks that they are best able to manage. The European 
Investment Bank, acknowledging that procuring projects through the PPP concept is a 
more expensive mode of delivery than the traditional one, recommended that the 
anticipated gain to the public sector client should be efficient management associated 
with the transfer of risks (Gaffney et al. 1999) As noted by Owen in his research into 
privately financed toll roads, the inappropriate allocation of risks during the Second 
Severn Crossing contributed to delays during the negotiations. He further found that 
placing the risks associated with public enquiries for the M6 Toll road within the 
domain of the private sector consortium resulted in one of the longest public enquiries 
(Owen, 2003). 
Clear and robust designs are often seen to be of key importance, as both public and 
private sector parties are likely to be more comfortable with proven and well- 
understood solutions. This is why the group of attributes relating to the quality of 
technical proposals produced for the bid comes second in order of significance. It is 
ironic that a key objective of PPP - encouraging innovation in design solutions, is 
rated so lowly as a success factor in the negotiations. Perhaps this is not surprising as 
innovation and technical complexity create conditions of uncertainty in meeting 
project objectives. 
7.3.3 Project Attributes 
The study revealed that overall, attributes relating to the project's marketability and 
characteristic features of the project itself i. e. largely technical and relating to the 
delivery of the asset, almost play equal significant role in the negotiation process. 
With regard to the project nature attributes, the most significant attribute relates to the 
size and complexity of the facility. Arguably the larger and more complex the project, 
the more items and aspects there are for negotiation and agreement between the 
parties, and there is also a less complete understanding or conception of the whole 
project. With increasing complexity, there is more scope for misunderstanding what is 
required and different perceptions may be held as to the requirements of the project. 
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The level to which the project risks lend themselves easily identification, assessment 
and allocation, is also accorded a high priority by the respondents. This is hardly 
surprising given that the burden of risk allocation has been such a contentious issue 
from the outset. Flexibility in the ability to respond to future changes is also 
important. This is understandable, since both parties are contractually committing 
themselves to service delivery for a very long time. 
Considering the project's marketability, high priority attributes naturally include its 
ability to attract funding. With such huge long term investment required, lenders are 
key participants in the project procurement from the outset. Indeed the Treasury's 
PPP procurement framework frequently underlines the need for lenders to be 
comfortable with the risk allocation throughout the process. Other important attributes 
include the level to which the project meets the needs of the public, and the level of 
tariffs and tolls required for the project to be viable to the private sector to participate 
in. A project meeting the general public need would not only involve the service 
rendered to the public through the facility, but increasingly projects are being assessed 
by their contribution to enhancing the environment. Protecting the environment is 
essential the survival of the human race, hence any PPP project that impacts 
negatively on the environment will risk resistance and protestation from the public. 
7.3.4 External Environment Attributes 
The group of attributes relating to the socio-economic environment followed by the 
political and legal/regulatory environments are regarded as most significant. Within 
the socio-economic environment sub-group, a mature financial market is a big asset in 
advancing the PPP process, as huge capital outlays are required. These large capital 
outlays must be supported by the financial institutions with the capability to 
effectively assess the viability of the projects before investing in them. A mature 
financial market also enables the Consortium to float shares for the Special Purpose 
Vehicle set up specifically for the project and to also refinance their equity 
investments in the projects once the construction risks have been eliminated as the 
project enters the operation phase. It is therefore not surprising that the maturity of the 
financial markets as an attribute came top among the list of the socio-economic 
attributes. This is then followed by the demonstration of strong public/private sector 
relationships. Successful negotiations are built around trust. The public sector 
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therefore needs to understand what the driving motivations of private sector business 
are. In the same vein the private sector also needs to understand the role of the public 
sector client as the custodian and protector of public investments for which they must 
be held accountable. They also need to understand the institutional environment 
within which the public sector works which reflects itself in the form of norms and 
informal 'rules of the game' such as values and traditions within the public sector. 
This way, a much more harmonious relationship can be established that can foster 
altruistic behaviour among the parties during the negotiations. 
Within the political and legal/regulatory environment sub-group, clearly defined 
general planning and regulatory frameworks features strongly as the top ranking 
attribute in moving forward the process efficiently. This is followed by carefully 
established institutional and policy frameworks at the orga nisational level for the 
implementation of PPP projects. Well established and tested guidelines will no doubt 
allay the fears of both the Consortium and other investors such as the funding 
institutions on the project especially on the legal implications of issues related to the 
project. Whilst clear policy frameworks are important, these are not to be in the form 
of excessive regulation as this may tend to stifle innovation. The scope for 
discretional interpretation and implementation of these regulations must be as limited 
as possible to avoid abuse. The regulations may need to be supported with powerful 
legal instruments matched by transparency in governance. 
The stability of the political system and an all-party support for the philosophy come 
next in order of significance. A stable political system naturally reduces the level of 
political risks associated with such long term contracts as envisaged in the PPP 
philosophy. This should in turn reduce the level of tariffs or tools that may be 
proposed by the private sector bidders. There has certainly been considerable 
discussion about the politics and ideology behind PPP at a national level. Participants 
are naturally nervous about the long term viability of something that attracts so much 
heated debate and discussion, and may be subject to radical change by future 
governments with different views. The success or failure of PPP in terms of value for 
money for the public has to be convincingly made by both sides of the political divide 
in order to gain public acceptability as public protests against the philosophy could 
send the wrong signals to the private sector companies that may be contemplating to 
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participate in it. After all, the higher the level of participation, the more likely would 
higher value for money be obtained through innovative designs and financial 
proposals. It is a generally accepted fact that competition is better than monopoly as it 
allows efficient allocation of resources and would allow the efficient management of 
the commercial risks by the consortia managing these infrastructure projects. The net 
benefit of this would be better quality of services and lower tariffs and tolls to the 
benefit of society at large -a condition that may help enhance public acceptability of 
the philosophy. This would help minimise the risk of moves to limit the returns to the 
private sector as the idea of profiting from investment in public sector assets can be 
politically sensitive. 
7.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
The PPP project procurement has for long been criticised for the twin problems of 
pre-contract time and bidding cost overruns. This study has investigated in a more 
empirical manner the extent of the problem and clearly identified sectors where the 
problem is more pronounced. The study also identified a hierarchy of attributes that 
contribute to a more efficient way of procuring projects using the PPP strategy 
especially during the negotiation stages. The generic multi-attribute hierarchical 
model developed during the research also received very high approval rating from 
industry experts in terms of its comprehensiveness in the coverage of the attributes, its 
practical relevance in identifying competency gaps within organisations undertaking 
PPP projects, and its robustness as a guide to decision making when procuring PPP 
projects. In fact, one of the experts, as part of his comments on the model, indicated 
that he would apply it on his next PPP projects. 
7.4.1 To industry 
The in-depth review of the literature on bargaining/negotiation theory within the 
behavioural sciences is a leap forward in harnessing knowledge for application within 
the construction industry. The skills and disciplines of bargaining and negotiations 
have over the past decades been absent within the construction industry due to the 
introduction in the 1960s of the routinized form of project procurement via the 
traditional approach where the client specifies virtually everything with the winning 
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bid determined purely on the basis of the lowest offered price through open 
competitive bidding without room for any form of negotiations. 
The findings of the research in respect of the overall pre-contract time and cost 
overruns confirms process of the PPP procurement toward securing meaningful 
contract is still fraught with delays and cost overruns. The process is equally 
expensive and therefore adequate budgetary preparations need to be undertaken in 
order to avoid abandoning the project midstream. There is also the need to develop 
the relevant competencies within the public sector organisations in-house to help 
progress the process smoothly and efficiently. These competencies could then be 
effectively transferred to the next stages of the procurement process - the construction 
and maintenance phases of the facility. 
One of the major criticisms levelled against projects procured through the PPP/PFI 
scheme was the inability of the public sector organisations to identify and allocate 
risks optimally. Research has revealed that for some projects within the NHS the 
value of risk transfer constituted in some cases up to 50% of the total capital cost to 
the private sector - an indication of a high level of compensation being paid to the 
private sector for risk transfer. As a result some consortia have refinanced their loans 
at a lower cost because the risks turned out to be lower than expected, bringing to 
them windfall profits (Pollock, et al., 2002; The PFI Report, 2001). In some instances 
the inability to allocate the risks appropriated resulted in the projects running into 
major difficulties during the implementation stages such as the Benefits Agency and 
Passport Office IT projects, and the Modbury Hospital in South Australia (Pollock, et 
al, 2002). 
The hierarchy of attributes captured in the generic model should act as an essential 
guide for the development and enhancement of the relevant competencies within the 
public and private sectors. This is vital for a more constructive negotiation process 
during the PPP procurement in order to achieve win-win situations. In the same vein 
those attributes identified for the private sector should be focused on by the public 
sector procurers in setting out there requirements for the prospective bidders for their 
project in the form of more appropriate and relevant pre-qualification criteria. It is 
therefore pleasing to note that as part of the feedbacks on the model by the industry 
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experts, one of them indicated he would apply the model in his future PPP/PFI 
projects. 
As the UK concept of the PPP philosophy is gaining international popularity and 
countries all over the world are trying to adopt it as an alternative route to developing 
and maintaining their public infrastructure, it is firmly believed that this model could 
be replicated in those countries with minor modifications to reflect national cultures 
and institutional rules and regulations. 
7.4.2 To Academia 
The ever-increasing use of alternative procurement strategies such as the PPP, calls 
for the training and development of relevant skills in contract negotiations. The 
hierarchy of attributes captured in the model developed during this research could act 
as springboard for the structuring of rich syllabus content for contract negotiations 
and as a tool kit for educational purposes. 
7.5 Areas for Further Research 
During the investigations, a number of areas emerged, the further study of which will 
go to enhance the search for relevant knowledge needed to improve infrastructure 
procurement using the PPP philosophy. These identified areas have therefore been 
highlighted upon below. 
7.5.1 Time and cost efficiency model 
When larger amounts of data becomes available as more PPP/PFI project are 
negotiated, it would be appropriate to develop a multiple regression analysis that can 
model the relations between these derived attributes to the pre-contract procurement 
cost and time outturns. The study should also lead to the developments efficiency 
indices that combine pre-contract time and cost out-turns. These indices could act as a 
guide to organisations who are procuring PPP projects for the first time and even for 
the experienced ones to improve on the process. They could also be used as a basis for 
judging how a particular organisation has performed in the procurement of its PPP 
project. 
212 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Research Recommendations 
7.5.2 Sector-by-Sector Comparative Study 
The need to investigate why civil engineering projects procured through the PPP 
strategy appear to have been accomplished in a more time and cost efficient fashion at 
the pre-contract stages. This should cover areas such as whether PPP projects 
procured through a central body are done much more efficiently than through 
decentralised institutions and where there are any differences, what lessons can be 
learnt, what elements within these two types of governance could be used to predict 
the variances in the pre-contract time and cost out-turns between institutions. 
7.5.3 The extent of re-negotiations after contract execution 
The need to investigate the extent to which PPP contracts are renegotiated during the 
life of the projects and the sort of impact they have on the efficiency in the level of 
services provided through the projects, and whether the conduct of the initial pre- 
contact negotiations has a bearing on the level of these renegotiations. 
7.5.4 Model Bidding and Contract Documents 
Developing a model bidding and contract document that carefully captures these 
attributes in order to enhance the PPP procurement process will be beneficial to the 
promotion of the PPP philosophy. 
7.6 Limitations of the Research 
7.6.1 Data size 
Although substantial data has been gathered towards the development of this study, it 
is hoped that the findings of the requirements of the first objective of this research - 
the extent of pre-contract time and cost overruns, could be enhanced if data could be 
obtained on a greater number of projects. Currently, the PPP philosophy is at its 
infancy and as more and more projects are procured through this delivery system, 
large volumes of data of this nature should be readily available for analysis and for an 
informed judgement of how the system is performing. 
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7.6.2 The Cultural dimension 
This research has been conducted purely on the UK practice of the PPP philosophy. 
There is no doubting the fact that negotiation represents a microcosm of our broader 
social milieu and that negotiating behaviour is therefore regulated by societal norms. 
Cultures differ a great deal especially across countries and so the model may be 
limited by the fact that cultures within other countries may have some element of 
influence on the hierarchy of the attributes. This research recognises this as a 
limitation for its universal application without recourse to considerations for the local 
environment to which it may be applied. In cultures where collectivism is valued 
highly, the negotiating behaviour tends to be high other-oriented during the 
bargaining. In such cultures much more emphasise may be placed on trust and higher 
degree of altruistic and cooperative negotiating behaviour towards the other party. 
Further research may therefore be needed on an international basis as a means for a 
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Appendix A. 1: The Questionnaires for data collection 
Fp endix A. 2: Summary Research Report and Feedback P 
Questionnaire on the Generic Model 
Appendix A. I 
8 May, 2002 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Public Private Partnerships/Private Finance in Infrastructure Procurement: A research project 
to analyse the factors that influence the procurement time and cost out-turns. 
The above research is looking at the key attributes of the consortium, the public sector, the project and 
the external environment. 
The research aims at: 
I. Examining the extent to which these attributes influence the ability of the parties to conclude the 
PPP/Private Finance procurement process from the OJEC Notice/Advert to the date of signing the 
contract agreements in a timely and cost effective manner. 
2. Developing a model that can link these attributes to the procurement time and cost out-turns. 
It shall be most appreciated if you could spare approximately 10 minutes to share your valuable 
knowledge and experience by completing the attached questionnaire. 
Please be assured that any information given will be treated in the strictest confidence. The preliminary 
survey report should be ready by June and we shall be delighted to send you a copy. If you desire to 
have one please indicate your email address in Part I of the questionnaire. 
A prepaid envelope has been provided for the return of the questionnaire and we would very much 
appreciate it if it could be returned at your earliest convenience. 
Yours sincerely 
Marcus Ahadzi 
(PhD Research Student) 
Dr Graerne Bowles 
(Research Project Supervisor) 
School of the Built Environment 
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Survey on Public Private Partnerships (PPP)/Private Finance In Infrastructure procurement 
(May 2002) 
The main objective of this survey is to examine the extend to which the key attributes of the 
consortium, the public sector, the project and the external environment influence the time and cost 
out-turns of the PPP procurement process from the OJEC Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the 
contracts. The survey forms an essential part of a PhD research project. 
Please be assured that information given will be treated in the strictest confidence and will be used for 
academic purposes only and that only a summary of the results may be disclosed. The questionnaire 
has been designed to take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
Part I: General Information 
1. On behalf of which sector have you been involved in PPP project procurement? (please 
tick) 
Public Sector Organisation D Private Sector Consortium 0 
2. Designation: (please tick) 
i) Chief Executive/Managing Director 0 ii) Project Manager 0 iii) Legal Adviser 0 
iv) Financial Adviser 0 v) Property Adviser 0 vi) Facilities Manager 0 
vii) Cost Adviser 13 viii) Architect 0 ix) Engineer 0 
x) Others (please state) 
3. Your personal experience In PPP/Private Finance procurement In terms of number of 
tenders you participated in: (please tick) 
No of tenders: 1-2 0 3-4 0 5-6 0 7-8 0 9-10 0 over 10 tenders 0 
4. Type of project: (please tick the one in which your have been mainly involved and for which your 
answers to this questionnaire apply) 
i) Health 0 
ii) Schools El 
iii) Prisons 11 
iv) Transportation projects e. g. roads, bridges, rails 11 
V) Water and Sanitation 0 
vi) Housing 0 
vii) Others (please state) 
5. Project name: 
6. Estimated capital value of project (in; Em): 
7. What was the Indicative procurement time schedule from the date of the OJEC 
Notice/Advert to the time the contract was expected to be signed? (please state) 
........ . ................. 
months 
8. What was the eventual time taken to conclude the deal? (please state) 
.................... (months) 
9. What was the Initial estimated direct cost to the organisation you represented In carrying out 
the tendering and negotiation processes? (please state) 
............................ 
(EM) 
10. What was the final direct cost to the organisation you represented In carrying out the 
tendering and negotiation processes? (please state) 
............... . ........ 
(EM) 
11. Name and Address for correspondence (optional): 
name: e-mail: tel: 
The preliminary survey report is expected to be ready by the end of June 2002 and we will be 
delighted to send you a copy via your above e-mail address if you desire to have one by indicating a 
tick in this box. 0 
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Part 11: Significance of Consortium Attributes 
The significance of the consortium attributes refers to the extent to which these attributes influence the 
ability of the parties to successfully conclude the PPP/Private Finance procurement process from the 
OJEC Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the contracts in a timely and cost effective manner. 
Please tick the appropriate scale as follows: 
Scale: insignificant = 1, slightly significant = 2, significant = 3, very significant =4, extremely 
significant =5 
ID No: Consortium Attributes Level of significance 
12345 
CS Nature and Strength 
csI Previous experience in PPP procurement. 0 0 13 0 0 
cs2 Reputation enjoyed by the consortium. 0 0 0 0 11 
cs3 PPP procurement philosophy being part of the consortium's strategic 
business interest. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs4 Ability of the consortium to tie equity into the project for a long 
period. 0 0 0 0 0 
CS5 Readiness to accept risk. 11 0 11 0 0 
cs6 Open/frank communication during the negotiations. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs7 Willingness to commit to earlier negotiated terms. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs8 Current job holding of consortium members. 0 0 0 0 0 
CS9 Appointing a dedicated bid manager. 0 0 0 0 D 
CS10 Ability to understand what the public sector wants. 0 11 0 0 0 
csII Ability of consortium members to work harmoniously with each 
other. 0 0 0 13 0 
csl2 Experience of previously working together as a team. 0 0 0 11 0 
cs13 Taking proactive role in initiating the project. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs14 Ability to obtain planning permission timeously. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs15 Early involvement of other stakeholders such as funding 
organisations, facilities managers, specialist suppliers, subcontractors 
and other experts in the process. 
0 0 11 0 0 
cs16 Personal attributes of the champion within the consortium. 13 13 0 0 0 
cs17 Ability to persevere even if the negotiations become protracted. 0 0 0 0 0 
cs18 The multidisciplinary nature of consortium team. 0 0 0 0 0 
CS19 Experience of previously working with the public sector procurer. 0 0 0 0 0 
CT Quality of the Technical Proposal 
ctl Robustness of outline technical proposal. 0 0 0 0 0 
U2 Clarity of submissions and responses to queries. 0 0 0 0 0 
ct3 Innovative technical solutions. 0 0 0 0 0 
ct4 Provision of sound technical guarantee. 0 0 0 0 0 
CF Quality of the Financial Proposal 
cf`I Level of financial guarantees provided/proposed by the consortium. 0 0 0 0 0 
cf2 Payment mechanisms proposed 0 0 0 0 0 
cf3 Level of government funding/guarantees required by the consortium. 0 0 0 0 11 
cf4 Attractiveness of financial proposals in terms of levels of tariff/tolls 
proposed 
- 
0 0 0 0 0 
cf5 Credibility of financiers 0 0 0 0 0 
cf6 Level of exposure of the public sector organisation to financial risks 
contained in the financial proposals. 0 0 0 0 0 
cf`7 Level of financial returns to the public sector organisation. 0 0 0 0 0 
cf8 Length of concession period proposed. 0 0 0 13 0 
cf9 Financial proposal demonstrating the capacity of project to generate 
I 
third party revenue. 
13 13 0 11 0 
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cfI 0 High Equity/debt ratio so as to drive commitment. DDDDD 
Other consortium attributes that significantly influence the ability of 
the parties to conclude deals in a timely and cost effective fashion 




Part III: Significance of Public Sector Attributes 
The significance of the public sector attributes refers to the extent to which these attributes influence 
the ability of the parties to successfully conclude the PPP/Private Finance procurement process from 
the OJEC Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the contracts in a timely and cost effective manner. 
Please tick the appropriate scale as follows: 
Scale: insignificant = 1, slightly significant = 2, significant = 3, very significant =4, extremely 
significant =5 
ID No Public Sector Attributes Level of significance 
12345 
PO Organisational 
pot Ability to effectively sensitise public opinion on the project. C) 11 0 0 0 
po2 Level of reputation enjoyed by the organisation. 0 13 0 11 0 
po3 Level of bureaucracy in the decision making process. 0 0 0 0 0 
po4 Attitude to cost e. g. excessive desire to drive down cost 11 0 0 0 0 
po5 Top level commitment within the public sector organisation D 11 0 0 D 
po6 Level of collaboration and commitment among the public sector team. 0 0 0 0 0 
po7 Open/frank and flexible communication during negotiations. 0 0 11 0 0 
P08 Existence of an established PPP/Private Finance Unit to foresee the 
procurement process. 0 11 0 0 D 
P09 Ability to assist in land acquisition and in obtaining planning 
permission 0 0 0 0 0 
Polo Ability to tap knowledge and expertise gained by other public sector 
organisations in PPP/Private Finance procurement. 0 0 0 0 0 
pot I Level of commitment of the organisation to earlier negotiated terms. 0 0 0 0 D 
po12 Ability to accept and absorb risks. 0 D 0 0 0 
PT Technical 
ptl Strong in-house expertise in infrastructure procurement that is able to 
understand the private sector's technical, financial and innovative 
approaches. 
13 0 13 0 0 
Levels of preparatory work e. g. market sounding and effective pre- 
qualification of bidders. 
0 0 13 11 0 
pt2 Previous experience in PPP/Private Finance infrastructure 
procurement. 
0 0 0 0 0 
pt3 Previous experience in infrastructure procurement generally. 0 0 0 0 0 
pt4 Ability to establish clears statements of the evaluation criteria in the 
bidding documents. 0 0 0 0 0 
pt5 Ability to effectively establish the project parameters in the form of 
output specifications. 0 0 0 0 0 
pt6 Making use of standard bidding documents. 0 0 0 0 11 
PF Financial 
pfl Ability to raise ftinds through Bonds. 0 0 0 0 0 
pf2 Ability to receive financial support/guarantecs from the central 
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pS Ability to offer tax concessions and/or flexible tax regimes. 0DDDD 
pR Ability to provide equity finance. DDDDD 
pf5 Capability to pay the shadow tolls/tariff levels proposed by the private 
sector. DD 11 13 D 
Other public sector attributes that significantly influence the ability of 
the parties to conclude deals in a timely and cost effective fashion. 
(ple se list and rate) 
DDDDD 
[I DDDD 
Part IV: Significance of Project Attributes 
The significance of project attributes refers to the extent to which these attributes influence the ability 
of the parties to successfully conclude the PPP/Private Finance procurement process from the OJEC 
Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the contracts in a timely and cost effective manner. 
Please tick the appropriate scale as follows: 
Scale: Insignificant = 1, slightly significant = 2, Significant = 3, Very significant = 4, Extremely 
significant =5 
ID No Project Attributes Level of significance 
12345 
PN Nature of Project 
pnI Size and complexity. 0 0 0 0 0 
pn2 Amenability to innovation. 0 0 0 11 0 
pn3 Ease with which to identify, assess and allocate the project risks. 0 13 0 0 0 
pn4 Impact of project on the environment. 0 0 0 0 0 
pn5 Need for a third party to improve existing infrastructure. 0 0 0 0 0 
pn6 Health and safety provoked by the projecfs development. 0 0 0 0 D 
pn7 Level of design completion required at tender. 0 11 0 0 0 
pn8 Ability of project to respond to future changes. 0 0 13 0 0 
pn9 Project location and site conditions. 0 0 0 0 0 
pnIO Uniqueness of project. 0 0 0 0 0 
pnI I Tendency of project rendering existing public sector staff redundant. 0 0 0 0 11 
PM Marketability of Project 
pmI Suitability for private participation. 0 0 0 13 0 
pm2 Level to which project must meet general public needs. 0 0 0 0 D 
pm3 Possible land and property deals and buyouts. 0 0 0 0 0 
pm4 Useful life at the end of concession period. 0 0 0 0 0 
pm5 Bankability of project i. e. ability of project to attract funding from 
financial institutions. 0 0 0 0 0 
pm6 Potential to achieve near monopolistic advantage for the services 
delivered. 0 0 0 0 0 
pm7 Ability of project to generate third party revenue. 0 0 0 0 0 
pm8 Prospect of project offering opportunities for future refinancing. 0 0 0 0 0 
PM9 Ability of project to attract property development rights e. g. estates, 
hotels, supermarkets, offices, etc. 0 0 0 0 13 
pmI0 _ I Level of tariffs and tolls. 0 0 0 0 13 
Other project attributes that severely impact on the ability of the parties 
to conclude deals in a timely and cost effective fashion. (please list and 
rate) 
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Part V: Significance of the External Environment Attributes 
The significance of the external environment attributes refers to the extent to which these attributes 
influence the ability of the parties to successfully conclude the PPP/Private Finance procurement 
process from the OJEC Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the contracts in a timely and cost 
effective manner. 
Please tick the appropriate scale as follows: 
Scale: insignificant = 1, slightly significant = 2, significant = 3, very significant =4, extremely 
significant =5 
ID No External Environment Attributes Level of significance 
12345 
ES Socio-Economic 
esl Availability of traditional projects. 13 11 0 0 0 
es2 Maturity of the financial markets. 0 0 0 0 0 
es3 Perceived future economic uncertainties e. g. inflation, interest rate and 
exchange rate volatility. 11 11 0 D 0 
es4 Long term prospect for sale and purchase of equity in PPP/Private 
Finance projects. 13 0 0 0 0 
es5 Strong public/private sector relationships. 11 0 0 0 0 
EP Political 
epl. Public acceptability of the PPP/Private Finance philosophy. 0 0 0 13 0 
ep2 Stability of the political system. 11 0 0 0 0 
ep3 Level of all-party political support for the philosophy. D 0 0 0 0 
EL Legal/Regulatory regime 
ell Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 0 D 0 0 0 
e12 Ability of foreign investors to repatriate earnings. 0 0 0 11 0 
eb Clearly defined rules and regulations for the foreign ownership of 
property. 0 0 0 0 0 
e14 Clearly defined legislation on intellectual property rights. 0 0 0 0 0 
e15 Clearly established institutional and policy frameworks by the Central 
Government on PPP/Private Finance. 
0 13 0 D 0 
Other external environment attributes that significantly influence the 
ability of the parties to conclude deals in a timely and cost effective 
fashion (please list and rate) 
D D C1 0 El 
C1 0 D 0 D 
Part VI Overall Assessment 
Finally, on aI to 4 scale, I being the least, please indicate the level to which each of these elements 
influence the ability of the parties to successfully conclude the PPP/Private Finance procurement 
process from the OJEC Notice/Advert to the eventual signing of the contracts in a timely and cost 
effective manner 
Element Scale 




Public Sector Attribute 
_The 
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/03/04 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Research report on Public Private Partnerships 
As we did promise when we sent out the questionnaire for the above research, please 
find attached a summary of the findings. May we take this opportunity to express our 
appreciation of your contribution towards the realisation of this project. 
Once again we would like to take a bit of your time to provide us with a feedback on 
the model that has been generated from the analysis. Kindly complete the attached 
one page feedback format and mail it back via the prepaid envelop. 
The focus of the research was to investigate the extent of pre-contract time and pre- 
contract/bidding cost overruns for projects procured using the PPP/PFI strategy, and 
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Research report on PPP/PFI project procurement 
The main objectives of the research were: 
1) to investigate the extent of pre-contract time and bidding/pre-contr-act cost 
overruns for projects procured using the PP/PFI strategy. 
to develop a generic multi-attribute hierarchical model that can be used as 
a guide in addressing the problems of pre-contract time and bidding/pre- 
contract cost overruns during the negotiations phase. Earlier research 
identified the negotiation phase as the one accounting for most of the time 
overruns. 
(1) Pre-contract time and cost outturns 
The figures below reveal the extent of the pre-contract time overruns on a sector by 
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Sector by sector comparison of pre-contract time out-turns Percentage variance in pre-contract time outturn for each sector 
The bidding/pre-contract cost overruns were found to be equally high, with one 
project recording as high as 200% overrun to the private sector. Not only were the 
overruns high but also the costs in monetary ten-ns to the private sector were high, 
ranging from E0.1m to f6.0m. The public sector costs were equally high, ranging 
from EO. 4 to f 8m with overruns in the range of 38% - 167% over the planned 
budgets. 
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(2) The Ceneric Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model 
The figure below is the model derived from analysing the data provided during the 
questionnaire survey. The model captures the hierarchy of attributes that significantly 
influence the ability ofthe parties to minimize the undue delays during the negotiation 
phase of the PPP/PFI projects procurement. The Public Sector Client Attributes, for 
example, have emerged as the top ranking attributes, followed by those of the 
Consortium Attributes. The model captures only the top five sub-attributes among the 
several sub-attributes identified during the questionnaire survey. 
Negotiation outcoine in this model refers to time and cost efficiency during the pre- 
contract stages of the PPP procurement, where efficiency relates to the ability of the 
parties to niniunise and/or eliminate unnecessary time and cost overruns and yet strive 
to conclude the deals in a niatiner satisfactory to all parties. 
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Feedback on the Generic Model 
The criteria for assessing the model are as follows: 
a) Completeness: Comprehensiveness in the coverage of the key attributes. 
b) Practical Relevance: The usefulness of the model in identifying competency 
gaps. 
c) Robustness: The extent to which the model reflects reality as a guide to 
decision making. 
Please rate the model according to the above criteria asfollows: 
12345 
Completeness Low High 
Practical Relevance Low 1 11 11 El High 
Robustness Low I High 
Please include an. vjlirther comments below. 
............. 
. ...... . ......... .... ....... .... ........... ......... . ........ .... . 
.... ...... 
. .......... ............... .... ...... 
.... .... ................ 
........... 
...... ... ........ . 
........... .. 
PIT and Con(ract Neuotiations: A Generic Multi-Attribute Hierarchical Model 
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Appendix B. I: Pre-contract Time Out-turns 
Appendix B. 2: Pre-contract/Bidding Cost Out-turns 
Appendix B. I Pre-contract time out-tums 
Category Project ID CapHall Vallue(frn) original time actual time variation (mths) % variation 
health 50 200 24 36 12 50.0 
49 50 21 30 9 42.9 
40 200 18 24 6 33.3 
33 nia 18 24 6 33.3 
31 140 21 33 12 57.1 
19 300 18 21 3 M7 
15 100 9 15 6 6&7 
13 30 27 40 13 4& 1 
12 250 24 34 10 41.7 
3 229.2 18 30 12 6667 
2 160 18 36 is 100.0 
1 170 24 36 12 50.0 
schools 47 85.0 8.0 12.0 4 50.0 
46 40.0 26.0 36.0 10 3&5 
45 70.0 9.0 13.0 4 "4 
42 75.0 24.0 24.0 0 0.0 
41 37.0 18.0 36.0 is 100.0 
35 nfa 12.0 21.0 9 MO 
34 24.0 12.0 25.0 13 IOU 
32 25.0 15.0 26.0 11 73.3 
28 52.0 9.0 40.0 31 3"4 
27 91.0 24.0 36.0 12 50.0 
23 20.0 18.0 39.0 21 11667 
14 35.0 24.0 36.0 12 50.0 
9 12.0 12.0 18.0 6 50.0 
8 40.0 15.0 24.0 9 60.0 
6 20 18.0 24 6 33.3 
5 27 18 20 2 11.1 
civil eng 44 1000 12 18 6 50.0 
37 50 18 20 2 11.1 
30 300 12 12 0 0.0 
22 200 24 27 3 12.5 
20 25 12 24 12 100.0 
18 1300 15 18 3 20.0 
43 nfa 18 30 12 667 
16 98 15 12 -3 -20.0 
4 600 30 42 12 40.0 
36 120 12 24 12 100.0 
26 30 25 36 11 U0 
24 60 21 30 9 42.9 
10 90 24 36 12 50.0 
Others(. fti,,,, COYrU, etc) 21 8 24 36 12 50.0 
17 100 12 18 6 50.0 
11 300 36 60 24 6& 7 
7 20 12 50 39 31&7 
Amrage 18.3 28.5 10 62.5 
n 45 n= 45 n 45 n= 45 
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Project Project ID Capital Value Pro- contractfidd ing Cost Out-turn s Sector 
Category (im) original (fm) actual (fm) variation (fm) %variation 
health 50 200 2 3 1 50 private 
49 50 0.25 0.75 0.5 200 private 
40 200 0.4 0.5 0.1 25 public 
33 Na 0.1 0.1 0 0 private 
15 100 0.28 0.3 0.02 7.1 private 
13 30 0.39 0.6 0.21 53.8 private 
3 229.2 3 4.5 1.5 50 public 
2 160 1 2 1 100 private 
1 170 0.5 0.5 0 0 private 
schools 46 40.0 1.00 2.20 1.2 120 private 
45 70.0 0.20 0.40 0.2 100 private 
42 75.0 0.50 1.00 0.5 100 public 
41 37.0 1.85 3.70 1.85 100 public 
35 nfa 0.13 0.28 0.145 111.5 private 
34 24.0 0.8 1.20 0.4 50 public 
32 25.0 0.35 0.55 0.2 57.1 public 
28 52.0 0.6 1.40 0.8 133.3 private 
27 91.0 0.75 1.00 0.25 33.3 public 
14 35.0 0.4 0.7 0.3 75 private 
9 12.0 0.4 0.4 0 0 public 
8 40.0 1.19 1.2 0.01 0.8 public 
6 20 0.4 0.5 0.1 25 private 
civil eng 30 300 6 6 0 0 private 
18 1300 1.25 1.25 0 0 public 
16 98 1 0.5 -0.5 -50 public 
4 600 8 11 3 37.5 public 
36 120 0.5 1 0.5 100.00 private 
26 30 0.5 1 0.5 100.00 private 
24 60 1.5 3 1.5 100.00 public 
Others(. ifi,,,, 17 100 1 1.6 0.6 60 public 
11 300 2 4 2 100 public 





Appendix C. 1: Statistical Computations for the Model Development 
and Testing (Hypothesis 2) 
Appendix C. 2: Comprehensive listing of the hierarchy of Attributes 
Appendix C. 3: Statistical Computations for validating the Model 
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Appendix CA 
Split-half test for Consortium Attributes 
overall rating (A) 4- 49 splitl ratings (B) a- 24 split 2 rating Cn- 25 
IF Mb r-b Iww r.. M I" r" iwn rw. I" r wb Imin r.. k 
Natý and 11"nUth 0.734 1 0.740 1 0.736 1 
csI PrwAý Vý in PPP ;, -ýL 0392 a 0.825 4.5 0.760 10 
cs2 R. PAMoner4oydbyIwc. -nh- 0.703 11 0.725 10 0.6110 13 
cs3 PPPb. *Va*d. &b-inwd Me 12 0.675 15 0.696 11 
cs4 AbMytotiw$Ayintotoproimifbro"porbd 0.682 13 0.708 12 0.656 145 
C65 R.. dinýt*&. WIrWk. 0.416 a 0.817 6 0.816 6 
C68 Opm*w* coff-katon dwkV ft negobabona 0.841 3 0.825 4.5 0.856 3 
cs7 warqý b cw,., * 10 , b. . Oobw Nnn& 0.751 10 0.717 11 0.7" a 
CS8 C-ni job hokWV of bbý*Orb" 0.604 Is 0.650 19 0.6% 145 
CS9 Appýinting . ddi. MW bod -oý 0.865 1 0.992 1 0.640 4 
c8lo Undwatandmg " PUbIc Owtor -da. 0.953 2 0.833 25 0.872 1 
c8l i Abikty at convorkm rnwnlý 10 wwk hmwnmWy. 0.820 5 0.808 7 0.932 5 
cs112 EVýWn- of Wwouly woking bgt- .a1. - 0.645 Is 0.700 13 0.632 165 
cs13 TMdnq W-U. oW In hW" to propa 0.929 17 2.625 Is 0.632 165 
cs14 AbdVyIobtAnpI-AVp-ft-Wn-, * 0.657 16 0.692 14 0.624 is 
C315 Ealy invok-nt of othff "*, Wm 0.833 4 0.800 a 0.864 2 
CSIG PW-1 MWwt" of Vw ch-pion w*M to consonkm 0.765 9 0.742 9 0.7611 9 
cs17 AbOty Io p- dwhQ prol-W negotwdý 0.812 7 0.933 25 0.792 7 
CSIB The . Abd-kA-y nd- of %. ý 0.669 14 0.660 10.5 0. "1 12 
cslg E*40@ý of prwAouWy working w0h to Pubk . 8clor pný 0.596 19 0.650 165 0.5" 19 
0-Ifty of Toch. " Propos. 1 6.723 2 0.739 2 0.7118 2 
Ctl Robutn- of oudne technicad Proposal 0.780 2 0.783 1.5 O. T79 2 
C12 CW* of snd I. M-W 10 *WW8 0.800 1 0.783 1.5 6.4116 1 
CM In-va bichmicW "Oon.. 0.641 4 0.667 4 0.616 4 
Ct4 ProwWon of wund tocPwkdi O-WO, 0.673 3 O. T17 3 0.632 3 
Ou. 11ty of th. Fin-1.1 P-p .. A 0.652 3 0.648 3 0.656 3 
di L-1 .1 finýid 9. wt- proW. ". p-d by I* cone. Wn O. T39 4 0.758 3 0.720 5 
cf2 P. W-t -hmnW- Wopod 0.731 5 0.733 4.5 0.722 4 
d3 L" of go-nt kindinW9-1ý mrAred by In c-ordum 0.641 6 0.592 6 0.698 a 
d4 L. AW. of t. Mkft Pop-W 0.545 1 0.825 1 0.864 1 
d5 Credibbly of S-W. 0.767 2 0.733 45 0.600 2 
da L" of *qý* of to pubs: wUw orgenisabon to financii Mks 0.763 3 0.783 2 0344 3 
cr7 L" of MwcW ralýe to to puble w1or organisadon. 0.5511 a 0.550 8 0.552 7.5 
dS Length of ý PýIod W. Pbd 0.567 7 0.583 7 0.562 71 
crg L. W of f" p" ý to b. 9-ded 0.453 10 OA33 to 0.472 9 
dlO High EWWOM fbo Ma to drNe 0.465 9 0.492 9 0.440 10 
rho Notes: 
ft beb~ A wW 0 Rw naký end evength 0921 ik.. 00A sodicemos ind. to, *Aýý 
rho b. 1- A and C for . b" and M-Vth 0.964 . *, e*ft of 00 A14011buts 
W. bet- 9 and C for .. I- and W-gth 0.805 I-W. rhMSA aWfte- Widw of One main attribut" 
rhocs 0.894 PnWn., rwkkV of 0. rn. I. afirbut" 
rho, spe-ý. rw* corWation Mff-nI 
rho b4*~ A"8 br qua" of %ch propo&W 0.949 
rho beh~ A and C for quaRy of wonrkal propoed 1.000 
W. bb-n 6 end C Jo, quefty of I.. h-. i pmp.. d 0949 
rhoct. 0.966 
rho beh-n A end 8 for qu&Wy of finaneW pmpmW 0.948 
ft W- A and C fc, queky of fin.,. W ppod 0.973 
ft Wn-n 0 and C for qu" of finwel propmal 0.915 
rhocfw 0.945 
rho oo. widi 0.935 
at 0.005 (0.5%) level of significance with N-33, rhomww from statistical tables Is 0.446 
Since 0.935 Is greater than 0.446 Ho Is rejected 
For N- 33, rho - 0.935 from the statistical tables shows that 
a value as large as this is significant alp ýc. 001 level 
(one-tail test). Thus we could reject Ho at a-0.001 
level. 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 




IN - Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance (level of agreement) 
k- Is the sets of ranking (- 3) 
W- rhoav(k - 
1) +I 




with N- 33 
[-Z2 
--ý 91.8328 
From statistical tables we find that 91.8328 
with a degree of freedom, cY -N-I- 32 has a probability of 
occurrence under Ho of p40.001. Hence it can be concluded 
with considerable assurance that the likelihood of the samples 
coming from the same population Is higher than it will be by chance. 
The very low Probability under the Ho associated with 
the observed value of IN enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the ratings for the sets am unrelated. 
Hence we accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
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AppsrdxCA 
split half test for public sector attributes 
overall rating (A) nw 49 split I ratings (B) n- 25 *pill 2 rating Cn- 24 
tub rub Imm rm- Isub rub Imain rmau, tub rub Issoin rmain 
Org. n1astlonal C. p. bMdm 0.736 2 0.735 1 0.737 2 
pal Abdtytooffectý*oon&4k. pLbkopbionmoupvimt 0.686 9 0.692 7.5 0.680 10 
po2 Level or Nputsdon arjoyed by to organlastlon. 0.633 12 0.650 11 0.616 11.5 
p03 L" or b"suorscy in 0. decklon m"Int; ismess. 0.747 4.5 0.750 5 0.744 5 
P04 AWUA* to cost a 9. massive dwalm to dd" doýn cost 0.694 8 0.700 6 0.688 8.5 
P05 Top Is. 1 comffft .. 9 0.902 1 0.917 1 0.888 1 
Pas Tom collaborsoon and camn*nora 0.865 2 0.850 2 0.880 2 
P07 Opwwnv*wwfloxib4ocommu*44ondutigmgodadom. 0.949 3 0.842 3 0.856 3 
Pas Ism-esUbliamd PPP tk* 0.637 11 0.658 10 0.616 11.5 
pag ASW. OVinhwWwquodion"inobtWr6VpwwA. 0.698 7 0.692 7.5 0.704 7 
Pal 0 TppkV knwtdg. " w9efte 9.1-d ebwh- 0.665 10 0.642 12 0.688 85 
Poll Convmr-MI-allarneg. 1stedwrns 0.747 4.5 0.758 4 0.736 6 
P012 Abilkyto-Wondsteobrisks 0.714 6 0.675 9 0.752 4 
Technical C. p. 1,111des 0.739 1 0.726 2 0.751 1 
ptl Soong WAwnse experds. 0.759 3 0.750 3 0.768 3 
pt2 Soundpp. "wo'k 0.759 3 0.7117 4 utio 2 
PO PreAous In PPP procurmert 0.678 7 0.667 65 0.688 7 
p14 ExpoMm. in Infrasaucase pmwwnwt 0.698 5 0.700 5 0.696 6 
pt5 ClawasWA"d evAotlonorkeds 0.759 3 0.758 2 0.760 4 
pts Ciw Quiput specifications 0.829 1 0.825 1 0.832 1 
pt7 The we of standard biddint; doc-ft 0.690 6 0.667 65 0.712 5 
Financial Capabilities 0.578 3 0.563 3 0.592 3 
Pill Abky to mae funds fir"O Bond.. OA57 4 OA75 3 0.440 5 
P(2 Strorg firwcw supporttguwanteee fmm " cw*. l glovt 0.747 2 0.692 2 0.800 1 
pf3 Fl., dbl. tax r. 9irms. 0.465 3 OA42 4.5 OA88 3 
pf4 AbilkytoproMsequkyfln- OA53 5 0.442 4.5 OA64 4 
pf5 cq. "Kytpy 0.767 1 0.767 1 0.768 2 
rho 
d. W-sn A and 8 for mt.. and wV-gth 0.923 Not. $: 
rho bM-- A and C for mUs, and atergth 0.963 )sub., 
ft boo- 6 and C for mooe indevargOn 0.801 r subý rsrMV of d. .. b-. tWft 
= 
rhopo w 0.896 Imsinýr%Ied-gnRc-ind-ofth*rR &Urlxfts 
Ow bsb~ A mid B (w quoky or tsch propces! 0954 rmain., -nkk offtnuinsfirbutse 
ft bet-en A and C for quky of tect. " proposal 0.927 P. --,. -* .. ". 1abon . 
ft bt-- B and C for quality of twtrkW proposal 0.793 
rhoptw 0.891 
ft bm-- A and 6 F. quWky of financial luoposal 0.821 
ft bet- A and C for quoky of flnencial pmpmW 0.800 
rho betmen 8 and C for qusky of (Iracial proposal 0564 
rhopf- 0.728 
rho mw 0.838 
at 0.005 (5%) level of significance Win N-24, rho critical from statistical tables Is 0.521 
since 0.838 Is greater then 0.521 No is rejected 
P-0.001 
For Na 24, rhoev a 0.838 from the statistical tables shins; that 
a value as large as this is significant at pý0 001 level 
(one-tall test). Thus we could reject No at a-0.001 
level. 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
- -1 kW-1 FP; Tav - 





W- Kendal Coefficient of Concordance (level of agreement) 
k- hi to sets of r&Mng (- 3) 







Mh N- 24 
rx-2--J 61.565 
From statistical tables we find that = E] 61.565 
vAth a degree of freedom, df -N-I- 23 has a probability of 
occurreme under Ho of p40.001. Hance it can be concluded 
With considerable assurance that Via likelihood of the samples 
coming from the same population is higher Own It Will be by chance. 
The very low probability under the Ho swociated vAlh 
the observed value of W enables us to reject the mA 
hypothesis that to ratings for the sets are unrelated. 
Hance we accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
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PrI Sb* ard C.. Pl. )dty 
pn2 Am-bility to Inno. don, 
pn3 Project ritit numraga-mt 
prA IrTact of proict on the ww*ommt 
pn5 Need For a ted p" to inw-e A. *v idaft-h- 
pn6 Heakh and saf. 4y pr-kd ". projecrs d*vWopmwt. 
pn7 Leyel of d"gn cornplebon mquired at twdw. 
pn8 Ab#ky of pmjOd to mpond to its" Changam. 
png PfoJect 1-don ww "o condloors. 
POO uni*ý or Project 
prill Effect on )dW&v pUft aeoW 
Split half test - Project Attributes 
overall rating (A) n 49 













split 11 ratings (8) n- 24 













split 2 rating Cn- 25 
I sub r-b 













Marketability of Project 0.656 2 0.633 2 0.678 2 
PM11 SAbiky for p*, m. participaWn, 0.924 2 0.792 2 0.856 2 
pm2 I" to Wrich, prolect rnust mest gwwW pthlic mod.. 0.755 3 0.758 3 0.760 3 
pm3 PO-448 bad wal property deal. and bWoU.. 0.637 6 0.583 6 0.688 5 
prn4 Useful life at the ard of cont-ion period. 0.661 5 0.700 5 0.648 6 
PM5 Barkability of project 0.890 1 0.850 1 0.928 1 
PM6 Moreaphfic . &wtsgo 0.539 a 0.533 a 0.560 a 
PM7 Abay or project to qwwrwa, third party 0.453 10 0.417 10 0.472 10 
Pins Opperuee" for Rare renniaring 0.584 7 0.550 7 0.600 7 
PM9 potential for property deYWOPRWI rights 0.494 9 0.442 9 0.528 9 
PMIO I" I thft arx! toll.. 0.722 4 0.708 4 0.744 4 
rho Notes: 
rho be- A seat 6 fow PI. Ject Mkir. 0.954 1 wbý faila" sigralicarce ird" ror the cLaý-a"L"o 
rho W-an A wd C ror p, *. l mt- 0.943 r xuhý reeking or to ude-awax" 
rho betmen B .. d C ror p. Jd nat. * 0.824 1 nvainý reiative significarce M" of the main ad*, A" 
rhopn w 0.907 ranaom% artung of the mein AtUbtass 
ft beh- A ars! 8 for rnarktbily, 1.0(M rho-. p. ---. -* o. ". 0- 
ft between A and C for marketability 0988 
rho between B ant C for nwk*LWAIV 0.988 
rhopm w 0.992 
rhoa"'aU 0.949 
at 0.005 1" of significance with N-21, rhocritical front statistical tables is 0.556 
since 0.949 Is greater then 0,610 M) is rejected 
p40.001 
For N- 21. rhoav - 0.949 from the statistical tables shows that 
a value as large as this Is significant at p40.001 level 
(one-tail test). Thus we could reject Ho at a-0.001 
1". 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 




IN - Kendall CceMcIent of Concordance (level of agreement) 






with N- 211 - -1 r; r72= 57.98 
From statistical tables we find that E] 57.98 
with a degree of freedom, dif uN-Ia 20 has a probability of 
occurrence under Ho o(p -0 001. Hence It can be concluded 
with considerable assurance that the likelihood of the samples 
coming from the same population Is higher then It will be by chance. 
The very low probability under the Ho associated with 
the observed value of W enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the ratings for the sets are unrelated. 
Hence we socept the alternative hypothesis that the 
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Split half test - Exti Envt Attributes 
ovorall rating (A) n- 49 






















civ bob~ A wW 8 for =oýwam 1.000 
rtobe~AWWCfor=oýý 0,866 
rho boMM 8 W4 C for =OýOnorrk 0.913 
rhoes w 0.920 
ft beWw A W4 8 for polibcNAe"IreqUatory mgim 0.976 
ft b. ~ A WO C Otto 0.830 
rho bob~ B 04 C dtW 0.805 
rhoopolov 0.870 
ftýlall 0.898 
at 0.005 level of significance Wth N-11 3, rhocritical from statistical tables is 
since 0.838 he greater than 0.703 No Is rejected 
p40.001 
For N- 13, rhoav - 0.900 from the statistical tables shovs that 
a vskie as large as this is significant at pý0.001 level 
(one-tall test). Thus we coLAd repict Ho at a-0.001 
level. 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
From the relationship 
rk -W--Ij 
wbere 
IN a Kendal Coefficient of Concordance (level of agreement) 






rZ-27-ý Fk'j(-N --I)-W-l 
WIN N- 13 
Fz 72- 33560 
From statisbcal tables we find that El 33560 
with a degree of freedom, df -N-I- 12 has a probability of 
occurrence under Ho of p40 001. Hence It can be conclixiod 
with corisiderable, assurance that he likelihood of to isenvies 
coning from the same population is higher than it will be by chance. 
The very low probability under the Ho associated with 
the observed value of W enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis that ft ratings for the sets are unrelated. 
Hence we accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
ratings are related. 
split I ratings (B) n- 24 







split 2 rating (C )n- 25 








0.700 3 0.774 
0.692 4 0.760 4 
0.675 5 0.760 4 
0.742 1 0.760 4 
OAOS 7 0.384 a 
OAOO a OAOO 7 
0A92 6 0.520 6 
0.725 2 0368 2 
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ca Consortium Attributes 
psa Public Sector Client Attributes 
pa Project Attributes 
eea External Environment Attributes 
Split half test - Main Components 
overall rating (A) n= 49 





split I rating (B) n= 24 












rho between A and B 0.800 loomp. - relative significance Index for the main component 
rho between A and C 1.000 rcomp. - ranking of the main components 
rho between B and C 0.982 rho: - spearmam's rank correlation coefficient 
MOCOMP av 0.927 
at 0.05 level of significance with N=4, rho critical from statistical tables is 1.000 
0.10 <p<0.25 
For N=4, rhoav = 0.927 from the statistical tables shows that 
a value as large as this is significant at 0.10 <p<0.25 level 
(one-tail test). Thus we could only reject Ho at a=0.25 
level. 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
From the relationship 
W-I 
where 1 k-I 
W= Kendall Coefficient of Concordance (level of agreement) 
k= is the sets of ranking (= 3) 
-1 rho (k-l)+l Hence Fw--= IkI 
W=0.952 
-(N-- -I) -W 
again FX2 -9 Pl 
with N=4 
Fx-2i=-q 8.564 
From statistical tables we find that = [E] 8.564 
with a degree of freedom, df =N-I=3 has a probability of 
occurrence under Ho of p<0.001. Hence it can be concluded 
with considerable assurance that the likelihood of the samples 
coming from the same population is higher than it will be by chance. 
The very low probability under the Ho associated with 
the observed value of IN enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the ratings for the sets are unrelated. 
Hence we accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
ratings are related. 
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Appendix C. 2 Comprehensive listing of the hierarchy of Attributes 
Public Sector Attributes 
0 7ýý 
, -il., '- ými- -ýIi. -pi-i-m 
0-00 
code Attributee i sub ranking i main 
Pt Tec&. Vical Capabilities 0.739 
pt6 Clear output specifications 0.829 1 
pti Strong in-house expertise 0.759 3 
pt2 Sound preparatory work 0.759 3 
pt5 Clearly established evaluation criteria 0.769 3 
pt4 Experience in infrastructure procurerner-ft 0.698 5 
pt7 The use of standard bidding documerytý 0.690 6 
pt3 Previous experience in PPP procurement 0.678 7 
J=1MORCial capajwfitfe's 
1015 Capability to pay 0.767 
pf2 Strong financial supporUguarardees from the central govt 0.747 
pf3 Flexible tax regimes. 0.466 




-t2 cl-ity -1 0-1000 
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. -. J- I ý"&ý I -i, 
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ýfs --Ii-t'n -P-- tý riýký O. T433 ý3 
-1 1 F 1-"ýl &3-rm"t- -- 0. T 319 
-1ý ", -p --- ci ". Z311 
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Project Attributes 
CCPCIC!! AtItwiiR3-Lffte!!! m F swb rdirnki", g M, ), 
pn J%O: Er tjwre o. r JýJ--Oje Ct 0.065 
pnl Size and complexity 0.788 1 
pn3 Project risk management 0-759 2.5 
pn8 Ability to respond to future changes. 0.759 2 -5 
pn7 (Design completion required at tender. 0.702 4 
pn9 Project location and : site conditions 0.694 5 
pn4 lrnpa-zýt on the environment 0.633 6 
pnl 0 Uniqueness of project 0.624 7 -: 
5 
pn2 Amenability to innovation 0.624 7 45 
pn6 Heiatth and safety provoked 0.684 9.5 
pnI 1 EffecI on existing public sector s1aff 0.584 9-5 
pn: 5 Third party improving exiýý-ing infrastructure 0-563 11 1 
CCOCIdm- AtItirit3urbeir i -SIJb -.? AJ", g 
I f main 
prn jFLrJCW. V* e it. & &. ffp4t_V , IF Ct 0.056 
prnS Bankability of project 0.890 1 
prnl Suitability for private participation 0-824 2 
prn2 Meeting general public needs 0.755 3 
prnI 0 Level of tariffs and tolls - 
0.722 4 
prn4 Useful life after concession per iod. 0.661 5 
prn3 Potential for land and property buyouts. 0-637 6 
prn8 Opportunities for future refinancing 0.584 7 
pm6 Monopolistic advar-ftage 0.639 a 
prn9 Potential for property development rights 0.494 9 
prn7 IThird party revenue potentials 1 0.4153 1 10 1 
External Environment Attributes 
code Attriburtes i swb rankinj i Mai,, 
es Socio -Economic 0.073 
es2 Maturity of the financial markets- 0.735 1 
es5 Strong public/private sector relationships. 0.722 2 
es3 Perceivecl future economic uncertair-dies 0.682 3 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase in PPP pjts 0.629 4 
esl 
l Availability of traclitional projects. 
1 0.600 15 11 
code Attributes i sub rGnkinj i M.?, n 
el POMffcafALegaflRegafatory Regime 0.623 
ell Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 0.751 1 
eIS Established institutional and policy frameworks on PPP 0.747 2 
epl Public acceptability of the PPP philosophy. 0.739 3 
ep2 Stability of the political system. 0.727 4 
ep3 All-party political support for the philosopy 0.718 !5 
e14 Intellectual property rights. 0.506 6 
e13 Clear regulations on foreign ownership of property. 0.400 7 
e12 I Ability of foreign investors to repatriate earnings - 1 0.396 18 1 
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Consortium Attributes 
Consortium Attributes - Quafty of Financial Proposal 
TWd pwty -f, b, g-- 
figh Eqotyld- Mi, t, &N--f 
F-d -. I. I. p. Iý.. t., , -, 
LffQ Ih If -sionpwod p I, P. -d 
GI-t 
fty-nt -ý-. P, IP. - 
F-W gwwlý PMIAýlpmplll 
chý'-po'::, I "'m 1 -1 
C-1 ioy7f I"--- 
L-.. If 1.9 In . 11. P.,... 
0.00 
Consortium Attributes - Quality of Technical Proposal 
Ir. rve tecI1C1 Iutio 
P-isi-f -dtachnic. A 
g--t-. 
Rýb.. t--f -A I 
P-F--w 
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Public Sector Client Attributes 
Public Sector Attributes - OrIganisational Capabilities 
Public Sector Attributes - Technical Capabilities 
Previous mperienoe in PPIP procurarnent 
Theuseof standard bidding docurrentý 
ExpwiýinirifrastrLictýeprocLwenýV 
Clear established evaluation criteria 
Sound preparatory %vork 
Strong in-hDuseexpertise 
Cleeroutputspecificetiomjý 
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Relative Significai 
Public Sector Attributes - Financial Capabilities 
Ab. l, ty t. p,.. dý q ty f. - 
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F I. ib I. ta. %... 
Strong fimnam wpporl/gmrantý 
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Appendix C. 2 
Project Attnbutes 
Project Attributes - Nature of Project 
--g p 
ImplIt .. th. -11 . ..... ..... I 
A hilKy t. ,. p., d 1, -g- 
. .10 20 11 . 11 ý, 1. 
R. Iatlý Significanc. 
ProJect Attributes - MarketablHty 
"; It, f( pptydp.!. fl - 
f a 00 
0.494 
0,72ý 7 
11 10 030 040 0 !, 0 060 0/0 0 flo 0ý CIO 
Ftmletlý Significance Index 
External Environment Attributes 
Exti Envt AsAtributes 
- FWaticaffLoaallMeaulat-ory regime 
Abilityll I'mig, to MPMiltl -11191 0ý306 
C I, w regul-lo - on fomign -OWSNP Of PM t-y 0.400 
ý-Il-tusl pl, p-y Ilght I1-. 506 
0,713 All-pwtypolitice uppo, tfa, tl-pNlo --g, y tI 
st=lity, f tr- P'Istiew 'y- 0.727 
P, Nl, ,.,., pt, bilRy, f th, PPP philo-, hy .20.739 
E. t. bli. t-d i-itutio-I ýd p, 11,. yf-m-ý, 0, P PP 
0.747 




11 W, I., () .0 070 1180 
External Envt Attributes - Socio-Economic 
Attributes 
Availability of traditional projects 2. 
Potential for future equity purchase in FPP pjts 
M, 
" 
Perceived future ecommic uncertaintiesM 682 
Strong public/private sector relationships 
Maturity of the financial trarkets; o. n 
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Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of Consortium Attributes - Civil Eng Projects 
Project Type: Roads, Rail, Flood Defences, Waste Water and Sanitation Treatment, and Bridge* 
project ID 
project ID 44 37 30 22 20 18 43 36 26 24 16 10 4 
respondent pr Pu Pr pr pu pu pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
project type rdt so rdt rdt rdtn rdt rit fid fid w/s rlt w/s rlt 
Aftributes 
Nature and Strength 
CS1 Previous experience In PPP procurement. 
CS2 Reputation enjoyed by the consortium. 
CS3 PPP being a strategic business interest 
CS4 Ability to Us equity Into the project for a long period. 
CS5 Readiness to accept risk. 
CS6 Opentfrank communication during the negotiations. 
CS7 Willingness to commit to earlier negotiated terms. 
CS8 Current job holding of consortium members. 
CS9 Appointing a dedicated bid manager 
CS10 Ability to understand what the public sector wants. 
CS1 1 Ability of consortium members to work harmoniously. 
CS12 Experience of previously working together as a team 
CS13 Taking proactive role In Initiating the project. 
cs14 Ability to obtain planning permission timeously. 
CS15 Early Involvement of other stakeholders 
CS16 Personal attributes of the champion within the consortium. 
CS17 Ability to persevere during protracted negotiations. 
CS18 The multidisciplinary nature of consortium team. 
CS19 Experience of previously working with the public sector procurer. 
Isub Imain 
0.717 
4 2 2 5 4 5 3 4 3 3 4 5 5 0.754 
3 4 5 5 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 0.631 
4 2 5 5 1 4 4 3 3 2 5 1 4 0.662 
4 3 1 5 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 5 0.708 
5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 0.938 
4 5 5 5 4 3 5 3 5 4 4 2 5 0.831 
3 4 5 5 4 3 5 2 4 1 3 2 5 0.708 
4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 3 1 4 0.523 
4 4 5 5 4 6 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 0.908 
5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 1 4 0.831 
4 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 3 5 3 5 0.846 
4 4 5 5 2 1 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 0.662 
3 3 5 2 4 3 3 1 2 1 3 1 4 0.538 
3 1 1 1 4 2 4 2 2 5 2 1 4 0.492 
4 4 5 5 3 5 4 2 3 3 4 3 4 0.754 
3 3 5 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 5 3 5 0.723 
5 4 4 5 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 0.815 
5 3 4 5 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 0.646 
5 3 4 5 4 1 2 1 4 3 4 3 4 0.662 
76 66 79 86 66 64 67 58 64 57 73 48 82 
Quality of Tochnical Proposal 0.765 
CH Robustness of outline technical proposal. 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 3 0.831 
Ct2 Clarity of submissions and responses to queries 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 2 4 5 3 0.846 
Ct3 Innovative technical solutions. 4 4 5 5 3 2 4 3 4 1 3 3 3 0.677 
Ct4 Provision of sound technical guarantee. 4 3 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 1 3 4 3 0.708 
18 16 20 20 14 14 15 16 16 7 15 16 12 
Quality of the Financial Proposal 0.672 
Cfl Level of financial guarantees provided/proposed by the consortium. 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 4 4 0.769 
Cf2 Payment mechanisms proposed 4 3 5 5 2 5 5 4 4 1 4 4 4 0.769 
CM Level of government funding/guarantees required by the consortium. 4 2 3 5 3 5 4 2 2 1 4 2 4 0.631 
d4 Levels of tariff/tolls proposed 5 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 0.892 
Cf5 Credibility of financiers 5 5 5 5 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 4 4 0.815 
Cf6 Level of exposure of the public sector organisation to financial risks 5 3 1 5 4 4 4 4 3 1 5 5 4 0.738 
Cf7 Level of financial returns to the public sector organisation. 4 3 1 5 2 3 4 1 2 1 3 1 4 0.523 
M Length of concession period proposed. 4 3 5 5 2 2 4 3 3 1 4 1 4 0.631 
M Level of third party revenue to be generated. 2 2 5 5 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 3 0.477 
CH 0 High Equity/debt ratio so as to drive commitment. 3 1 4 1 2 2 4 4 2 1 3 1 3 0.477 
40 28 39 46 27 34 41 32 27 17 39 29 38 
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General Rating of Consortium Attributes 
Pmjed Type: Hospitals 
project ID 50 49 40 38 33 31 29 19 15 13 12 321 
respondent pr pr pu pu pr pu pr pr pr pr pu pu pr pr 
project type h1th hith hith h1th h1th hith h1th tilth hith hith h1th hith hith hith 
Attributes isub 
Nature and Strength 
CSI Previous exporter" in PPP procurement. 
W Reputation enjoyed by the consorflum. 
CS3 PPP being a strategic business Interest 
C54 AbOlity, to tie equity Into the project for a long period. 
C55 Readiness to accept risk. 
CSIS Open&wk communication during the negotiations. 
CS7 Willingness to commit to earlier negotiated terms. 
CSS Current job holding of consortium mernbers. 
CS9 Appointing a dedicated bid mmager 
CS10 Abdity to understand what she public sector wants. 
CSI I Ability of consortium rnmbars to work harmoniously. 
W2 Expw*x* of previously working together as a team 
CS13 Taking promotive role In initiating the project. 
CS14 Ability to obtain planning permi"lon tinmeously. 
CS15 Ealy Involvernent of other stakeholders 
CS16 Personal attributes of the champion within the consorbum. 
CS17 Ability to persevere during protracted negotiations. 
CS18 The multidisciplinary nature of consortium team. 




















80 65 65 63 84 68 87 81 56 74 69 75 67 73 
Quality of Technical Proposal 
Cd Robustness of oughe technical proposal. 
Ct2 Clarity of submissions end responses to queries 
d3i innastive liechn" solutions. 
CW Provision of sound technical quarmtem. 
Quality of the Financial Proposal 
dI Level of financial guarantee* provided/proposed by the cwuKw*mn. 
cf2 Parrowl nwdwkwns proposed 
C(3 Level of goverment lundirWguerentess required by the consortim. 
d4 Levels of t"Aolls proposed 
CM Credibility of financiers 
Cfe Level of exposure of the public seclor organlostlon to Mancial risks 
Cf7 Level of Anancial returns to the public sector organisalion. 
Cf8 Length of concesvion period proposed. 
Cf9 Level of third party revenue to be generated. 






















Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of Consortium Attributes 
Project Type: Schools 
prolect ID 48 47 46 45 42 41 39 35 34 32 28 27 23 14 9865 
respondent pr pr pr pr pu pu pu pr pu pu pr pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
PrOjeCt tge ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach ach sch ach sch ach 
Attributes laub 
Nature and Strength 
CS1 Previous experience in PPP procurernem. 
cs2 Reputation eMoyed by it* consortium. 
CS3 PPP being a strategic business interest 
CS4 Ability to be equity into Me project for a long period. 
CS5 Readiness to accept risk. 
cs6 Openflnenk communication during ft negotiations. 
cs7 Willognmess to commit to serfler negotiated terms. 
CS8 Current job holding of consortium members. 
C89 Appointing a dedicated bid manager 
CSIO Ability to understand what the public Sector wante. 
CSI I Ability of consortium members to work harmoniously. 
CS12 Experience of previously working together as a team 
CS13 Taking prosictive role In initiating Me projed. 
cs14 Ability to obtain planning permission Urneously. 
cs15 Early InNoNsmant of other stakehoklent 
CSI 6 Personal attributes of the champion within the consortium. 
C817 Ability to persevere during protracted negotiations. 
CS1 8 The multidisciplinary nature of consortium team. 




















48 80 80 73 78 65 64 62 47 78 67 71 80 70 73 74 82 62 
Quality of Technical Proposal 
CH Robustness of oulline technical proposal. 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 0.767 
Ct2 C" of submissions and responses to queries 4 4 4 5 4 5 2 2 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 0.811 
ct3 Innovatift technical solutions. 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 11 1 4 5 3 4 3 3 5 3 3 0.600 
CM Provision of sound technical guarantee. 3 4 3 3 2 4 1 1 2 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 2 0.622 
15 16 14 15 12 14 7 5 113 16 17 15 17 17 15 17 14 13 
Quality of the Financial Proposal 
dl Level of financial guarantees provided/proposed by the consortium. 4 4 4 3 2 3 2 1 5 4 3 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 0.744 
Cf2 Payment mechanismii, proposed 4 4 2 3 2 5 1 1 5 5 3 4 4 5 3 5 4 3 0.700 
cf3 Level of government huxiing/guorantses required by Ow consortium. 3 4 3 4 2 5 1 1 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 2 0.622 
M Lev" of teriffholls proposed 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 0.867 
d5 Credibility of financiers 4 5 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 5 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 3 0.722 
Cf6 Leval of exposure of Vie public sector organklation to financial risks 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 3 5 5 3 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 0.756 
Cf7 Level of financial returns to the public sector organlastion. 3 3 2 5 1 3 1 1 1 3 4 2 5 4 4 1 3 1 0.522 
(18 Length of concession period proposed. 3 4 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 1 0.478 
Cf9 Level of third petty revenue to be generated. 2 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 4 3 3 1 2 1 0.411 
d1O High Equity/debt ratio so as to drive commitment. 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 3 1 4 3 2 4 1 3 4 2 2 0.479 





App-, & C. 3 
Model Validation - Consortium Attributes 
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. 19 E-Iýdp-uWviw"ýthvaýýWý 0.546 Is 0.0112 13 0.968 Is C. S57 
Qý. ft. fT. ft, AWft, e. W &723 2 97" 1 OL714 2 o", 2 
CtIl Rýdý. dftcimo.. L 0.700 2 0.1,11 2 OLT71 I OLM 2 
ad owwdt-ow-wo- CLOOD I as" I a757 2 011"1 1 
ct3 Out 4 0. 4 0.667 4 0.600 4 
C14 0.972 3 9709 3 Mir" 3 0.022 3 
am 3 Og, * 3 USX 3 &593 3 
art L- 1030 4 OL76S 3S saw 6 1744 3 
cf2 pi~ ý wqpý IL731 0709 35 4757 2 0.700 : 
c13 L" d Or- kdroIl- . oidbvW. - ILGO 4631 55 &U3 a 0.122 
cf4 Lýd., 00k-. d to" 1 0 me 1 0.743 3 OAST 1 
CM Q-. *Wrm- 176? 2 sale 2 OL 9 4 OLrJ2 4 
C f6 0.743 3 0.738 01900 1 0.756 2 
. 17 0.561 a 0.523 0,557 0 OLS22 7 
cra Lwalhfýpwadmea. " our 1 CA'" 05 &514 1 0.471 a5 
do Q-M" 0.493 40 1477 0 5 &129 as 0.411 10 
CrI a NO EQ., ~ -.. W= &4" a &477 9 5 &476 as 
rho 
ftb-AwW8%, ýaW-0 0 082 
ftýAwd a f. ýow~ 0 937 
ftýAw, d 0 WýW-Vh 0 OW 
a W-W11111h 0 937 " b= 
ow-14ý, Ih 0 740 
* 
ftb~CondDW-ý-4h 0 an 
rhocs . aws -00 - aw4fto 
ftb*-A*, d9ftr9~FWh Waa" 1000 hw" -"Pwwcpý 
ftbýAwaO11r"1yW4aI, *1ma" Owo 
ftb~AýDfbr, A*ydl. ý. ý. 1 000 
ft 0 wo 
ftbýsa, do WOARYOýW"" 1 0" 
ftb- c ýDftr*Mydlý. IýW I ODO 
rhoct. CLO33 
ft1a~Aý9%, wWv " W-awwww 0954 
ftb-. AWW '. forq.. Y. M. "ýW a on 
ftbý. AýOlbrq-y r &ýw P'W" 0 942 





at 0 005 (5%) 1. "1 of . 1orillIcarce Wth N-33, 
rho 0.449 
Sirce 0.675 Is Wooter Ilm O. "S He Is rol-Wil 
I- N. 33, rho .0 875 fro. ft stabotical tbloa shat%a set 
. v" as large w ft is sigriftert at p90 DOI level 
for. -W 140t). The " MAd roiwA No at a-0.001 
1". 
PLathor chock W. 9 Kmd. ft Co. M. 1ord of Concordance 
=k- I 
W- Kordall Cooftlort of Comarderc. flowl of swomert) 
k-iodievet. of. -M (-41 
H.,, as MW. 
h-(k - 1) +I ik 
We 0.900 
a-- F. -I --1 ý 
Wth N- 33 
-1 
Fror, stftd. W tobles m Wid dat EM 
0 115.95 
V, J, . dearve of froedm df vN-Ia 32 hn a probobAty of 
cowurrwco LgWor No of 
;40 001, Horce k am be corckdod 
wNh coriolderblit ý-* thim the Uk. Wvod of 0. swriploo 
cornkv from ft satire populadw Is hatior Van " be by cherce. 
The very low Probbdky under Ow, Its inowleted vAth 
6. observed yoke of IN mobloo w to MGM to Mill 
hypoduse dist the radrip, for ft as% we uirelated. 
-- i's occept dw Aw. " hvpodwls set the 






4i 4i ci G; ci ci ci 4i c; 4mi 0a 
v"*vvvvv*vvvý, 
ILI 






















HHOM - I'M 66d. d. 35.16.5 
. oft NOV. 
wv. VVVVR 
In awaa In a 
II 
11 





4 '03 0 0P- 
""""" 
N (I 0 
0. '0*! 
0.0 0 0 NP- 
ei ei ei NN 
ei Vi N ei fl! 
-. -.  
ei ei. Vi 
ei 0 ei ei ei 
N* ei 
". " ei Vi 
"". -. 
N Vi - In SO 





N fl). 3 -T 











Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of Public Sector Client Attributes 
Project Type: Civil Engineering (Roads, Rail, Flood Defences, Waste Water and Sanitation Treatment, and Bridges) 
project ID 
project ID 44 37 30 22 20 18 43 36 26 24 16 10 4 
respondent pr pu pr pr pu pu pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
projecttype rdt sit rdt rdt rdtA rdt rit fid fld w/s r1t w/s r1t 
Attributes Isub Imain 
OrganIsational Capabilities 0.749 
pol Ability to effectively sensitise public opinion on the project. 4 3 5 5 5 3 3 2 3 1 4 3 4 0.692 
P02 Level of reputation enjoyed by the organisation. 5 3 5 5 3 3 3 1 3 3 4 4 3 0.692 
P03 Level of bureaucracy in the decision making process. 3 4 2 5 4 3 5 4 4 2 4 4 4 0.738 
P04 Attitude to cost e. g. excessive desire to drive down cost 4 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 0.723 
P05 Top level commitment 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 4 0.877 
P06 Team collaboration and commitment 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 4 0.877 
P07 Open/frank and flexible communication during negotiations. 4 3 4 5 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 0.785 
P08 Pre-established PPP Unit 4 3 1 5 3 3 3 2 4 4 2 5 4 0.662 
P09 Assisting In land acquisition and In obtaining permits 5 1 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 4 0.754 
pol 0 Tapping knowledge and expertise gained elsewhere 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 4 0.723 
pol I Commitment to earlier negotiated terms 4 4 5 5 3 5 4 4 3 1 3 3 4 0.738 
P012 Ability to accept and absorb risks 4 3 5 5 3 5 4 2 3 4 3 2 4 0.723 
51 41 51 60 44 47 47 35 42 32 46 41 47 
Technical Capabilities 0.752 
ptl Strong in-house expertise 5 5 5 5 3 5 3 2 4 4 4 5 4 0.831 
pt2 Sound preparatory work 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 0.800 
pt3 Previous experience In PPP procurement 5 3 4 5 3 5 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 0.723 
pt4 Experience In Infrastructure procurement 5 3 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 0.754 
pt5 Clear established evaluation criteria 5 4 4 5 4 3 5 3 2 3 5 4 4 0.785 
pt6 Clear output specifications 2 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 0.862 
pt7 The use of standard bidding documents 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 0.708 
31 28 30 35 26 19 28 19 21 24 27 26 28 
Financial Capabilities 0.551 
PM Ability to raise funds through Bonds. 1 5 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 4 0.431 
pf2 Strong financial supporttguarantees from the central govt 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 1 2 4 4 0.738 
pf3 Flexible tax regimes. 1 3 4 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 4 0.446 
pf4 Ability to provide equity finance. 1 3 5 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 5 1 2 0.415 
pf5 Capability to pay 5 2 1 5 1 5 5 5 5 1 5 5 2 0.723 
13 IS 16 15 10 18 15 11 12 5 18 12 16 
273 
Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of Public Sector Attributes 
Project Type: Hospitals 
Aftrlbutes 
project ID 50 49 40 38 33 31 29 19 15 13 12 321 
respondent pr pr pu pu pr pu pr pr pr pr pu pu pr pr 
projecttype h1th hith hith hith hith h1th hith h1th hith hith hith hith hith hith 
Organisational Capabilities 
pol Ability to effectively sensitiss public opinion on the project. 
P02 Level of reputation enjoyed by the organisation. 
P03 Level of bureaucracy In the decision making process. 
P04 Affitude to cost e. g. excessive desire to drive down cost 
P05 Top level commitment 
P06 Team collaboration and commitment 
P07 Open/frank and flexible communication during negotiations. 
P08 Pre-established PPP Unit 
P09 Assisting In land acquisition and in obtaining permits 
Polo Tapping knoWedge and expertise gained elsewhere 
pol I Commitment to earlier negotiated terms 















52 40 42 41 44 49 54 48 43 46 40 45 43 50 
Technical Capabilities 0.727 
Pill Strong in-house expertise 5 5 2 4 5 1 5 3 5 3 4 3 4 4 0.757 
Pt2 Sound preparatory work 5 3 2 4 5 2 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 0.700 
PQ Previous experience In PPP procurement 4 4 2 4 4 1 5 4 4 3 5 2 5 4 0.729 
P14 Experience In Infrastructure procurement 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 4 2 3 3 4 5 4 0.686 
pts Clear established evaluation criteria 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 0.714 
Pt6 Clear output specifications 4 5 3 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 5 3 5 0.814 
Pt7 The use of standard bidding documents 4 3 4 2 5 3 3 4 4 5 2 1 5 3 0.686 
30 26 19 26 32 19 24 25 25 25 26 24 27 28 
Financial Capabilities 0.606 
PH Ability to raise funds through Bonds. 3 2 3 3 2 5 1 2 1 3 1 2 4 4 0.514 
Pf2 Strong financial support/guarantees from the central govt 4 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 1 3 1 5 4 4 0.700 
PQ Flexible tax regimes. 3 3 3 3 4 1 1 2 1 3 2 1 4 4 0.500 
PM Ability to provide equity finance. 4 1 4 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 5 1 3 0.486 
Pf5 Capability to pay 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 1 3 4 5 4 5 0.829 
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Appwwfx C. 3 
Model Valldatlon -Public Sector Attributes 
rath, 6ý11pjt. (A) 4- 49 nt1aq-d, *aaqpjtp(8j0-l3 
lcA r" I- r- leA r" I. - r- 1cb re* I- r- 1ý rab lmo rmo 
019. WAOGýW C0.10011.0.736 2 0.7447 2 0.759 1 0.707 2 
Pal 0.6116 9 0.692 los 0.743 7 a 6" 1 
po2 LmW6fMw&mwT*Adtyft*Vv-Wý 633 12 0 692 10 : : 614 12 0 579 11 
P. 3 747 45 . 0 738 6 . 757 56 . 0 722 4: 
Pea 0694 a 0723 643 11 0 a 6 : 
05 P 902 1 :1 943 I alf? 7 25 
P 06 ...... 065 2 0. 77 15 0 $43 3 C. "s 1 
P07 op-ftt "$ 3 0.741S 3 a $71 2 0.870 21 :. 
1 Poll pft_ý Lkil $37 1 0 AW 12 6.729 85 0589 io 
Poo Aes*&TMla, dý§MýMabft-Výft CAN 7 0.754 4 0700 10 : 156 a 
10 TýVý-Adg* &665 10 P 072 3 : . 129 : :: 567 12 
P:, 1 C-_ 0=... . 0.747 45 8 0.73 5 7ST 0 722 45 
1012 AbAV-Wa, dab-bM*. 0714 6 0723 8 0.771 4 0.678 7 
TIM 1 0.7" 1 0.715116 1 0727 2 9.724 1 
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P t5 Dow Imd 0.759 1 . 705 4 0.714 4 11.71 1 
Pis : *29 1 0 2 " 1 PI 1 4 1 *22 1 
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0.579 3 05500 3 0606 3 0.579 3 
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, f2 0.747 2 0.738 1 0.700 2 0833 11 
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ftý amD 0933 'ft. " 
ft b. - andod" 0766 eaok-cNpqeOe 
rhopo- 0.833 
ft a 927 
ft b. - "c d" . 642 
0 964 ftb-A. dD :: 
. Wc 0 721 -b- : 
ftbe- ,d DO. 0829 
ft a- C am Do. 0418 
rhopte, @J32 
0ab. -Aardilblik-leap"If 0 900 
ft. -Aand " do, . 900 
0872 "b. ~A"D :: 
ft awc 0 am = 
ft b. - andDd. 097 : 
. b. - "Do. 0 71 
rhoprov 0.801 
rho --d 0.808 
ato , 
005 (5%) lowl of sipiftonce with N-24, 
d, OC, iti;. 1 Itam otth. 1bal tabloo, Is 0.521 
ofte 0 6011 to g.. tr Vn 0 521 No In rejected 
p-0.001 
FWN -v -0 638 from " stati. 11-1 tbi- ohova that 24, d 
so large as ft 16 Significant at P40.001 b. 1 
(ýto1tnQ. T1vAw9@o%ddrqwtHo@t 0-0.001 
,., W. 
Foirther cheak esing Kondro Coofficlet of Coccomi-e 




Wa Kendal CoaffloW of Concordance (W4W of aq-t) 
it - Is V. Sale of making (- 4) 
c-a m- FJ± 
ýk 
IN -0 a5d 
again 
r_2 -1 
with N- 24 rX-72.78 7" . 
Fmivi statikal Ibloo vm find tat = Ej 79784 
vAth a dsme of -N-I- 23 has a pb. bhty of i 
a 001. Hav; * ft ". be cvickdd -no* under He of P 
with ". Nk. M-d of tM "mica 
can" from the cam poptgation Is Nghor ftn it wd be by chamo, 
The wry low pmbabiNV War ft No associated with 
Vw ob-d who of W enables W to mjoct the NA 
hypotimic that ft mlnp for . goto am unrelated. 
H-ev's Map( ft Memo" hype*. " that 1. 







































a., eia ei ei edNa eiei; 
na.,.. ei ei ein ein 
ei ei ei ei ei ei ei e ei eiN; 
ei- eiei eieiei ei 
aC C Vi -Nat ei ei N 
ei. eiei-eieiei--n 
"C ne aa ei. ei C; 
"C ne ei ae ei. ei ei; 
ei eine, a ei N ei eiei; 
ei ei ei ei ei ei ei ei ei na; 
nein ei e ei nein nn 
"ae Nan ei ei a ei ei 
"a ei a Nein eieiei ei 
ei ei ei ei a en ei ei ei ei 
en., - ei ei ei C ei ei ei 
V, nna-eieinn-.. 
ei ei eiei ei ei ei ei 
a ei ted a ei e ei ca -; 
cc Ca ei a ei ei eCC 
"CCCCC ei C ei ei - 
ei ei eieine e ei ei ein 
aa ei a ei ei ei ei a ei ei; 
C ei ei ei ei CC ei ei Ca 
ei ei ei C ei ei a ne ei ei? 
ei eine ei ei eace ei 
ei ei ei ei ei ei ei cane 
ei -a ei - ei e nein ei 
eieiC.... 
. aeie. ei ca. ee 
na en. a.. C ei 
" ei e ei a na. a- ei; 
"a ei ei nein. ei ei ei 
ei. eeCe ei e ei ei ei 
a ei en ei a ei an ei ei; 
ei ei Ca eine ei e ei ei; 
e eiCC ei *e ei a at; 
C ei ei ei eieieie C ei; 
C ei ei ei N ei C ei CNN 
"e ei ein ei ei C ei ei ei 
ei ei ei a eine ei e Ca; 
ei.. ei e ein e ei earn; 
eiceie ei ei C ei ei. ei; 
ii, ei a ei eieieit aa-; 
eine...... t ei. ei; 
ei ei tt eiein ei ei e 
" ei a ei C ei ei. ei ei C 
e ei. aa ei a ei ne ei; 
ei ei ne ei ei ein ei ei C 










.. " ". S 
0 
!z 16 5-= 
. vr 
Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of Project Attributes 
Project Type: Civil Engineering (Roads, Rail, Flood Defences, Waste Water and Sanitation Treatment, and Bridges) 
project ID 
project ID 44 37 30 22 20 18 43 36 26 24 16 10 4 
respondent pr pu pr pr pu pu pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
project type rdt sti rdt rdt rdtA rdt ot fid fid w/s rlt w/s rlt 
Attributes 
Nature of Project 
pnl Size and complexity 
pn2 Amenability to Innovation. 
pn3 Project risk management 
pn4 Impact of project on the environment. 
pn5 Need for a third party to improve existing Infrastructure. 
pn6 Health and safety provoked by the projects development. 
pn7 Level of design completion required at tender. 
pn8 Ability of project to respond to future changes. 
pn9 Project location and site conditions. 
pn1O Uniqueness of project. 
pnl 1 Effect on existing public sector staff 
Marketability of Project 
PIT11 Suitability for private participation. 
PM2 Level to which project must meet general public needs. 
PM3 Possible land and property deals and buyouts. 
PM4 Useful life at the end of concession period. 
PM5 Bankability of project 
PM6 Monopolistic advantage 
PM7 Ability of project to generate third party revenue. 
PM8 Opportunities for future refinancing 
PIT19 Potential for property development rights 
PIT110 Level of tariffs and tolls. 
Isub [main 
0.657 
4 4 5 5 2 4 4 5 3 5 3 5 3 0.800 
3 3 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 1 3 3 3 0.692 
3 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 0.785 
3 2 5 5 4 4 4 2 5 1 3 1 3 0.646 
2 3 4 5 1 5 3 1 1 2 3 2 3 0.538 
2 3 5 5 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 0.600 
2 3 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 0.631 
2 3 5 5 2 5 4 3 4 2 4 5 2 0.708 
2 3 5 5 3 4 4 1 5 1 3 2 3 0.631 
2 5 5 5 2 2 3 1 5 1 2 5 3 0.631 
2 5 5 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 1 3 0.569 
27 38 54 53 31 43 41 27 38 24 31 32 31 
5 5 5 5 3 4 5 4 3 4 3 5 3 0.831 
5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 1 3 0.815 
4 4 5 3 5 3 3 3 1 1 2 4 3 0.631 
4 5 1 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 0.738 
5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 3 0.877 
2 4 5 5 2 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 3 0.631 
2 2 5 3 1 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 0.446 
3 3 5 3 1 3 3 2 3 1 2 4 3 0.554 
3 1 5 3 1 4 2 1 1 1 2 3 3 0.462 
5 1 5 5 5 3 4 5 2 3 4 4 3 0.754 
38 33 46 42 30 36 36 31 23 28 31 34 30 
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Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of project Attributes 
Project Type: Hospitals 
project ID 50 49 40 38 33 31 29 19 15 13 12 3 2 1 
respondent pr pr Pu pu pr pu pr pr pr pr pu pu pr pr 
project type hith hith h1th hIth h1th hith hith hIth h1th h1th h1th hIth h1th h1th 
Attributes Isub 
Nature of Project 
pril Size and complexity 4 2 4 4 3 5 6 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 0.800 
pn2 Amenability to Innovation. 3 2 3 3 5 2 3 4 1 3 4 3 1 3 0.571 
pn3 Project risk management 5 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 4 0.714 
pn4 Impact of project on the environment. 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 4 4 3 2 3 2 4 0.614 
pn5 Need for a third party to Improve existing Infrastructure. 4 3 3 4 3 1 3 5 2 3 2 2 2 3 0.571 
pn6 Health and safety provoked by the projecfs development. 4 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 4 0.557 
pn7 Level of design completion required at tender. 4 2 3 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 0.800 
pn8 Ability of project to respond to future changes. 3 3 3 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 0.829 
pn9 Project location and site conditions. 3 2 3 2 3 5 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 0.657 
pn10 Uniqueness of project. 3 2 4 2 4 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 4 3 0.629 
prill Effect on existing public sector staff 4 4 3 4 4 5 1 5 3 3 2 2 3 4 0.671 
41 30 36 35 43 39 35 43 36 42 33 34 31 41 
Marketability of Project 
PM1 Suitability for private participation. 4 4 5 4 5 3 3 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 0.843 
PM2 Level to which project must meet general public needs. 4 2 5 4 3 5 2 5 1 4 4 5 3 4 0.729 
PM3 Possible land and property deals and buyouts. 3 4 4 3 4 2 5 4 2 3 2 1 2 3 0.600 
PM4 Useful life at the end of concession period. 4 2 5 4 3 1 1 4 2 3 3 4 1 4 0.586 
PM5 Bankability of project 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 0.957 
PM6 Monopolistic advantage 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 4 3 2 1 2 4 0.529 
PM7 Ability of project to generate third party revenue. 3 2 4 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2 1 2 2 0.457 
PM8 Opportunities for future refinancing 4 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 0.543 
PM9 Potential for property development rights 3 3 4 4 3 1 1 3 2 3 3 1 2 2 0.500 
PM10 Level of tariffs and tolls. 4 3 4 4 3 5 3 2 4 3 4 5 5 4 0.757 





Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of project Attributes 
Pr*J*d Type: Schýls 
project ID 48 47 46 45 42 41 39 35 34 32 28 27 23 14 9865 
respondent pr pr pr pr pu pu pu pr pu pu pr pu pr pr pu Pu pr pu 
project type sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch sch 
Attributes Isub Imaln 
Nature of Project 0.664 
pril Size and complexity 2354454553254334430.756 
pn2 Amenability to Innovation. 3343233213325334430.600 
pn3 Project risk management 4442443435335534440.756 
pn4 Impact of project on the environment, 3242334153445334320.644 
pn5 Need for a third party to Improve existing Infreaftucturs. 3242344113353254330.611 
pn6 Health and safety provoked by the projeds developmerL 2342332153334344330.611 
pn7 Level of design completion required at tender. 4353344443434243340.71111 
pn8 Ability of project to respond to future changes. 3344443434355334330.722 
pni) Project location and eke conditions. 4253344453443353440.744 
pn1O Uniqueness of project. 5222154123434333430.600 
prill Effect an existing public sector staff 32323 11 4424533221410.5" 
36 29 44 29 33 40 39 31 36 37 38 40 45 32 38 38 39 33 
Marketability of Project 
PMI Suitability for private participation. 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 5 2 0.811 
PM2 Level to which project mist meet general public needs. 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 1 5 4 3 5 5 3 5 5 3 4 0.744 
PM3 Possible land and property deals and! buyoiats. 2 2 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 3 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 0.622 
prn4 Useful We at the and of concession period. 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 5 3 3 0.656 
PM5 Bsr*abflity of project 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 1 4 5 4 0.844 
pme Monopolistic advantage 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 4 1 3 3 3 2 3 1 0.511 
PM7 Ability of project to generate third party reverim. 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 0.433 
PM8 Opporhmities, for hAm romancing 2 4 5 3 3 3 3 1 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 2 0.611 
PM9 Potential for property developrnarA rights 2 3 5 4 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 0.456 
PM110 L" of tariffs and tolls, 2 3 4 4 5 5 2 1 5 3 2 5 3 2 4 4 5 11 0.667 
23 33 43 35 32 37 29 24 31 36 32 31 36 29 29 36 34 22 
0.636 
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AppwWix C. 3 
Model Validation - Pr*ctAttributes 
rating-elipjh; (A) ft - 49 r. dq. - cM"gpr. (0) n- 13 raiingaftchmpkelpits(C)n-14 rating. for whisplis (D) ft - 18 
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p. 3 9 3T 631 ." too 
2 
5 0.622 6 
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Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of External Environment Attributes - Civil Eng. Prjts 
Project Type: Roads, Rail, Flood Defences, Waste Water and Sanitation Treatmentand Bridges 
project ID 
project ID 44 37 30 22 20 18 43 36 26 24 16 10 4 
respondent pr pu pr pr pu pu pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
project type rdt so rdt rdt rdw rdt rit fid fid w/s rlt w/s rit 
Aftributes 
Soclo-Economic 
esl Availability of traditional projects. 
eS2 Maturity of the financial markets. 
eS3 Perceived future economic uncertainties 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase in PPP projects 
es5 Strong public/private sector relationships. 
[sub Imain 
0.677 
2 4 4 5 5 4 2 2 3 1 3 3 4 0.646 
4 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 2 1 3 3 4 0.708 
3 4 5 5 3 4 3 4 2 1 3 3 3 0.662 
4 3 5 5 2 5 2 2 3 1 3 3 5 0.662 
4 1 5 5 3 4 5 3 4 2 3 3 4 0.708 
17 16 24 25 17 22 15 14 14 6 15 15 20 
Politlcat/Legal/Regulatory regIme 
epl Public acceptability of the PPP/Privata Finance philosophy. 
eP2 Stability of the political system. 
eP3 Level of all-party political support for the philosophy. 
ell Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 
e12 Ability of foreign Investors to repatriate earnings. 
e13 Clearly defined legislation on foreign ownership of property 
e14 Clearly defined legislation on Intellectual property rights. 
e15 Clearly established Institutional and policy frameworks on PPP/PFI 
5 3 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 1 4 1 4 0.738 
5 5 5 5 2 4 3 4 3 3 4 1 3 0.723 
5 5 5 5 2 4 4 3 3 1 5 1 3 0.708 
4 4 2 5 4 4 3 5 3 3 4 3 3 0.7231 
2 1 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 0.3846 
2 2 2 5 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 4 0.4154 
2 3 4 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 0.5077 
5 4 4 5 3 3 4 5 2 3 5 2 4 0.7538 
30 27 29 40 21 27 24 24 17 14 27 14 28 
283 
0.619 
Appendix C. 3 
General Rating of exti environment Attributes 
Project Type: Hospitals 
project ID 50 49 40 38 33 31 29 19 15 13 12 321 
respondent pr pr pu pu pr pu pr pr pr pr pu pu pr pr 
projecttype hith hith h1th hith h1th h1th h1th hith hith h1th hith h1th hith h1th 
Attributes 
Soclo-Economic 
esi Availability of traditional projects. 
eS2 Maturity of the financial markets. 
eS3 Perceived future economic uncertainties 
es4 Potential for future equity purchase In PPP projects 
es5 Strong public/private sector relationships. 
Political/Legal/ftgulatory, regime 
epl Public acceptability of the PPP/Privale Finance philosophy. 
eP2 Stability of the political system. 
eP3 Level of all-party political support for the philosophy. 
ell Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 
Q Ability of foreign Investors to repatriate earnings. 
e13 Clearly defined legislation on foreign ownership of property 
e14 Clearly defined legislation on Intellectual property rights. 


















33 24 30 24 31 19 25 27 27 29 17 25 26 27 
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Appendix C. 3 
Attributes 
SIM104conomic 
OSI Availability of tradlitionall projects. 
e62 Maturity of the financial morkaft. 
053 Perceived Future economic uncertainties 
OS4 Potenbal for future equity purchase in PPP projects 
OSS Strong pubiWprlvam sector relationships. 
General Rating of exit environment Attributes 
Pmject Typo: Schools 
PrOjed ID 48 47 46 45 42 41 39 35 34 32 28 27 23 14 9065 
respondent pr pr pr pr pu pu pu pr PU PU pr pu pr pr pu pu pr pu 
projed tm ach sch offi NA ach ach sch se ach MA Och sch sch ge ach ach ach ach 
Political/Legalflitegulatoiry regime 
epl Public acceptability of " PPP/Private Finance philosophy, 
SP2 Stability of Ow political system. 
SP3 L" of all-party, poliWW support for to philosophy. 
oil Clearly defined planning and regulatory frameworks. 
012 Ability of foreign Irwestors to repatriate sanifts, 
e13 Clearly defined legislation on foreign ownership of property 
e14 Clearly defined legislation on Intellectual property rights. 
915 Clearly established inaftbonsl and policy frameworits on PPPIPFI 
Isub Imain 
0.638 
3 3 4 3 5 3 1 1 5 3 2 2 4 2 4 3 1 1 0.556 
3 5 5 4 4 3 2 4 5 4 4 2 5 3 4 3 2 2 0.711 
2 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 5 5 4 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 0.678 
2 3 5 3 1 3 2 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 4 0.578 
3 A 4 4 5 3 4 3 1 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 4 0.667 




















OP2 ? ýnd- 




ModW Voldedon - ExftmmlEnvkvnm*ntAddbufts 
MW"IPIN (A) A- 49 mOnp cMiangpnls (8) rl - 13 mdng. for hoWtlpjt. (C) m- 14 d. g. W wNpjlo (D) n- 16 
I- r- I- r- I- r- I- r- I- r- I- r- I- r- I- r- 
9673 2 0977 1 0.720 1 can i 
$406 6 0 G" 5 0629 5 0116 5 
V35 1 5 ' " 1 0 0 2 . "I I 
0 662 3 62 3 . 6 1 0 0 3 097 2 
0 1" 4 lu 31, 0 $43 . 0 57: 4 










3 osie 2 0.650 2 0734 2 0757 26 
4723 35 4786 1 
0708 6 0757 25 
0723 36 0714 5 
oms 6 0443 76 
0413 7 0443 76 
0504 6 0571 6 
0.7S4 1 0.729 4 
0590 a SBS 3 
a 667 5 












st 0 05 1" ofucnkwce WWI N-13. thoomicil 
04" 
WM 0 NO a WO&W fQn 0 464 He a rMaNd 
040001 
0.806 
Fa N- 13. rhý -0 606 &M to 2wftvcd loba &ý* to 
a VOA a IN- a to a ac"Acart at 0(0 0011" 
fwww two Tr: " coud relat No st am0.001 
I" 




W- Kor40 CDAMM of CDMWMMO AUM 09 
HWM "w- 
W- com 
- EI ý wlhN-13 M 41017 
FrwII etoftle41 1. Nft » kX1 tM =. E] 41017 
ýetrew 0400go«0001 
C«a lem e» ý pop"W 0 NOW rffl IR VA be IN Cn«» 
The my IM grobiMlv UNIV ft Wo ý»d WIM 
u». b. @IV. dý"Ofwwww. m ID Mt Vw MLO 
11.011. Ih. r. riwm mt V» -M tm ffll"a 
HgIme m =IINN ew «W-»M FwormII ein ft 




















ýo C14 Oo 
.5a CO N CD 
(D C14 00 
MI. 
'IT Cl) M 
IT LO 
. r_ ý: r -'T C-) 
(Dr) C') "T C-) 
C-4 zT 
Q) CY) Cn (Y) 
C-) C') CY) 
CY) (14 'IT 
Cl) Cl) CY) 









-0 6- o2o 











. C: -0 V) 
mU 0) 
0) M 








a) =3 0 
C: =3 a) 0 
C: cc V) 











Appendix D: Statistical computations for testing the perceptual 
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Testing of hypotheals 3: agrearrent between the private and public sectors - Project Attributes 
overall rating ma 49 priva te sector rating m- 26 public sector rating Ra 24 
1.0 raa I- r~ I" raut, 1~ r~ 1., b raut, I- r~ 
Attributes 
N. %-. fprot 0.665 1 0.671 1 0.6511 1 
prill S. W4, -V 0.708 1 0.776 15 0.800 1 
pn2 A-MV 0 VMM. 0.824 75 0.648 a 0.400 7.5 
Pn3 ftl. Mk 0.759 2.5 0.760 3 0.758 2 
pn4 l., P. Jr W"I . r. --.. * 0.633 a 0.644 65 0.400 7.5 
pn5 NnCIPWAIMPOVID' pe 0.543 11 0.5" 11 0.563 95 
Frill 0.584 95 0.540 10 0.608 a 
pn7 0.702 4 0.720 4 0.683 5 
pnS Ab1IlV*1WqmIWrWw4. hejeaharQm 0.759 25 0.776 1.5 0.742 3 
pn9 0.094 5 0.672 5 0.717 4 
pniO 0.624 7.5 0.6" 65 0.583 9.5 
prill EffWt. mamrqpýbft-w. R 0.584 95 0.900 9 0.597 11 
M. rk. t. WKy .1 Pr%. t 0.454 2 0.653 2 0.659 2 
p"V1 Sumtawlerptaboanopes. 0.824 2 0.856 2 0.792 3 
LeA 0~ WWI -. 1 ~ prena W-M M. 0 0.755 3 0.664 4 0.850 2 
P-bo. WKI .4 pr. P. V 014111 W byuw 0.637 a 0.432 5 0.442 6 
PM4 U-KO Ift 0 1- -4 .1 om- Wod 0.061 5 0.4108 6 0.717 5 
Wra S. *. mV. IVqe: n 0.890 1 0.904 1 0.975 1 
PrIle M-. P. MC edentg. 0.539 8 0.5114 a OA92 a 
PW AbMV of MWI % WW*W tend PWW nIanum OA53 10 OA64 10 OA42 10 
pra Opmouns. for eve k-" 0.584 7 0.392 7 0.575 7 
" P. WdMF*rV. PIIV&AkPnWAghW OA94 9 0.534 6 OASO 9 
PRTIO 0.722 4 0.680 3 0.750 4 
rho 
rhommetwumc for mbx* of project -0.888 
rhog, nnetwofte for nurketabilty . 0.861 1&&' "lei% -ignincenc. InClIx for ft ab-601bum 
rhosvpn, w. pAIo. W. mr -0.875 ma-ranievolre"481" 
I-rWW-iQn1I1CSnC*WKIWOIft-Wft" 
r-- n~v f Ine . in amribumI; 
At 0.005 levell of III grilkance W th N-21. 
thoentical fromstabellcall tables is 0.556 
-Sncs -0.875 Is lemer Vmn . 0.556 No In reimted 
For Na 21, rhoav a 0.875 Ilrom Ine stakkal tablea shows 
that 8 value of large as he is signiftent at p40.001 level 
(On"ll W114 Thus wecouldrejactMo at a-0 . 001 1". 
Further check using Kandall's Coefficient of Cancordamd, 








Wa Kendall's Coofilclent of Concordance Coval of agreement) 
k- is ft sale of mridng (- 2) [, *. -, (k 7 1) ýI ED 
Ik 
W-0.930 
again rZ2 -I 
rk(-N--I-)Wl 
YAth N- 21 
r- -1 
x-2-- 37.500 
Fromstabodcoll hibles wo And that 37.500 
Wth a df -N-Ia 20 has a probability of occurrence under 
HO of 0.0011 <V<0.011. Home It can be concluded vAth considerable 
assurance ftt the agreement between ft publIc and private 
Is Nglw ftn It wAN be by chance. 
The very Im probability under the Ho associated vAth 
Vw observed vahm of W enables us to reject the null 
hypoftsis Illat the ratings for Vw sole are unrelated. 
Hance we accept Iwe alternative hypollosio, Vmt Ow 
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Testing of hypothesis 3: agreement between the private and public sectors - External Environawnt Attrfbutes 
*ýNrstl. l a -49 pl-t-otorrati. 8 ft - 23 Puboo -Ior MU. 1 a- 24 
O. W3 1 0.404 1 0.052 1 
-1 AýVf ýý W-0.4 . Soo 5 0.592 5 O. GS& 4 
-2 M"V. Imk. *M-. w 
: 
. 733 1 6.700 Is 0.706 1 





, , 3 
: 
S. 's 1 5 
.: 722 2 0 760 1a 0: 083 25 
0.623 2 0.650 2 0.595 2 
091 Pk6ft -~Volft PPPP*ý Fkwm 0**WV 6.730 3 776 1 0.700 4 
"2 8ýsvfmpdý. wý 0.727 1 
:. 
736 TIT 3 
1.3 L". 1~vPd". Wýbr-oW.. Wv 0.718 5 0.752 083 6 
.1 G. Isi 1 0.768 2 733 2 
012 AbilVGfbr44gml-*ý"mmffmW 0.398 6 0.440 75 0.350 a 
o13 . 400 7 0.440 75 0.358 7 
014 
: 
. 509 6 &. 534 6 0.473 6 
015 CýV=ý-ý", WytýmPPPPFJ 0.747 2 0.752 35 0.742 1 
rho 
rftom, okmýo for qoclýmonomlc 0.703 
rbophw, pow fw poNUcaMegWroptiatory mgkm 0.038 
rho&vpriwtopubw-uttr. 0.820 
FwN 1 13, th- - 0.820 from to stadeftal tb" It- lht 
e wk. " 12,9* " We b 04w"nt It p40.001 ww 
(ýtd tnt). MR. .. ackild reoct No It 0.001 
Wei. 
Further chock mine Kendaft Coefficient of COWGOrdfim- 




W8 KmdmN Coefficient of Concordance (loval of agnaorment) 
k- to the vat. of rarking (- 2) 
We 0910 
Spain 
with N- 13 
rx-2--l 21.845 
Fnonn otoUtical tables we And hot rm Q 21.845 
With a df aN-Ia 12 has a probability of coewme undw 
No of p40 05 Hwvýo N can be conckided with ol"alderable 
- M, - VWt 1* 89-11.11 between 1. Pbllc and princts 
ill Nghw than It WE be by chance. 
The vary low pnobobillty, widw the No associated with 
" -býd vsko of W onablea W to retool line MIN 
11YIP-Plasic Smit V* M11.96 (W the .. to ora unraWled. 
Hance We accoPt the altem. tim hypollmole Imt lho 
monp are related. 
NGtot 
s_a. 
qwilr. of. st. ft1biS 
Sm.,.. . 4. t. SIkm.. Wfl. SI. mSn. fl, N. 
cm.,.. 
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Appendix D 
Testing of hypothesis 3: agreement between the private and public sectors - Main Components 
overallratlng(A)n-49 prlvatesectorrating(B)n-24 publicsectorrating)C)n-25 
Components lýP rýP lýP rýP lýP rýp 
CO CaorUm At"et» 0.653 2 0.632 1.5 0.675 2 
PS& 0.657 1 0.632 1.5 0.683 1 
pa p,. Ja Attrrut" 0.568 3 0.584 3 0.592 3 
Oeß UMM. 1 9. W«ýt Attlbt- 0A14 4 0A88 4 0.342 4 
Note& 
rho 
rho(ptvataAwic) 0.949 rýpý, mnkmg af Sm min conip-ts 
thw.. p. -Is mnk -1.6- C-ffid-t 
For N-4, rhopfvmpwj, - 0, M from the statistical tables shows that 
& value as large as this 13 significant at 0.25 ý- p )- 0.10 level 
tons-talt test). Thus we could reject Ho at az0.25 
level. 
Further check using Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance 
From the relationship 
FkW 71 
where 
IN - Kendall Coefficient of Concordance Veyel of agreement) 
Ar - Is the sets of ranking (- 2) 
_ 
lrhoav(k-l)+l 
Hence F =-I 
W-0.974 
again Fx-27ý 
wlthN-4 Fx 72= 6.846 
Fmm statistical tables we nnd that = E] 6.846 
with a df -N-I-3 has a probability of occurrence under 
Ho of 0.20 ý, p>0.10. Hence N can be concluded with considerable 
assurance that there Is fair amount of agreement between the Public and private 
Is higher than It will be by chance. 
The very low probability under the Ho associated with 
the observed value of W enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the ratings for the sets are unrelated. 
Hance we accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
ratings am related. 
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